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This thesis investigates the emergence in human evolution of 
communication through symbols, or conventional, arbitrary signs. 
Previous work has argued that symbolic speech was preceded by 
communication through nonarbitrary signs, but how vocal symbolic 
communication arose out of this has not been extensively studied.  
Thus far, past research has emphasized the advantages of vocal 
symbols and pointed to communicative and evolutionary pressures that 
would have spurred their development. 
 
Based on semiotic principles, I examine emergence in terms of two 
factors underlying symbols: interpretation and conventionalization.  I 
address the question with a consideration of embodied human 
experience – that is, accounting for the particular features that 
characterize human communication.  This involves simultaneous 
expression through vocal and gestural modalities, each of which has 
distinct semiotic properties and serves distinct functions in language 
today.  I examine research on emerging sign systems together with 
research on properties of human communication to address the 
question of symbol emergence in terms of the specific context of 
human evolution. 
 
I argue that, instead of in response to pressures for improved 
communication, symbolic vocalizations could have emerged through 
blind cultural processes out of the conditions of multimodal 
nonarbitrary communication in place prior to modern language.  
Vocalizations would have been interpreted as arbitrary by virtue of 
their semiotic profile relative to that of gesture, and arbitrary 
vocalizations could have become conventionalized via the 
communicative support of nonarbitrary gestures.  This scenario avoids 
appealing to improbable evolutionary and psychological processes and 
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provides a comprehensive and evolutionarily sound explanation for 
symbol emergence. 
 
I present experiments that test hypotheses stemming from this claim.  I 
show that novel arbitrary vocal forms are interpreted and adopted as 
symbols even when these are uninformative and gesture is the primary 
mode of communication.  I also present computational models that 
simulate multi-channel, heterosemiotic communication like that of 
arbitrary speech and nonarbitrary gesture.  These demonstrate that 
information like that provided by gesture can enable the 
conventionalization of symbols across a population.  The results from 
experiments and simulations together support the claim that symbolic 
communication could arise naturally from multimodal nonarbitrary 
communication, offering an explanation for symbol emergence more 
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This thesis investigates the emergence of symbolic communication in human 
evolutionary history.  A major step in the evolutionary process by which symbolic 
communication could have emerged has been proposed in the bodily mimesis 
hypothesis (Donald, 1991; Donald, 1998; Zlatev, Persson & Gärdenfors, 2005; Zlatev, 
2007, 2008).  The bodily mimesis hypothesis holds that prior to modern, symbolic 
language, humans evolved the ability to communicate through mimesis, or 
sensorimotor-based iconic and indexical signs.  This ability provides a foundation 
from which symbolic communication could arise, but how such a transition would 
have taken place has not been fully examined.  This thesis examines the gap between 
bodily mimesis and symbolic communication and aims to explain how that transition 
occurred.  Thus, it will address the emergence of symbols from non-symbolic signs in 
human evolution. 
 
The central question of this thesis is one about symbols, about human experience and 
about evolution.  An investigation must therefore address all of these issues 
simultaneously and consider potential interactions.  Each aspect of the question brings 
a set of ideas and constraints from its respective discipline that should be utilized and 
accounted for in the larger explanation.  The present inquiry will interpret evidence 
and evaluate the validity of potential explanations guided by these factors.  
 
The issue of human experience requires a consideration of the particular features of 
embodied human communication – that is, communication between beings with 
certain anatomical, cognitive and social attributes, as well as certain communicative 
demands. A recent multidisciplinary movement, broadly referred to as embodiment, 
recognizes the need to take into consideration the complexities and idiosyncrasies of 
lived experienced when attempting to understand a behavior or ability of an organism.  
An embodied perspective is necessary for both properly formulating a research 
question as well as identifying potential explanatory avenues for reaching an answer.  
Taking this perspective is crucial because it removes the question of this thesis from 
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the abstract and situates it in a specific context with a unique and causally relevant set 
of interacting forces. 
 
The issue of evolution requires a consideration of evolutionary theory.  Typically, 
evolution follows certain general patterns and principles, which can speak to the 
plausibility of a given scenario or outcome arising through evolutionary processes. 
These principles make it possible to assess the probability that certain events or series 
of events occurred in human evolution, and thereby formulate a viable evolutionary 
scenario for the emergence of symbols. 
 
The issue of symbols requires a consideration of the nature of signs.  Though signs as 
representational devices may at first seem straightforward and simple, capturing the 
relationship between form and meaning carried in a sign is more complex and 
conceptually nuanced than may appear on the surface.  We can therefore carefully 
consider ideas from semiotics, which tell us how symbols are used to communicate 
and how to identify them.  These principles are necessary for both evaluating research 
on symbols as well as formulating new hypotheses about their emergence. 
 
This chapter will lay the explanatory framework that will guide this thesis.  First, it 
will address the three aspects identified above: i) embodiment philosophy, ii) 
evolutionary principles and iii) the issue of symbolism itself.  The ideas presented in 
this chapter will allow us to interpret evidence, evaluate the validity of potential 
explanations and formulate new solutions.  Following that it will review the bodily 
mimesis hypothesis, which will serve as the theoretical backdrop from which this 
thesis will proceed.  Finally, it will provide a brief overview of the research examined 




Embodiment theory represents not one single discipline but an approach to explaining 
cognitive and physical phenomena that spans a number of disciplines.  This section 
will give a brief overview of the central ideas behind the movement and then discuss 
how the perspective can inform this thesis. 
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1.1 Background and theory 
 
Embodiment has its roots in the work of philosophers Edmond Husserl (1931, 1960), 
who examined the structure of experience and consciousness, and Maurice Merleau-
Ponty (1962, 1963), who recognized the inextricable relationship between self and 
world and explored the nature and implications of this relationship.  Building upon 
these ideas, Varela, Thompson & Rosch (1990) first proposed embodiment as a 
scientific framework.  They argue that it is not possible to abstract away from 
embodied existence – encompassing bodily experiences, external cultural artifacts and 
social history – in trying to understand human abilities because it is precisely from 
these that behaviors and skills arise.  That is, more generally, the specific physical, 
anatomical and social conditions of an organism and its environment are causally 
relevant to understanding the origin and underlying operations of its behaviors and 
abilities. 
 
These ideas were later extended under what is called the enactive approach, which 
highlights the fact that a being’s biological properties shape its experience in a very 
direct sense (Noë, 2004; Noë & O’Regan, 2001).  This approach focuses on how the 
nature of our bodies determines how we act in and experience the world, and through 
these experiences our more sophisticated and complex behavioral and cognitive 
repertoires are built.  The enactive position holds that it is both useful and necessary 
to consider the explanatory potential of lower-level, body-based factors in order to 
formulate an accurate understanding of how the abilities in these repertoires work.  
From this perspective, then, the most distinctive and remarkable abilities exhibited in 
human behavior may be explained in large part by looking to our embodied 
experience and the sorts of tools and scaffolding a rich physical and social world 
provides. 
 
An embodied approach has proved theoretically fruitful and helped to solve 
notoriously difficult problems in cognitive science.  The following section will 
describe examples that illustrate how embodiment, beyond providing a more realistic 




1.2 Embodiment as a solution (not a problem) 
 
Adequately considering the context in which human abilities arise does not merely 
result in a more valid description of the object under investigation.  Doing so can 
serve simultaneously to discover solutions to seemingly intractable problems.  As A. 
Clark (1997) notes, ‘for many problems there is an elegant, often computationally and 
representationally low-cost solution that makes the most of gross physical properties 
of bodily platform and location situation’ (pg. 205). 
 
A. Clark (2008) cites as an example the fact that roboticists and engineers have spent 
substantial time and energy attempting to design and program robots to walk fluidly 
and flexibly.  Though some success has been attained through the classical approach 
of engineering joints and programming movement sequences, such designs are far 
from energy efficient and do not cope well with novel environments.  Designs that 
more closely resemble genuine human walking (in both appearance and energy 
requirements) are ones that make use of ‘passive dynamics’.  These designs exploit 
mechanical couplings between properties of the walking mechanism and the 
environment in which movement takes place.  Power and motion are driven by the 
effects of gravity on the structure and weight of a design, mirroring human skeletal 
mechanics.  This paradigm suggests that human-like locomotion can in large part be 
attributed to basic morphology (Collins, Wisse & Ruina, 2001; cited in A. Clark, 
2008).  In other words, the supposed computationally elaborate and complex act of 
walking may in fact simply ‘fall out from’ the physical relationship between 
anatomical features of the human body and its environment of movement. 
 
Another example demonstrates how task-oriented skills can arise through the 
interaction between simple learning mechanisms and activity in the physical world.  
A. Clark (1997) describes a robot that was assigned the goal of collecting discarded 
soda cans in a busy laboratory – a task that required navigating a dynamic 
environment and identifying and collecting objects of interest.  Though far beyond the 
scope of any contemporary classically programmed design, this goal was achieved by 
outfitting the robot with low-level ‘sensory’ systems to explore its environment and 
building in the potential for emergent coordination between these systems.  The 
environment itself provided the structure and knowledge needed for success via the 
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robot’s ability to sense and move within it.  This research demonstrates that 
sophisticated behaviors can arise through simple mechanisms exploiting potential 
structuring that comes along with environmental input gained through active 
exploration. 
 
Noë’s (2004) in-depth exploration of the visual system also illustrates the principle 
that an embodied perspective is necessary and useful for understanding our abilities.  
The traditional view of visual perception conceived of the process as computations 
within the brain on stored internal representations of the environment, which in 
practice would entail vast amounts of storage for these representations and extensive, 
complex computations carried out on them.  In contrast, Noë argues that if we 
consider the perceiver as a whole – an embodied animal that can interact with and 
gain information from its environment – a solution becomes available that makes 
more sense in terms of engineering and evolutionary constraints.  That is, because the 
environment is immediately available to an active, embodied perceiver, the supposed 
role of internal representations can in large part be off-loaded on to that perceiver’s 
ability to flexibly engage the environment to acquire the information needed at the 
time of seeing. Noë’s approach provides a more comprehensive explanation of how 
vision operates, is computationally efficient, and is consistent with research on how 
visual perception is affected under various atypical experimental conditions.  It is by 
integrating factors related to embodied experience – the kinds of bodies perceivers 
possess and the ways in which they act in the world – that this solution becomes 
available. 
 
Finally, Thompson (2007) addresses the notoriously problematic concept of 
consciousness from the perspective of embodiment philosophy.  He draws parallels 
between the way all living organisms derive meaning from the world through sensory 
explorations in the quest to survive and the similar relationship between mind and 
world.  Thompson notes that self-sustaining beings, even at the level of single cells, 
are entities consisting of a dynamic relationship between their bodies and the world, 
and the nature of those bodies determines what in the world is meaningful to those 
beings.  In the same vein, consciousness can be understood as dynamic interactions 
between beings with certain bodily and cognitive attributes and the environment – 
physical and social – in which they sense and act.  By conceiving of consciousness 
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and mind as things that are carried out by whole, embodied beings in their 
environments – as opposed to internal to the brain – Thompson demystifies the 
concept of consciousness and lays a solid foundation for further understanding how it 
emerges. 
 
1.3 Summary and discussion 
 
The ideas and research reviewed here demonstrate the importance of accounting for 
lived experience in investigations of human traits.  First and foremost, doing so 
ensures the object of investigation is comprehensively and accurately characterized, 
which is a prerequisite for understanding its origin and development.  In addition, 
however, this approach often leads to the incorporation of factors that can in 
themselves inform an explanation.  Thus, accounting for the particular features of 
situated organisms in their natural contexts is vital for an investigation of symbolic 
communication as it is practiced by humans. 
 
Aspects of embodied experience are often thought of as ‘messy’ distracters that can 
be abstracted away.  While this strategy may be useful and necessary depending on 
the level of analysis one takes as a starting point, the robotics research reviewed 
above shows we should not disregard the explanatory potential of context and 
embodied factors.  Indeed, when the topic of inquiry is something as context-
sensitive, interactive and dynamic as human communication, the embodied 
perspective becomes especially relevant. 
 
The examples described above focus on how sensorimotor skills and interaction in the 
world construct higher cognitive skills in an individual.  While symbolic 
communication is a trait that transcends the individual and exists on the cultural level, 
it is ultimately enacted, and presumably constructed, by the actions of individual, 
embodied humans.  Thus, despite the second-order nature of our question the 
principles of embodiment are still applicable and relevant and should therefore be 
incorporated into the present investigation. 
 
Some points that warrant brief mention concern ambiguities surrounding the notion of 
‘embodiment’.  The word is often blanketly used to refer to what are in fact distinct 
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concepts, though these are of course related.  For example, Wilson (2002) analyses 
theories concerning ‘embodied cognition’ and claims that six different categories of 
ideas are argued for under the same term.  Embodiment can be used to talk about 
organisms on a biological, experiential or social level – or a combination of two or 
more of those levels.  This subject of this thesis encompasses all three of these levels, 
as it focuses on the physiological features with which humans communicate, how 
communicative acts are perceived and how those are shared culturally.  For present 
purposes, the notion of embodiment in these senses will be employed to accurately 
characterize communication as it is accomplished by humans, which will lay the 
explanatory groundwork for investigating the evolution of symbolic communication. 
 
Another ambiguity in terminology to address is that surrounding the concept of 
‘multimodality’.  Multimodality can refer to three different meanings: i) the 
combination of multiple sensory modalities, like auditory and visual communication; 
ii) the combination of multiple channels of communication, like gesture and text; and 
iii) the combination of different semiotic media, like spoken language and music.  A 
given instance of multimodality can include more than one of these senses, but one 
does not necessarily entail another.  For example, in theory communication could take 
place simultaneously through sign language and written language (imagine if a deaf 
signer were giving a presentation using slides with text), in which case the second 
sense holds but not the first.  Similarly, song involves two different semiotic resources 
– language and music – but not two different modalities.  To clarify the notion of 
multimodality in this thesis, we can note that it encompasses the first and second 
meanings, as it examines communication through two different channels that 
correspond to two different sensory modalities – vocal and gestural. 
 
 
Based on the ideas from embodiment theory presented here, the question of symbol 
emergence can be framed in terms of the particular anatomical, perceptual and social 
factors characteristic of human experience.  Specifically, it requires an examination of 
human communication in action and the modalities through which meaning is 
expressed.  These factors will influence semiotic issues regarding sign use (discussed 
below in section 3), and taking an embodiment perspective therefore makes it possible 
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to address properly the question of symbol emergence in the context of human 
evolution. 
 
2. Evolutionary theory 
 
Research on evolution in various disciplines has established that certain principles 
typically govern evolutionary trajectories.  These basic principles can therefore be 
used to evaluate the viability of hypothetical scenarios in human evolution proposed 
to explain the emergence of symbolic communication.  This section will review these 




The principle of parsimony is based on the idea that evolution typically works as a 
minimalist, with change being rare and taking place through the simplest and fewest 
available routes as possible (Sterelny & Griffiths, 1999).  Thus, given equal evidence 
for two or more possible evolutionary scenarios, the one that involves the fewest 
transitions is the sequence with the greatest likelihood of reflecting the actual course 
of events.  In other words, overly complicated scenarios involving events that are not 
strictly necessary to reach the known end state violate the principle of parsimony and 





Continuity is related to parsimony, in that new traits tend to be built upon existing 
ones as opposed to constructed from scratch.  This is because co-opting and tweaking 
precedents requires fewer and more minor changes than creating entirely new 
structures to perform the same function.  The concept of continuity also emphasizes 
the contingency-based nature of evolution (Gould, 1996).  Evolutionary trajectories 
are contingent on the previous evolutionary history of an organism (Sterelny & 
Griffiths, 1999), meaning the current state of an organism limits and determines 
possible future avenues through which evolutionary change can occur.  Continuity is 
based on the fact that an organism’s particular physical and social characteristics 
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select which features of the environment are relevant to it and thereby guide and 
constrain evolutionary outcomes (Thompson, 2007).  Thus, when evaluating or 
formulating scenarios, it is important to consider how traits that are known or 
presumed to be already in place could give rise to the trait under investigation. 
 
2.3 Biological and cultural evolution 
 
Thus far this discussion has spoken of evolution in a general sense; however, the issue 
in question here in fact involves two kinds of evolution: biological and cultural.  The 
relative roles of biological and cultural evolution in leading to human symbolic 
communication as it exists today will be addressed in later chapters.  For now it is 
only necessary to discuss their dynamics generally, which will provide the framework 
for assessing potential evolutionary explanations. 
 
Biological and cultural evolution are separate – although highly interdependent 
(Richerson & Boyd, 2005) – processes that operate on distinct levels and targets.  
Broadly, the materials of biological evolution are genes and physical traits, while that 
of cultural evolution are cultural artifacts like tools, words and ideas.  Biological 
evolution takes place typically on a timescale of many generations, while cultural 
evolution proceeds much more rapidly, with many changes often occurring in the 
lifetime of an individual.  Despite these core differences, there is strong evidence that 
the two share deep similarities in their dynamics and processes of change (Boyd & 
Richerson, 1985; Cavalli-Sforza & Feldman, 1981; Mesoudi & Whiten, 2008). 
 
An axiom of biological evolution is that it is not directed, meaning the sources that 
provide the raw material for natural selection are blind to their effects on the fitness of 
an organism.  In other words, genes can only produce random variation, from which 
advantageous traits are selected and retained by way of the reproductive success of 
the organism carrying those genes.  Thus, the fact that a given change would be 
advantageous does not increase the likelihood of its appearance and is not in itself a 
reason for a trait to arise.  This critical idea is deceptive in its simplicity and can be 
difficult to apply, and as such is frequently violated in evolutionary theorizing.  As 
Gould and Lewontin (1979) and later Gould (1989) have described, many proposed 
evolutionary scenarios fall prey to a tendency to equate current utility with reasons of 
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origin.  That is, theories often carry an implicit assumption that evolution inevitably 
leads to progressively more complex and sophisticated traits and behaviors – in other 
words, that evolution is inherently directed.  However, because the mechanisms of 
biological change are blind, progress is not guaranteed, and stasis is in fact the norm, 




There are some reasons to caution making a direct analogy to cultural evolution 
concerning the idea of directed change.  In contrast to biological evolution, variation 
in cultural evolution is generated by intentional beings with goals, needs and desires, 
and selection stems from the psychological and social features of cultural transmitters 
themselves.  As such, it is possible to argue that innovation from the insight of those 
transmitters results in a more directed process, with more advantageous strategies or 
artifacts arising than sheer random variation would predict.  However, the extent to 
which cultural evolution is directed in this sense is contested, as cultural change can 
often resemble the ‘blind’ processes of biological evolution (Mesoudi, Whiten & 
Laland, 2006).  That is, improvements in cultural artifacts are frequently the result of 
copying errors or unintentional alterations that are only recognized as advancements 
after the fact and retained.  This indicates that evolutionary explanations that invoke 
insight into cultural advancements may not be the most likely or viable solutions.  In 
addition, studies on cultural processes involved in communication suggest that even 
non-directed cultural evolution can produce improved communication strategies.  A 
number of computational models and behavioral experiments demonstrate how 
‘blind’ cultural mechanisms involved in repeated transmission and learning can shape 
communicative systems to take on the appearance of ‘design’ for enhanced 
functionality (Batali, 1998; Kirby, 1999; Kirby, Cornish & Smith, 2008).  In these 
studies, low-level forces have amplified and unanticipated effects as a result of the 
complexity that arises out of many communicative interactions taking place over an 
extended period of time.  The emergent properties of such systems and processes are 
therefore a potential alternative source for more effective communicative strategies 
apart from intention-based forces. 
                                                
1
 Note that this position is not equivalent to or an adoption of Gould’s (1977) 
saltationist theory of evolution, which holds that evolutionary changes typically take 
place rapidly and in large steps.  The point being emphasized here is related to larger 
patterns of change – how frequently and for what reasons changes happen – not the 




The concept of parsimony is an important tool for any inquiry regarding evolution, 
and particularly for one attempting to understand the processes that resulted in a 
complex behavior like human symbolic communication.  This question has many 
interacting factors, and therefore many potential competing evolutionary explanations.  
With this principle in mind, however, we can rule out many hypothetical solutions 
and identify the most viable scenarios. 
 
The embodiment perspective discussed above bears directly on the issue of continuity.  
The particular anatomical, cognitive and social features of pre-symbolic 
communicators will in part determine how evolutionary processes could have 
operated to result in the emergence of symbolic communication.  Thus, it is critical in 
the present investigation to explore the communicative and evolutionary 
consequences of those features. 
 
This discussion of evolutionary theory highlights three primary principles with which 
this thesis aims to be consistent: parsimony, continuity and the avoidance of appeals 
to intentional forces.  These ideas will be used to evaluate existing theories and 
formulate new hypotheses in later Chapters.  
 
3. Signs and symbols 
 
This section will examine the nature of signs, or representations for communication, 
as they are understood in semiotics.  The concepts and principles of sign theory 
provide a framework for understanding the defining characteristics of symbols and 
how symbolic signs could arise from non-symbolic signs through communicative 
processes.  Different sign types will be described, and the key factors distinguishing 
symbols from other sign types will be identified.  These differences will be discussed 
in terms of implications for communication and emergence. 
 
Before discussing sign types, a brief terminological clarification is necessary.  The 
term ‘symbol’ is used for a variety of purposes with many different, often conflicting, 
meanings.  As it is used here, symbol refers to a sign – an intentional representation 
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for communication – with a particular form-meaning relationship (this relationship is 
described below) that is context-independent (can be displaced in time and space from 
its referent).  This is a distinct use of the term from a number of other contexts.  For 
example, one frequent meaning for symbol is ‘functional reference’ (Marler, Evans & 
Hauser, 1992).  Functional reference is used to describe certain animal alarm call 
systems.  However, such calls are not like the signs of interest here, as they are not 
used outside predator situations and therefore not context-independent.  A different 
use of the term symbol is Deacon’s (1997).  He conceived a complex network of 
interrelated signs wherein symbols refer to other symbols and the relationships 
between them, as opposed to referents in the world.  While one could argue that in 
order to exhibit the properties of symbols in language there must be some kind of 
association between symbols beyond associations for objects in the world.  However, 
for present purposes, it is not necessary to specify whether or how symbols relate to 
each other in these ways.  As this thesis is investigating the emergence of symbolic 
communication, it is not immediately relevant to account for or consider this more 
elaborated version of symbols; at present we are interested in individual symbols, not 
systems of symbols.  Finally, another frequent use of the term ‘symbol’ comes from 
cognitive science and refers to any representation that is manipulated in a 
computational process (Fodor, 1975; Zenon & Pylyshyn, 1980).  Symbols in this 
sense are not communicative signs – they are abstract units of mental content 
involved in subconscious cognitive operations.  As the present discussion is 
concerned with outward, embodied representation for communication, this cognitive 
science notion of symbol is not directly relevant. 
 
3.1 Signs and sign types 
 
A sign, in the most basic sense, is a form that carries meaning. Peirce (1931-1958) 
first categorized signs into three types: icons, indices and symbols.  These three types 
differ from each other in how a sign’s form relates to its meaning.  This section will 
describe what constitutes this relationship – a sign’s ground in Peircian terms – for 
each category of signs.  While the nature of signs and distinctions between sign types 
continues to be actively discussed in semiotics, some basic principles are well 
established and widely accepted.  This review and analysis will take the position, also 
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proposed by Peirce, that sign relationships involve the interpretations of sign users, 
implications for which will be elaborated on further in the following section.  
 
An icon is ‘a sign that is made to resemble, simulate or reproduce its referent in some 
way’ (Sebeok, 1994; pg. 10).  Iconic signs represent a referent by virtue of some 
aspect of our sensory experience of that referent; they are the ‘transformation of 
perception into representation’ (Danesi, 1999; pg. 33).  Iconicity, then, is 
representation based on similarities between features of a form and features of a 
meaning, which theoretically can occur in any of the visual, auditory, tactile and 
olfactory modalities.  Icons are frequently used in human communication, from 
pictures in instruction manuals to gestural pantomiming in the game charades to 
onomatopoeia in speech. 
 
Indexical signs are based on concrete physical, temporal or causal associations that 
occur in our experiences in the world.  The presence of one component of an index 
evokes awareness of the other.  For example, smoke is an index of fire, and thunder is 
an index of lightning.  Note, however, that the relationship between smoke and fire is 
not an instance of an indexical relationship between a sign and referent for 
communication.  The most common and prominent example of indexical 
representation in human communication is deictic pointing, which is based on 
physical location and division of space.  The typical pointing gesture involves a single 
digit extended toward an intended referent.  In this case, the direction of the digit 
indicates the direction of the referent in space and identifies it by guiding an 
interlocutor’s gaze to its location.  Pointing occurs when a referent is present, but it is 
also frequently used to represent an absent referent by indexing a previously occupied 
location or points in space assigned to different referents. 
 
Signs that make use of indexical relationships are ubiquitous in human 
communication, although these are typically built upon iconicity.  For example, 
interstate road signs in the United States use the image of a tent to indicate that 
campsites are present at a given exit.  The image itself depicts a tent, but the sign 
refers to spaces where visitors can set up tents or campers.  Thus, the sign represents 
campsites by resembling an object associated with campsites.  In this way, 
communicative indices make use of associations in our experiences by way of forms 
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that resemble one component of the indexical relationship.  This blending illustrates 
that signs may not be exclusively one type, a topic that will be addressed in the 
following section. 
 
In contrast to icons and indices, the forms of which bear a direct relationship to their 
referents, the relationship between form and meaning for symbols is arbitrary.  
Symbolic forms are connected to meanings without regard to resemblance in features 
or concrete association.  As a result, symbols represent their meanings through 
cultural convention, or a shared understanding between individuals that a given form 
stands for an agreed upon meaning.  While icons and indices can be and often are 
conventional, symbols must be conventional in order to serve as effective 
communicative devices.  That is, because the meaning of an arbitrary sign is not 
retrievable from features its form, successful communication via symbols requires 
that communicators possess the same knowledge that a form stands for a particular 
meaning. 
 
With the different representational relationships of the three sign categories in mind, it 
becomes apparent that icons and indices together comprise a more general category of 
nonarbitrary representation.  Nonarbitrary signs have a direct relationship between 
form and meaning – either through resemblance in form or concrete association.  In 
contrast, arbitrary signs, or symbols, have an indirect relationship that exists as a 
social agreement between communicators. 
 
3.1.1 Indices vs. symbols 
A closer consideration of the distinction between indices and symbols reveals it is 
somewhat less clear than the description presented above.  If an index is based on an 
experienced association between form and referent, it could be argued that signs 
otherwise generally agreed to be symbols are similarly characterized by reliable 
associations. 
 
The standard distinction rests on symbols’ referents not being concretely associated 
with their forms like indices are.  This reasoning is based on the fact that symbols 
may never be used at the same time that their referent is physically present, as one can 
learn about, say, zebras from others’ accounts and later talk about them without ever 
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having seen a zebra or even a picture of a zebra oneself.  While symbols may not 
involve a physical correlation in this way, their forms are nevertheless associated with 
their referents; the two do reliably co-occur, in that a word is used when 
communication is about its referent.  For example, the word ‘cat’ always occurs when 
the topic of discussion involves cats in some way, which is a kind of association 
between a form and a concept to which attention is directed.  In this sense, the 
relationship is not arbitrary, because the word and the communication about the 
concept reliably co-occur.  If we accept this as an association, then it becomes 
difficult to draw a clear line between indices and symbols. 
 
One way to reconcile this problem is by appealing to an important difference in the 
correlation between symbols with their referents and indices with theirs.  Although 
symbolic forms are associated with their referents, these co-occur only in the minds of 
communicators as they express and comprehend meaning conveyed through signs.  In 
other words, the association for symbols exists internally to the semiotic process itself 
and nowhere else.  Indexical relationships are exploited for communicative purposes 
only after they have been observed and reinforced in non-communicative experience 
in the world.  The connection between symbolic forms and their referents does not 
require nor seem to involve a process of reinforcement and co-option, as they are 
inherently communicative and immediately understood as signs.  The relationship 
between symbolic form and referent can be said to be arbitrary in a way that that of 
indices is not because the connection for symbols is interpretable only if we first 
assume that the form is being used as a sign.  The connection is inferred based on the 
perceived intent of another person to communicate a meaning with a form, not 
directly through our own independent experience in other contexts.  This is somewhat 
along the lines of Deacon’s (1997) conception of symbols, under which the 
connection between a new symbol and referent is established by reference to other 
symbols.  In this way, the distinction can be thought of as relying on direct, concrete 
association versus semiotic or indirect communicative association. 
 
The blurring of indices and symbols is also apparent in child language development.  
It may be the case that in the early stages of children’s acquisition of language their 
understanding of words is through indexical reference.  Much of what is 
communicated by and to children involves objects and events in the immediate 
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environment (Lust & Foley, 2004), which means the words they hear are concretely 
associated with their referents.  Eventually, however, children begin to learn words 
for and communicate about things beyond what is physically present.  Moreover, they 
do so after a single exposure to a word, without the need for repeated observations.  It 
is both intuitively appealing and theoretically useful to posit that at some point in this 
process the way children learn and interpret signs qualitatively shifts.  This shift can 
be captured by characterizing their later use of signs as symbolic. 
 
Although the distinction between indices and symbols may be more complicated and 
subtle than distinguishing either type from icons, it is theoretically useful to recognize 
the differences that do exist.  Doing so helps to understand the unique properties of 




This section has described sign categories in terms of forms and meanings.  However, 
in order to understand specific, individual signs, an additional element concerning a 
sign’s user(s) is required.  How these different relationships constitute a given sign 
involves an act of interpretation by a user, which is addressed in the following section. 
 
3.2 Sign interpretation 
 
A central notion in semiotics is the idea that forms do not intrinsically carry any 
meaning.  For a sign to represent something requires it to be interpreted as such 
(Sebeok, 1994; Eco, 1979).  Not only is that a sign carries meaning interpretation 
dependent, but how it does so is as well.  In this way, a sign’s meaning and status as 
an icon, index or symbol critically depends not on form alone, but on how that form is 
understood by users.  This issue involves nuances and questions that the discipline of 
semiotics continues to address; however, this thesis will take the context-dependent 
perspective of users as a foundational and guiding principle for conceptualizing 
symbols.  The present inquiry is concerned with a very specific sign system – words 
understood to be arbitrarily related to their meanings – created and communicated by 
very specific users – embodied human beings. The psychological and behavioral 
profile of users will affect how signs are perceived and used, which is a determinant 
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of sign type.  Thus, the interpretation of users in context is highly relevant from an 
embodiment perspective, and it is an essential tool for understanding how symbolic 
language emerged. 
 
The interpretive element of signs is especially apparent with symbols, as they bear no 
direct relationship to their referents and have no connection to their meanings outside 
knowledge in the minds of users who possess a conventional system with which to 
interpret them.  However, the same is nonetheless true for icons and indexes, as 
someone must recognize the resemblance or association between a sign and its 
referent.  This section will describe the interpretive processes underlying each sign 
type and discuss the implications of sign interpretation for understanding how forms 
could transition between nonarbitrary and arbitrary signs. 
 
For icons, interpretation is based on recognition of similarities between features of a 
sign’s form and features of its referent.  As a result of this inherently interpretive 
process, the number of iconic features appearing in a form functioning as an icon can 
vary greatly.  A given referent will have many different features, and an iconic 
representation may depict a few or many of these.  In many cases, fairly minimal and 
schematic iconic resemblance is sufficient for an iconic relationship to be perceived.  
Moreover, iconic representations can vary not just in how many features of a referent 
are included, but also which ones are depicted.  The particular set of features depicted 
can itself be meaningful and reflects the communicative demands of a given situation.  
Thus, the possible ways an icon represents its referent through particular 
combinations of salient features varies enormously and will depend on a number of 
factors, including why the sign is produced, who is producing it, the medium through 
which it is produced and the wider context of sign production.  It should also be noted 
that a prerequisite for understanding an iconic sign is familiarity with the referent 
itself.  Regardless of how many iconic features are present in a form and how 
elaborately depicted a referent is, without knowledge of the referent, those features 
cannot be perceived. 
 
For indices, interpretation is based on awareness of a correlation; a sign is indexical if 
an association is perceived between its form and referent.  As with icons, one must 
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have gained from experience knowledge of the correlation between the components of 
an index in order to interpret one as standing for the other.   
 
The critical role of interpretation is most obvious with symbols.  Unlike icons and 
indices, interpretation of symbols relies on cultural knowledge of mapping arbitrary 
forms to meanings.  Recognition in this sense comes from a socially shared awareness 
that a form stands for a meaning, regardless of how features of the form relate to 
features of the referent or whether the form and referent are reliably associated in 
experience.  Note that implicit in this knowledge is the assumption that the 
relationship between form and meaning holds for others as well, as it is a 
representation for communication. 
 
The differences between sign types in how forms relate to meanings, and by extension 
how they are interpreted, reveal another important distinction between symbols and 
nonarbitrary representations.  In addition to the requirement, shared with icons and 
indices, that to communicate with a sign its form must be perceived as representing 
meaning, symbolic communication involves another underlying factor: 
conventionalization.  Because the interpretation of a symbol is not knowable through 
any information contained in its form, effective communication via symbols demands 
that interlocutors share the same pre-established, arbitrary form-meaning mappings – 
they share the same interpretation of signs. 
 
Conventionalization is a functional consequence of – and prerequisite for – using 
arbitrary signs as communicative devices.  In this way, interpretation and 
conventionalization are not entirely independent. Interpretation is an individual-level 
phenomenon that feeds into conventionalization, a cultural-level phenomenon.  
Conventionalization of a symbol, thus conceived, is the cultural propagation of a 
certain interpretation of an arbitrary sign across a community of individuals.  While 
interpretation and conventionalization will both be present in an established symbolic 
communication system, the two factors become disconnected from one another in the 
conditions of novel symbols.  We can disregard as highly improbable that, without 
any previously established symbols, multiple people would spontaneously and 
simultaneously decide that the same form arbitrarily stands for the same meaning.  As 
such, we can assume novel symbols initially will exist only in the mind of a single 
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individual (how such interpretations might come to exist will be discussed below and 
addressed in regard to the focus of this thesis in later chapters).  Therefore, dissecting 
symbolic communication into the factors of interpretation and conventionalization 
becomes especially important when trying to understand the emergence of symbols.  
This issue will be discussed further in section 3.4 below. 
 
Finally, while conventionalization is necessary for symbols, it is by no means 
exclusive to symbols.  Nonarbitrary signs can and often are conventional, like the 
road sign example above.  The conventional aspect of symbols is emphasized here 
because symbols are obligatorily conventional, while nonarbitrary signs are not.  
Thus, an explanation for symbols must account for this factor. 
 
3.2.1 Sign type blending 
A consequence worth noting of interpretation is that the categories of icon, index and 
symbol are not mutually exclusive (Keller, 1998).  The case of modern Chinese 
characters demonstrates this point.  Some characters originated as iconic pictorial 
signs, but their forms were altered substantially over time.  Most current users are not 
aware of the signs’ development and understand them to be arbitrary and symbolic.  
In contrast, others who have studied their histories know the original and intermediary 
forms and can therefore recognize surviving iconic features, when they exist, even if 
very little of the earlier form remains.  In this way, a character may be iconic to one 
user while purely symbolic and arbitrary to another who does not share the relevant 
historical knowledge.  This example illustrates how a single form’s representational 
status can differ between users as a function of the different knowledge and 
experience those users possess.  As a result, form alone cannot unambiguously 
indicate how a sign represents meaning. 
 
In addition, the layering of iconicity and indexicality in signs discussed above (section 
3.1) reveals that sign types are not mutually exclusive for an individual interpreting a 
single form.  A sign may refer by way of both iconic and indexical features, making it 
neither purely an icon nor index, though wholly nonarbitrary.  This intra-sign, intra-
individual blending of sign type would seem to be possible only for nonarbitrary 
signs.  If, under the perspective adopted here, the distinguishing characteristic of 
symbols is an arbitrary relationship between form and meaning, then a sign that is 
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symbolic cannot involve iconicity or indexicality.  However, it is possible for 
individuals to hold idiosyncratic nonarbitrary perceptions of forms used as symbols 
by the majority of a communicating population while not assuming that others share 
that perception.  For instance, if in learning a second language a person acquires a 
new word by perceiving it to ‘sound like’ its referent and uses that iconicity to 
remember the word’s meaning, that person’s interpretation of the sign relies on 
nonarbitrary properties.  That same person also likely understands that others do not 
use the word in the same way, and in communicating with it this person assumes the 
word is functioning symbolically (though their understanding is unlikely explicit or 
thought of in these terms).  Thus, a single form may be understood as both 
nonarbitrary and symbolic for an individual, but only as a result of a divergence 
between their subjective interpretation and others’ assumed interpretations of the sign.  
The blending of nonarbitrary and symbolic sign type, then, is unlike that of 
nonarbitrary blends.  While the latter exists in a single interpretation of a form, the 
former makes reference to two separate interpretations of the same form. 
 
The possibility for sign type blending reveals that sign categories are ideal types of 
signs in theory, but in practice many actual signs embody a combination of 
representational qualities – an issue considered in Peirce’s (1931-1958) work.  In this 
way, a sign that is considered symbolic may in fact not have a fully arbitrary 
interpretation by all users.  However, if that sign is used and understood by virtue of 
convention and not by means of any shared nonarbitrary perceptions in its form, this 
indicates the sign can be considered a symbol.  In this way, a sign’s interpretations 
across individual users may not be consistently or purely arbitrary, but the lack of 
consistent and robust nonarbitrary interpretations to enable comprehension without 
convention renders it effectively arbitrary.  It is thus in this necessary dependence on 
convention sense that we can conceive of symbols as ‘arbitrary’. 
 
One final note worth addressing on interpretation and sign types is Sonesson’s (1997) 
proposed distinction between primary and secondary iconicity.  In these terms, 
primary iconicity is when a form is understood to be an iconic sign because it is 
perceived to resemble a particular meaning.  Secondary iconicity is when a form is 
perceived to resemble a particular meaning after it is understood to be a sign by way 
of cultural learning.  In other words, some signs may be perceived as iconic only after 
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the connection between form and meaning is first established through convention.  
Note that the realization of secondary iconicity is only a possibility.  That is, it is not 
guaranteed that or necessary for the iconic relationship to be perceived, as the sign 
can be understood through convention alone and still used effectively in 
communication.  In cases of secondary iconicity, then, it may be that some users 
perceive a sign as iconic while others do so as symbolic.  The implications of this will 
be discussed further in section 3.2.3 below. 
 
3.2.2 Context-specificity 
The interpretive nature of signs entails both that i) any form – that is, any entity or 
object in the world in any modality – is potentially a sign, and ii) a single form can 
potentially function as many different signs of each type depending on how perceivers 
interpret its connection to particular meanings. The factor that distinguishes non-
representational objects – be they sounds, images, whole objects or any other form – 
from signs is the fact that signs are forms that are interpreted as meaningful by certain 
individuals.  Similarly, the factor that distinguishes whether a given form is 
functioning as an icon, index or symbol is how the form is perceived to relate to its 
meaning by certain individuals.  How a form is perceived by particular 
communicators using a sign in a particular context is a function of those users’ shared 
knowledge and experience – related to the concepts of common ground (H.H. Clark, 
1996) and relevance theory (Sperber & Wilson, 1987).  Sign users will share a 
physical, social, cultural and/or interactional history in which the sign’s form-meaning 
relationship has been established, which bestows them with a shared awareness of that 
relationship and allows them to communicate successfully with the sign.  As such, 
separate contexts with users who have correspondingly different knowledge and 
experience can yield different sign relationships for the same form.  Distinct contexts 
resulting in unique and independent sign interpretations can range from a single, 
temporally bound conversation between two people to an entire culture across 
centuries. 
 
An illustration will help to demonstrate that a sign’s status as an icon, index or symbol 
critically depends on how it is perceived by particular users.  As an example of how 
one form can vary between sign types and meanings depending on context, consider 
the image in Figure 1.1.  This form could iconically depict a number of referents, but 
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for present purposes we can pick an immediately obvious interpretation and imagine 
that it might be used to represent cats’ whiskers.  In this case, it would be an iconic 
sign, as features of the form directly depict features of the referent.  In addition, as it 
may be evocative of cats in general for most people familiar with feline creatures, we 
can imagine that it could be used to represent something associated with cats, like a 
litter box.  In this context, the sign would be an index (by way of iconicity for the 
associated concept); the form would be perceived as resembling whiskers, which are a 
part of cats, which use litter boxes.  Furthermore, it is conceivable that, perhaps in the 
interest of secrecy, the image could be used as a symbol by an intelligence 
organization to represent something arbitrarily, like the now-convicted underground 
international nuclear arms trader Viktor Bout.
2
  The context-internal, unique histories 
and awareness shared by users in each of these hypothetical situations is what allows 






Figure 1.1. A form that in the hypothetical situations described functions 
independently as an icon for whiskers, an index for litter box or a symbol for 
Viktor Bout depending upon its users and context. 
 
 
In the first case, in which the sign is iconic, it is recognized as resembling the referent 
itself, which is possible due to knowledge and experience of cats and their whiskers.  
In the case of the index, the resemblance in form is also recognized and similarly 
dependent on knowledge of cats, but a further step is made to an associated concept, 
which requires additional knowledge about cats and their use of litter boxes.  Finally, 
the symbolic sign is understood not by any recognition of corresponding features 
between form and referent or by experiencing their co-occurrence, but only by users’ 
shared knowledge that the image stands for ‘Viktor Bout’ in the community of their 
organization.  The crucial point revealed by these hypothetical situations is that the 
                                                
2
 I have made this third hypothetical situation involve the intentional creation of an 
arbitrary sign for illustrative purposes; however, evidence discussed later in this thesis 
indicates deliberate invention of symbols such as this is atypical. 
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key determinant of sign type in each scenario is the interpretation of the sign’s users.  
The referent changes while the form remains constant, and this change in referent is 
due to different users communicating with a sign for different purposes.  Moreover, 
the change in referent corresponds to a change in how form relates to meaning, which 
also resides in the perceptions of sign users.  This demonstrates the fact that a sign is 
not merely a form connected to a meaning, but a form connected to a meaning by a 
perceiver (Sebeok, 1994).  A sign, therefore, has three components: a form, a referent 
and a user.
3
  It follows that the meaning and semiotic status of a given sign cannot be 
identified without reference to the user, as the relationship between form and meaning 
that determines that status exists in the user’s interpretation of the sign. 
 
It is important to note that it is not possible to know with certainty how signs are 
interpreted by users in the contexts described above by looking at the form and the 
referent in each case and trying to discern objectively the connection between the two.  
In the iconic and indexical case, seeming resemblance between form and referent or 
an associated concept is suggestive evidence that the form is nonarbitrary, though it is 
possible that the same form could be used to represent the same referent in a different 
context by others who, for a number of possible reasons, do not recognize the 
resemblance and/or correlation.  Thus, this type of evidence is insufficient to reliably 
determine signs are icons and indices.  In the case of the symbol, objectively 
establishing that the form arbitrarily represents its referent becomes even more 
difficult.  For instance, with knowledge of the referent, we might suspect, and cannot 
rule out, that the form is meant to depict Bout’s characteristic mustache.  Or it could 
be intended to resemble the explosion of a bomb, a concept associated with Bout’s 
business dealings.  In the case of all sign types, then, without knowing how a sign’s 
users perceive its form, we cannot determine with certainty if they are using it as an 
icon, index or symbol. 
 
One final point on an objective approach to discerning sign type is that doing so 
becomes more difficult the simpler and more abstract a form is.  Somewhat 
                                                
3
 The ground mentioned previously is also sometimes included as part of a sign (for 
example in Ahlner & Zlatev, 2010).  As the connection between form and meaning 
ultimately resides in the user, including the interpreter is sufficient for present 
purposes. 
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counterintuitively, the more schematic a form, the more potentially iconic it is.  This 
is especially true for distinguishing icons from arbitrary symbols, as humans perceive 
resemblance in instances where only slight similarities exist, as evidenced by the 
common activity of looking for shapes of objects in clouds or the tendency to see 
images of religious figures in various artifacts that were not intentionally designed to 
depict specific images (for example, the burn patterns in a piece of toast).  When a 
form contains one or only a few features, those isolated features can be mapped onto 
similar features of many different and widely varying referents, which may not on the 
surface be perceived as resembling each other but happen to have that one particular 
feature in common.  The absence of additional features means there is nothing to 
conflict with potential referents’ many other features.  Due to this high match-ability, 
together with humans’ tendency to seek out and perceive iconicity, it is extremely 
difficult to rule out that a sign with a minimal form is not interpreted as iconic in 
some way by some of its users. 
 
3.2.3 Sign type transition 
An additional consequence of interpretive processes defining signs is that, at least as 
observed in modern human communication, changes in sign type for a given form can 
occur simply through the use of a sign over time (Keller, 1998).  In the same way that 
a form can be iconic for one individual and symbolic for another in independent 
contexts, this asymmetry can also arise within a communicative exchange when one 
individual does not perceive the intended iconicity of a sign and interprets the form as 
arbitrary and symbolic.  If and how semiotic transitions occur will depend on the 
perceptual and social features of sign users, the number of dimensions in which forms 
resemble their meanings (when nonarbitrary), the number of channels through which 
forms are expressed, and the medium(s) in which forms are expressed, among other 
factors, and therefore should be considered in relation to the specific conditions of a 
given communicative context. The process by which imperfect communication 
through nonarbitrary signs could result in symbols will be examined in more detail in 
Chapters 2 and 3.  For now, the point of interest is that, for purposes of investigating 
the emergence of symbols from nonarbitrary signs, it is useful to conceive of symbols 
in the negative: Interpreting a form as symbolic can simply involve not perceiving 
iconic or indexical features.  Taking this perspective is key to understanding research 
that will be presented in Chapter 2 and the arguments put forward later in this thesis. 
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The next section will briefly discuss implications and other issues related to different 
sign types. 
 
3.3 Comparison and implications 
 
In what ways do icons and indices differ from symbols beyond those related to 
interpretations of signs described above?  The different relationships between form 
and meaning also have communicative and cognitive implications.  This section will 
review these implications and discuss how they relate to the question of the 
emergence of symbolic communication. 
 
3.3.1 Nonarbitrariness 
Nonarbitrary representations have communicative advantages by virtue of the direct 
relationship between form and meaning.  The perception of iconic and indexical 
features is based on knowledge that naturally arises out of our experience observing 
and acting in the world, which means that knowledge will be largely shared across 
individuals simply as a consequence of encountering similar objects and events.  As a 
result, icons and indices can, at least potentially, be interpreted directly through this 
common sensorimotor and associational knowledge without the need for an agreed 
upon and learned conventional system.  As symbols are arbitrary, they are 
disadvantaged in this sense.  Because specific cultural knowledge must be acquired in 
order to understand symbolic signs, they cannot be used to communicate unless both 
parties share that knowledge.  This point is exemplified by the fact that speakers of 
different languages who cannot understand each other’s speech can nevertheless 
communicate, to some degree, through pantomime. 
 
Another advantage of having an immediate connection to our sensory systems appears 
to be an increase in memory for communicated information when that communication 
includes nonarbitrary representations.  When speech is accompanied by iconic and 
indexical gestures – as frequently occurs in natural communication – more 
information from the overall message communicated by the two modalities is 
remembered (Beattie & Shovelton, 1999; Feyerseisen, 2006; Kelly, Barr, Church & 
Lynch, 1999; Kelly, McDevitt & Esch, 2009; the multimodal nature of language will 
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be explored in depth in Chapter 3).  It may be that because nonarbitrary 
representations like gestures directly engage our sensorimotor knowledge and capture 
rich aspects of our experience, they provide an evocative mode of expression that is 
especially powerful and perceptually salient.  In this way, nonarbitrary signs seem to 
be expressive in a manner that is particularly compelling to our senses. 
 
3.3.2 Arbitrariness 
While the arbitrariness of symbols may not have the same expressive and mnemonic 
effects, it does appear to have benefits of its own.  In a computational modeling study, 
Gasser (2004) demonstrates that arbitrary signals are a superior signaling strategy 
when communication involves many and related meanings.  Assuming some pressure 
for economy in signaling, iconic forms will be limited in the number of features 
through which referents can be portrayed.  Given this constraint, a single form could 
resemble two or more very similar meanings, but which one of these the sign is 
intended to represent could not be distinguished based on form alone.  Thus, if the 
meaning space of a communicative system is densely covered – if the meanings 
conveyed share many features – iconic representations will become increasingly 
ambiguous.  Because arbitrary signals are disconnected from their meanings, they are 
free to take a wider range of forms.  This freedom allows them to remain distinct from 
one another even as the number and similarity of meanings increases, and thus avoid 
the ambiguity of nonarbitrary signs.  As a result, arbitrary symbols offer the potential 
for infinitely precise and expressive communication. 
 
Another feature of arbitrary symbols is their detachment from immediate perceptual 
experience, and there may be some advantage to limiting the interaction between a 
sign’s form and the sensorimotor system.  According to A. Clark (2008), symbols 
serve as powerful boosters of cognitive potential as a result of this disconnect.  
Symbols function as simplified stand-ins for things in the world; they are abstractions 
of what is referred to that are not bound to any particular context or perceptual event.  
Labels, as Clark calls them, therefore become separate objects of thought that allow 
for new cognitive possibilities – a view that is mirrored in Tomasello (1999) and 
Deacon’s (1997) conception of symbols and their function in language and thought.  
By condensing a rich and varied aspect of experience into a single representation, 
symbols reduce the computational load of many cognitive processes.  Thinking about 
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relations between complex features of the world is thus converted from a complicated 
problem to a much simpler one.  This allows for more and more regularities in the 
environment to be recognized and labeled with ever-increasing levels of abstraction.  
Once established, symbols can then regulate and structure cognitive processes, aiding 
selective attention and guiding reasoning. 
 
This claim about symbols seems to gain support from empirical evidence.  
Chimpanzees were able to solve problems concerning second order relations only 
after learning labels for the first order relations (Thompson, Oden & Boysen, 1997).  
Without labels, the chimpanzees were able to indicate correctly if two items were the 
same or different but were unable to do so when the task involved extending this 
concept to a comparison of two sets of items; as in, if the ‘sameness’ of one set is 
shared by the other set.  Once the chimpanzees were taught labels for ‘same’ and 
‘different’ that they could assign to individual sets of items, however, they could then 
respond correctly to comparisons of sets.  As additional evidence, Smith & Gasser 
(2005) survey research on human ontogeny and argue that encountering a symbol 
system like language profoundly alters cognitive development.  The order of 
development – beginning with grounded, multimodal learning of how to move and act 
in the world and progressing through increasingly higher level cognitive milestones – 
suggests that acquiring language enables children to develop more complex and 
sophisticated modes of thinking and acting by providing simplified, arbitrary 
representations of rich and perceptually-loaded concepts. 
 
3.4 A paradox in inception 
 
A problem seems to arise when we try to apply the characterization of symbolic signs 
as presented – arbitrary and conventional – to the emergence of symbols.  If we are 
thinking about symbols arising from non-symbolic communication, it necessarily 
follows that there must have been a time at which non-conventionalized arbitrary 
signs were used in communication.  This may at first appear nonsensical: If no shared 
system of arbitrary signal-meaning mapping existed, why would someone produce a 
sign that others would not understand?  One possible solution is that an individual or 
individuals would create symbols and teach others how the sign should be used.  Due 
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to reasons addressed in section 2 above and expanded on in section 3.5 below, 
however, an alternative to deliberate instruction is desirable. 
 
The apparent paradox - symbols as obligatorily conventional versus the prerequisite 
of non-conventional signs being used ‘symbolically’ for shared systems to emerge in 
the first place – can be resolved by breaking up symbolic representation along the 
lines of the two underlying mechanisms identified in section 3.2: interpretation and 
conventionalization.  Under this conception, interpretation of a sign as symbolic is 
possible without that interpretation being shared by any other individuals. 
 
To understand how this works, note what is typically implied when a sign is 
interpreted as symbolic.  Part of this interpretation is an understanding – or belief – 
that others attach the same meaning to a given signal, what I will call virtual 
conventionalization. Virtual conventionalization is what could induce an individual to 
use a sign to communicate with others who in actuality may not share their symbolic 
interpretation of that sign.  In doing so, however, such an exchange could result in the 
interlocutor coming to adopt that interpretation, and therefore spur 
conventionalization.  The relationship between interpretation and conventionalization 
in the emergence of symbolic communication will be examined in greater detail in 
Chapters 2 and 3.  For now, it is sufficient to note that teasing the two apart allows us 
to understand how, in a stage prior to the emergence of shared symbolic systems, 
signs that do not meet the conventionalization criterion for symbols could 
nevertheless be used symbolically by individuals who interpreted them as such.  
 
3.5 Summary and discussion 
 
Icons, indices and symbols are similar in that they are representations for 
communication, but they differ in terms of form-meaning relationships.  Icons and 
indices embody a direct relationship between form and meaning and can therefore, at 
least potentially, be interpreted without additional, communication-specific cultural 
knowledge.
4
  In contrast, symbols have an arbitrary relationship between form and 
                                                
4
 As recognition of icons and indices is also dependent on experience in the world, 
cultural knowledge regarding artifacts and other relevant aspects of a group’s shared 
environment is part of this experience and will similarly underlie the recognition and 
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meaning, and by extension require users to possess shared knowledge of particular 
arbitrary form-meaning mappings in order to function as effective communicative 
devices.  These two features correspond to the factors identified above as underlying 
symbolic communication – symbolic interpretations of forms and conventionalization 
of those interpretations.  Thinking about the defining features of symbols in terms of 
sign interpretation provides an essential framework for explaining how and why 
symbolic signs may arise in a given context. 
 
The inherent involvement of interpretation in sign use means a relationship between 
form and meaning, and therefore a sign’s status as iconic, indexical or symbolic, is a 
subjective matter and implies that it must be discerned in relation to a specific 
context.  In addition, it further implies the interpretation of users is integral to defining 
the relationship between form and meaning embodied in a sign, which was shown not 
to be retrievable from knowledge of the form and referent alone (section 3.2.2).  In 
this way, a sign is constituted by an irreducible triadic relationship between form, 
meaning and user (Sebeok, 1994); without reference to the user, we cannot know how 
form relates to meaning.  Thus, the perceptions of sign users in context will be 
considered the critical indicator of sign status. 
 
The position taken here may seem somewhat rigid in regard to distinctions between 
sign types.  Often iconicity is spoken of in terms of a gradient, as in a form being 
more iconic or more arbitrary (for example, in Garrod, Fay, Lee & Oberlander, 2007), 
which is meant to reflect differing levels of elaborateness or detail depicted in forms 
representing the same meaning.  This is not entirely incompatible with an 
interpretation-in-context perspective, though it requires conceiving of the gradient as 
deriving from interpretations in aggregate.  A sign might be perceived as nonarbitrary 
by some and arbitrary by others while all are unaware of these conflicting 
interpretations but are nevertheless able to communicate with the sign.  This is likely 
the case for signs that exhibit secondary iconicity (Sonesson 1997; section 3.2.1), as 
their conventionality ensures mutual understanding even in the absence of shared sign 
type recognition.  Thus, we could describe a given sign as ‘more symbolic’ if more 
                                                                                                                                       
interpretation of nonarbitrary signs related to this knowledge.  In contrast, the cultural 
knowledge of form-meaning mappings required for symbols is explicitly and 
specifically for communicative purposes. 
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people, on average, do not recognize any nonarbitrary features and rely on cultural 
knowledge to make the connection between form and meaning.  In capturing the 
notion of symbolic communication as we generally understand it in regard to 
language, it is also useful to take a population-level perspective.  Given that 
arbitrariness has traditionally been held as a fundamental feature of language (Hocket, 
1960; Saussure, 1916), it is likely that most words are in fact perceived as arbitrary by 
a large portion of a population of speakers.  In addition, although it is possible that 
some individuals perceive certain nonarbitrary features in a given word, it is unlikely 
nonarbitrary interpretations are the same across individuals.  Moreover, these 
individuals probably do not believe or expect others to share their idiosyncratic 
interpretations.  We can coherently speak of language as symbolic, then, because i) on 
average, most people perceive most words as arbitrary signs, and ii) individuals who 
might perceive nonarbitrariness in a given word do not rely on this when using it to 
communicate with others.  The context-dependent interpretation of individuals 
becomes crucial, however, when symbolic conventions are not established in a 
population and communication takes place through nonarbitrary signs.  In this 
situation, individual symbolic interpretations are what will feed the development of 
population-wide symbolic conventions. 
 
Regarding the comparison of sign types, while nonarbitrary signs are beneficial in not 
requiring conventionalization, symbols vastly expand the communicative and 
cognitive potential of their users.  As theoretical points, the advantages associated 
with symbols are clear.  These factors are a major part of what gives language the 
capacity to communicate complex ideas with precision and clarity.  However, the 
subject of this thesis is the emergence of symbolic communication in human 
evolution.  The context in which this took place – embodied experience – involves a 
number of various forces in operation, many of which would act to increase, subvert 
or balance the actions of others. Thus, we should withhold drawing any direct 
conclusions based only on the advantages and disadvantages of symbolic versus 
nonarbitrary representations in isolation from other factors. 
 
The issue of ‘blindness’ and intentionality discussed in terms of evolution in section 2 
above is especially relevant to the question at hand.  Given these considerations, it 
does not necessarily follow that any advantages for symbols would be discerned and 
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deliberately exploited by pre-symbolic communicators.  First, without prior 
conventions, symbolic communication is not an immediately obvious or advantageous 
strategy (Deacon, 1997), as it requires multiple individuals to share the same arbitrary 
form-meaning mappings.  As such, the advantages of symbols may only become 
apparent ex post facto, after a conventional system is learned and used.  In addition, a 
striking historical example of another symbolic revolution in human cultural evolution 
illustrates how even modern humans are not inclined to have insight into a new 
representational strategy despite its ready availability and numerous advantages.  
While we do not know precisely when modern spoken, symbolic language first 
appeared, it is generally believed to roughly coincide with the emergence of 
anatomically modern humans, somewhere between about 100,000 to 200,000 years 
ago.  Written language, however, did not appear until much more recently in human 
history, probably no earlier than about 5,000 years ago (Schmandt-Besserate, 1996).  
The advantages of a permanent, written linguistic system are quite obvious in the 
abstract, and this form of representation ultimately enabled the elaboration of the 
tools, social institutions and practices upon which our modern cultural institutions are 
crucially dependent.  We can see, in retrospect, that human society prior to the 
development of a graphical symbolic representation of language would have similarly 
benefited from the adoption of a writing system.  Pre-literate societies often have 
elaborate and rich cultural traditions and information that must be passed down across 
generations through extensive teaching and the memorization of lengthy oral ‘texts’, 
such as poems and stories (Ong, 1982).  The time and energy invested in preserving 
these cultural traditions could be greatly reduced by the creation of permanent 
records.  In addition, in the same way that spoken linguistic symbols reduce the 
cognitive demands of processing conceptual information (section 3.3), written 
linguistic symbols reduce memory loads and create opportunities for contemplating 
and manipulating conceptual knowledge, which aids and enhances thinking about 
complex problems (Olson, 1996; A. Clark, 2008).  Despite these profound 
advantages, and despite the fact that symbolic representation already existed as an 
established means of spoken communication, writing systems were only developed in 
isolated parts of the world in relatively very recent history.  Moreover, symbolic 
writing systems only came about after a long period of cultural evolution from what 
appear to be initially nonarbitrary visual representations (Olson, 1996).  There appears 
to have been no ‘insight’ for the potential to represent language through graphical 
 32 
symbols, but rather, the transition occurred as a result of imperfect transmission and 
learning across generations and cultures, leading to the reinterpretation of originally 
non-symbolic signs (Olson, 1996).  The fact that modern humans – with a remarkable 
ability for innovation – have not universally discovered and invented visual symbols 
for linguistic information, and that the limited cases where this has happened 
represent a considerably late fraction of human history, suggests the likelihood of pre-
symbolic communicators deliberately inventing symbolic representations is highly 
improbable.  Thus, appeals to intentional construction should be avoided in an 
explanation for symbolic emergence. 
 
The research on cultural evolutionary processes described in section 2 shows that 
alternative avenues may be available by which symbolic communication could arise.  
Complex systems, like communicating populations, have emergent properties, and 
these studies demonstrate that functional communicative strategies can take shape 
under certain conditions.  In this way, cultural processes that do not involve the 
conscious, deliberate action of communicators may be capable of spurring the 
development of symbols.  Because this alternative has explanatory potential, an 
investigation of the emergence of symbols should first look to such mechanisms 
before appealing to intention or insight. 
 
Finally, with the ideas presented in this section in mind, it is possible to more 
precisely specify the symbol aspect of the question at the heart of this thesis.  The 
issue of symbols is one of how symbolic interpretations of signs arise, and following 
that, how those interpretations conventionalize – how they are transmitted to and 
adopted by others.  The core of the symbolic relationship – the element that connects 
form and meaning – resides in users’ perceptions of a sign.  Understanding where 
symbols come from therefore first requires explaining how forms come to be 
perceived as arbitrarily representing meaning, with a consideration of how 
interpretive processes establish and alter signs’ representational status.  In addition, it 
also requires explaining how novel symbolic interpretations of signs then become 
shared by others and thereby become functional communicative devices.  These 
points are central to this thesis and will be discussed in relation to research presented 




The preceding three sections have discussed how the present investigation will be 
framed.  The following section will review the concept of bodily mimesis, which 
provides a starting point from which this thesis will approach the emergence of 
symbolic communication. 
 
4. Bodily mimesis 
 
Donald (1991) proposed the bodily mimesis hypothesis in an aim to bridge the gap 
between the communication observed in extant apes and modern human language – 
namely, symbolic communication.  Donald argued that because the gap is so 
substantial, an intermediate stage must have existed prior to and somehow enabled the 
development of modern language. One of the defining features of language is the use 
of conventional, arbitrary words, but this phenomenon is ultimately built upon the 
ability and inclination to produce intentional, referential representations for 
communicative purposes.  This more basic capacity, manifested in the form of bodily 
mimesis, is what is claimed to have preceded the development of symbols and fully-
fledged language.  This section will review what bodily mimesis is and supporting 
arguments. 
 
4.1 What is bodily mimesis? 
 
After it was first proposed by Donald (1991), the concept of bodily mimesis was 
refined and expanded by Zlatev and colleagues (Zlatev et al., 2005).  In the most basic 
sense, it is using the body to communicate with nonarbitrary signs.  Bodily mimesis 
therefore involves crossmodality, volition, representation and a communicative sign 
function (Zlatev, 2008).  In other words, mimesis is the intentional production of 
sensorimotor-based, referential signs in order to communicate some concept to an 
addressee. Creating and comprehending such representations relies on the ability to 
map one’s own implicit sensorimotor knowledge onto some other modality, and vice 
versa.  For example, translating the visual experience of another person’s gestural 
movements onto your own proprioceptive system and understanding it as a 
meaningful representation.  Simply put, bodily mimesis can be thought of as indexical 
and iconic communication, such as pointing and pantomiming, though it can also 
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apply to other modalities like auditory vocalizations.  In this way, mimetic 
representations are based on sensorimotor experiences of objects, entities, actions and 
events in the world that arise out of embodied, lived experience. 
 
Zlatev and colleagues (Zlatev, 2007, 2008; Zlatev et al., 2005) make a distinction 
between bodily mimesis and what they call post-mimesis 1 and post-mimesis 2, which 
refer to the specifically linguistic characteristics of conventional symbolic reference 
and syntactic structure, respectively.  Mimesis, post-mimesis 1 and post-mimesis 2 
form a hierarchy of stages in which each successive stage includes features from and 
builds upon the previous one.  Progression from mimesis to language is therefore not 
through replacement, but instead the overlaying of additional features.  Symbolic 
representation can be thought of as a coding system for an underlying conceptual 
structure that can also be directly communicated through bodily representations. This 
thesis is focused on the transition from bodily mimesis to post-mimesis 1 – 
communication through symbols.  Bodily mimesis would have served as a means to 
establish communication in the absence of such a coding system, which would have 
laid the foundation on which shared symbols could emerge. 
 
4.2 Support for the bodily mimesis hypothesis 
 
Donald (1991) and Zlatev (2008) present a large collection of evidence in support of 
the bodily mimesis hypothesis.  That evidence and their arguments will not be 
repeated in full here, but some key points will be reviewed that are relevant to issues 
discussed later in this thesis. 
 
A major line of evidence these authors point to is the human ability to communicate 
through nonarbitrary gestures and the fact that gestures of this type are produced 
together with and closely related to speech (the relationship between speech and 
gesture will be addressed in detail in Chapter 3).  Zlatev (2008) notes that because 
symbolic language is vastly superior in conveying complex meaning, there is no 
reasonable explanation for this ability and propensity for mimetic bodily 
communication unless communication relied on such mimetic skills prior to language.  
He goes on to argue that the fact that communication today makes use of nonarbitrary 
bodily representations in addition to  the powerful symbols of speech suggests 
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linguistic capacity is an extension of the ability to express meaning through 
sensorimotor knowledge.  Donald (1991) notes that language and mimetic gestures 
are dissociated, in that aphasics who do not also suffer from apraxia (motor 
impairment) typically retain the ability to communicate through nonarbitrary gestures, 
a phenomenon that has been documented in more recent studies (Fex & Mannson, 
1998; Kemmerer, Chandrasekaran & Tranel, 2007).  These cases demonstrate that 
language encompasses and relies upon abilities underpinning mimetic 
communication, and that mimetic abilities do not require language.  Donald (1991) 
claims this dissociation indicates that mimesis is a more basic ability upon which 
symbolic language has been built. 
 
Other supporting evidence comes from research on language and embodiment.  A 
number of behavioral studies demonstrate that language processing modulates the 
sensorimotor system (Boulenger, Roy, Paulignan, Deprez, Jeannerod & Nazir, 2006; 
Glenberg & Kaschak, 2002; Parrill, Bullen & Hoburg, 2010; Sato, Mengarelli, Riggio 
& Gallese, 2008), and also that motor actions affect language processing 
(Rueschemeyer, Lindemann, van Rooij, van Dam & Bekkering, 2010).  
Neuroscientific studies have shown that language processing activates body-specific 
areas of the motor cortex related to the meaning conveyed in that language (Aziz-
Zadeh, Wilson, Rizzolatti, & Iacoboni, 2006; Hauk, Johnsrude & Pulvermüller, 2004; 
Masson, Bub & Newton-Taylor, 2008; Pulvermüller, Shtyrov & Ilmoniemi, 2005; 
Tettamanti, Buccino, Saccuman, Gallese, Danna, Scifo, Fazio, Rizzolatti, Cappa & 
Perani, 2005; Willems, Hagoort & Casasanto, 2010).  These findings indicate bodily 
knowledge and representations provide structure and content to linguistic meaning, 
and Zlatev (2007) argues this is precisely what would be predicted from the 
hypothesis that language arose out of sensorimotor-based mimetic communication. 
 
Finally, Zlatev et al. (2005) discuss primate studies, noting that apes engage in 
imitation similar to that of humans, and imitative abilities ultimately underlie mimetic 
communication.  In addition, when enculturated in a human environment, apes can 
come to understand the communicative sign function.  The authors argue that the fact 
that these capacities are present in apes suggests the ability to communicate through 





The bodily mimesis hypothesis holds that prior to the development of modern 
language humans communicated through nonarbitrary, body-based signs.  The 
capacity for bodily mimesis enables intentional, referential communication without 
the need for a conventional symbolic code.  Once this kind of communication 
becomes possible, it provides an infrastructure from which a symbolic system could 
potentially be constructed. 
 
It is useful to make explicit an underlying assumption concerning the context in which 
mimetic, and later symbolic, communication would be used.  This kind of 
communication rests upon relatively sophisticated intention-reading abilities and an 
inclination for cooperativeness (Tomasello, 1999; Tomasello, 2008).  A sufficient 
level of these intersubjective qualities is an assumption of a theory that explains a 
transition from one type of intentional, referential communication to another.  
Although it is highly relevant and important to understand how the distinctly human 
trait of shared intentionality evolved, this thesis will not attempt to provide an 
explanation for this foundational feature of human communication and cognition.  
The arguments presented here take as a starting point a behavioral environment of 
skilled intention reading and cooperative activity, as described in Tomasello (2008). 
 
Together with these intersubjectivity skills, the fact that we share an embodied 
existence with others means we can understand them as similarly acting and sensing 
beings.  Meaning comes from knowledge of lived experience, and human 
communication results from the capacity and inclination to represent that knowledge 
for another person.  One strategy of sharing meaning in this way is through the use of 
our bodies as iconic and indexical representational devices, or mimesis.  Interpreting 
others’ bodily movements involves the application of our own sensorimotor 
knowledge and an understanding of intentions.  Because this strategy, as opposed to 
symbols, is direct, immediate and requires no cultural code, it is plausible to suppose 
mimesis is a more basic, phylogenetically older form of communication than symbols.  
Furthermore, that our bodies form the basis for linguistic representations today 
suggests that communicative sensorimotor representations played a similar role in the 
course of evolution, predating and providing a foundation for symbolic language. 
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The connections to primate studies highlight important distinctions between ape and 
human communication that will be useful in evaluating evidence in later chapters.  
Apes use gestures to communicate, but the referential status of those gestures – or 
having the communicative sign function (Zlatev, 2007) – is not firmly established.
5
  
For example, the same gesture is often used to accomplish multiple and very different 
communicative ends (Cartmill & Byrne, 2010), which suggests these do not represent 
meaning the way humans use signs to refer to stable concepts across contexts.  In 
addition, gestures are often created and developed between two individuals who do 
not then go on to use that gesture to communicate with others.  The prototypical 
example of this dyad-internal gesture development is what is called ontogenetic 
ritualization.  Ontogenetic ritualization is the process by which two individuals 
repeatedly interact under similar circumstances and shape each other’s behaviors 
(Tomasello, 1997).  The ‘nurse poke’ used by infant chimpanzees to initiate breast-
feeding is a gesture derived through ontogenetic ritualization.  The process starts with 
the infant touching and moving its mother’s arm to reach her breast.  Over time, the 
infant has to execute less and less of this action series for its mother to recognize its 
intent and begin breastfeeding.  Eventually, the sequence becomes so reduced that 
simply poking the arm is sufficient to initiate the activity.  This ‘poke’ is considered a 
gesture between mother and infant, one that has become shorter in duration and 
simpler over time. 
 
Notably, these gestures differ from human communicative gestures like bodily 
mimesis in two major respects.  First, they are not used outside the limited 
circumstances of breastfeeding; that is, apes do not produce these gestures to 
communicate about feeding in other settings for other purposes.  In contrast, human 
communicative gestures are not tied to a specific activity and are used to discuss the 
meanings they refer to or related topics independent of context.  Second, such ape 
gestures are only used between the members of the dyad, which indicates the gesture 
                                                
5
 Language enculturated apes may be an exception, as they can acquire language-like 
labels and communicate with them even when their referents are not present (Savage-
Rumbaugh, Shanker & Taylor, 1988).  This latent capacity is important for finding 
continuity between modern humans and their supposed predecessors, but the nature of 
ape gesture without atypical intervention is relevant to understanding processes of 
sign development that will be addressed in later chapters. 
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is not understood by the apes as a form that carries meaningful content that can be 
conveyed to others.  In contrast, human gestures are produced to represent a meaning 
that can be interpreted by different individuals across different contexts.  In this sense, 
ape gestures appear more akin to the real actions themselves, abbreviated in form 
though they may be, and therefore lack the communicative sign function.  Indeed, 
ritualization of this sort can be seen in human interactions, and similar reservations 
hold.  For example, what starts as a child reaching for an adult’s arms in order to be 
picked up can eventually become a simple raising of the arms, which is sufficient to 
initiate the picking up process by the adult.  Would we consider this movement a 
symbol, let alone a sign of the kind under investigation here?  Neither children nor the 
adults involved in this act use such gestures for communicative purposes with others 
or outside the act itself, again suggesting the movements are not representational in 
the sense of having the communicative sign function.  The fact that the process of 
ritualization does not appear to result in signs even for modern human communicators 
suggests this process may be of limited relevance to the question of symbol 
emergence.  
 
Finally, some researchers have characterized ritualization-derived ape gestures as 
iconic (Tanner & Byrne, 1996; Hopkins & Savage-Rumbaugh, 1991). However, 
Tomsello (2008) argues this iconicity only exists for human observers who recognize 
it as such; they are not iconic to the apes.  At the end of the ritualization process 
gestures may appear iconic because they are rooted in purposeful actions, but as they 
lack the communicative sign function for the reasons above, it is doubtful they are 
interpreted as nonarbitrary signs by the apes.  These and the other differences from 
bodily mimesis described above will be useful when examining processes of sign 
creation and development discussed in later chapters. 
 
A final point to address is the placement of bodily mimesis on the human evolutionary 
timeline.  Proponents of the hypothesis do not include a precise point at which bodily 
mimesis was established in the human lineage, though it is thought to have arisen 
mostly likely sometime after the appearance of Homo erectus and more advanced tool 
manufacturing and material culture, as these would presumably require the more 
human-like imitative skills that underlie mimesis.  Although pinpointing when in 
human evolution such abilities might have appeared is an important research question, 
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this thesis will not attempt to address chronological issues directly.  Instead, it will 
take a relative perspective and focus on what would have followed the development 
of bodily mimesis, though the issue of the pace of a transition to symbolic 
communication will be discussed briefly in Chapter 3. 
 
Separating symbolic communication from the more general and basic communicative 
sign function as proponents of bodily mimesis do (Donald, 1991; Zlatev et al., 2005; 
Zlatev, 2007, 2008) is an important and useful theoretical distinction.  In this view, 
symbols are not an entirely separate phenomenon, but are instead built upon the more 
basic capacity for intentional representation.  Donald, Zlatev and colleagues have 
offered a thorough account of how bodily mimesis may have arisen in human 
evolution prior to symbolic language.  A theory of the emergence of symbols, then, 
can take as its starting point this representational capacity.  This thesis will investigate 





The preceding sections have identified the premises and framework under which this 
investigation will proceed.  Embodiment theory places the question of symbols in a 
context with particular communicators that possess certain causally relevant modes of 
expression and perception.  Evolutionary principles can constrain and guide the 
formulation of an evolutionary scenario involving such embodied beings.  A 
consideration of semiotic theory reveals the explanatory factors that must be 
accounted for in a theory of symbol emergence.  Finally, taking bodily mimesis as a 
starting point, the question of interest here can be further specified to ask how 
conventional symbols developed out of mimetic – or nonarbitrary, body-based - 
communication. 
 
With this framework established, it is now possible to review and evaluate evidence in 
order to undertake the present investigation.  The following sections will briefly 




5.1 Chapter 2 - Emerging sign systems 
 
The emergence of symbols in human evolution is one instance of the initiation and 
evolution of a sign system.  A number of other examples of changing communication 
systems have been documented and analyzed.  This research can reveal if and what 
general features and processes characterize sign systems, and thereby inform how we 
conceive of emergence in the specific case of human symbolic communication.  
Findings from this research will be analyzed and discussed in terms of interpretation 
and conventionalization, the two factors underpinning symbols identified in section 3 
above. 
 
Evidence related to the issue of interpretation can be found in experimental sign 
research as well as the natural development of new sign languages as observed in the 
field.  Experimental sign studies show how signs are created, used and change over 
time under various conditions and parameters.  These also reveal how modality of 
expression and communicative dynamics affect sign interpretations, and offer insights 
into the transition or lack thereof from nonarbitrary to symbolic signs.  New sign 
language research in deaf communities documents aspects of the transition from an 
iconic and indexical gestural communication system to conventional sign languages in 
naturalistic settings.  How these systems change over time, the differences in modality 
to vocal communication and how the resulting languages differ from typical spoken 
language will help to understand the forces that would have affected a communication 
system that shared many of these features in human history. 
 
The issue of conventionalization is also addressed in experimental sign research and 
new sign languages.  Experimental studies offer observations of transmission 
dynamics in real time on a small scale, while new sign languages show broader trends 
on a larger scale.  In addition, a number of computational models have simulated the 
conventionalization of symbol systems.  The success or failure of these models in 
constructing shared vocabularies reveals key factors that enable or impede the 
conventionalization process.  Central to this process is the ability of recipients to 
identify the intended meaning of a novel arbitrary sign – that is, for the symbol to be 
grounded.  Thus, an explanation of symbols must include the means by which novel 
symbols would have been grounded, and thereby conventionalize. 
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From this research I identify processes and factors involved in emerging sign systems 
generally, which are then applied to the context of human communication and 
evolution, the topic of the following chapter. 
 
5.2 Chapter 3 - Human symbolic communication and emergence 
 
In order to answer the question of how symbolic communication came about in 
human history, we must begin with an accurate and complete description of symbolic 
communication as it is carried out by embodied humans in lived experience.  While in 
theory there are a vast number of different ways meaning can be shared through 
representations, humans engage in a specific version that is uniquely dictated by their 
bodies and perceptions.  These specific features will determine what kinds of signs are 
created, how they are used and if and how their semiotic statuses undergo changes.  
Therefore, it is necessary to take into account the number and qualities of the 
modalities through which communication takes place, how those are utilized in 
communication and any potential interactions between the modalities.  Incorporating 
this information into the investigation makes it possible to address the question of 
symbol origins in terms of embodied human experience and evolution. 
 
In this chapter I review research on human communication, including the semiotic 
capacities of the vocal and gestural modalities, the way those modalities are utilized to 
accomplish symbolic communication today and the phylogenetic origins of this 
features.  Symbol communication as practiced by humans is shown to be a 
multimodal, heterosemiotic system of unified symbolic vocal speech and nonarbitrary 
bodily gesture.  Because symbols are not used in isolation and are coordinated with 
other sign types in this way, the question of symbols becomes how this particular 
mode of coupled symbolic-and-nonarbitrary communication emerged. 
 
With the question fully specified and the relevant explanatory factors established, I 
then present and critique existing theories of symbol origins that begin from similar 
premises regarding bodily mimesis and nonarbitrary communication.  These theories, 
in aggregate, are shown to not fully address the critical factors identified in this thesis 
and/or to rely on evolutionary processes inconsistent with the evolutionary principles 
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outlined above – namely, invoking the advantages of symbols as reason for their 
development.  I argue that these issues can be resolved and explanatory gaps bridged 
by applying the information and ideas reviewed here – specifically, that the 
interpretation of vocalizations as symbolic and their subsequent conventionalization is 
a potential in-built consequence of the presumed communicative dynamics preceding 
symbolic language.  Vocalizations would be interpreted as symbolic due to their 
semiotic profile relative to gestures, and conventionalization of arbitrary vocalizations 
would be enabled by the communicative support provided by accompanying 
nonarbitrary gestures.  In this way, appeals to unviable evolutionary mechanisms are 
avoided and the modern state of multimodal, heterosemiotic communication is 
accounted for.  Thus, the explanation for symbol emergence presented here is more 
satisfactory in terms of evolutionary principles and consistent with the available 
evidence.  The following two chapters describe experiments to test hypothesis related 
to these claims. 
 
5.3 Chapter 4 – Experiments: Interpretation 
 
The arguments put forward in Chapter 3 make certain predictions regarding how 
vocal and gestural signs will be interpreted in relation to each other in the presumed 
context of symbol emergence.  I present a series of experiments conducted to 
determine whether the modalities are processed in an integrated way like that 
observed in language studies today when the communicative and semiotic roles differ 
from that of today.  Results indicate that arbitrary vocalizations are interpreted and 
learned like symbols even when they are communicatively uninformative and in the 
absence of the expectation to acquire a conventional symbolic system, providing 
support for the central claim of this thesis. 
 
5.4 Chapter 5 – Simulations: Conventionalization 
 
The arguments made here also make certain predictions regarding the ability for 
gestures to ground novel symbols.  Building upon previous computational models that 
address the subject, I present a set of models designed to simulate multimodal 
heterosemiotic communication and test the capacity for information like that provided 
by nonarbitrary gestures to ground arbitrary signs.  These simulations show that 
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accompanying nonarbitrary signals enable populations to converge on shared 
vocabularies across a range of conditions.  These results support the claim that 
accompanying nonarbitrary gestures could ground arbitrary vocalizations and allow 
conventionalization to take place through natural communicative and cultural 
processes. 
 
5.5 Chapter 6 – Conclusion 
 
In the concluding chapter I will briefly review the research covered in this thesis, 
restate its central claims, describe its theoretical and empirical contributions to the 
field and suggest opportunities for related further research. 
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CHAPTER 2 
Emerging sign systems 
 
1. Introduction 
The discussion of semiotics in the previous chapter showed that symbolic signs are 
forms that are interpreted as having an arbitrary relationship with the meaning to 
which they refer.  This relationship is distinct from icons and indices, which are both 
nonarbitrarily connected to their meanings.  To understand how symbolic 
interpretations of signs could arise from nonarbitrary signs, then, we should identify 
the causes, mechanisms and processes that instigate a transition from one 
interpretation type to another.  It may be that certain social dynamics or transmission 
processes lead to the interpretation of signs as symbolic while others impede or 
prevent a transformation.  Understanding the factors involved and the conditions that 
are associated with the development of symbols generally will provide valuable 
evidence for the present goal of explaining the emergence of symbolic 
communication in human history.  
 
This chapter will examine research on emerging sign systems, or circumstances in 
which new signs are created and used in communication.  This research sheds light on 
the nature of novel signs, how form and semiotic status change over time, and how a 
population’s shared use of signs changes over time.  The present review will focus on 
three main areas: lab experiments with human participants, sign language studies and 
computational models.  Findings from these three areas will be discussed in terms of 
the explanatory factors of interpretation and conventionalization identified in the 
previous chapter as key to understanding the emergence of symbolic communication. 
 
2. Experimental sign research 
 
Studies on novel signs produced by humans have been carried out in order to 
understand how communication is established and how newly created signs change 
through processes involved in communication.  Participants are given a medium 
through which to communicate and are in some way restricted from using linguistic or 
other standardized signs.  The most common design employs a graphical interface, 
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wherein pairs or groups of participants draw images to communicate a list of concepts 
or about a task the partners are engaged in (Fay, Garrod & Roberts, 2008; Fay, 
Garrod, Roberts & Swoboda, 2010; Galantucci, 2005; Garrod, Fay, Lee & 
Oberlander, 2007; Garrod, Fay, Rogers, Walker & Swoboda, 2010; Healey, Swoboda, 
Umata & Katagiri, 2002; Healey, Swoboda, Umata & King, 2007; Theisen, 
Oberlander & Kirby, 2010).  Another approach does not include a medium of any 
kind specifically devoted to sending and receiving signs, and participants must 
communicate solely through actions they can perform in the environment of the task 
(Scott-Phillips, Kirby & Ritchie, 2009).  In this design, participants must recognize 
the opportunity to communicate, develop strategies to represent meaning with their 
actions, and then go on to establish conventions for doing so.  The present discussion 
will focus on the first approach, as the results offer more insights into the 
development of symbolic signs from other sign types; however, the second approach 
represents an interesting comparison to these other findings and will be addressed 
after they are reviewed and discussed. 
 
Some of these studies were designed specifically to investigate if and how symbolic 
signs develop from non-symbolic signs through communicative processes (Fay et al., 
2008; Fay et al., 2010; Garrod et al., 2007; Garrod et al., 2010; Theisen et al., 2010).  
While others did not address this issue directly (Galantucci, 2005; Healey et al., 2002; 
Healey et al., 2007), their findings reveal important features of emerging 
communication systems.  This section will review these experiments and their 
methodologies, evaluate their findings and relate them to the question of the 
emergence of symbolic communication. 
 
2.1 Description and findings 
 
Graphical communication studies involve a pair or group of separated participants 
communicating with each other through drawings.  Participants must communicate a 
pre-given list of concepts, like ‘computer monitor’ and ‘cartoon’, but they are not 
allowed to use numbers, letters or other linguistic devices or symbolic conventions.  
Some studies do not restrict drawing abilities beyond these constraints, with 
participants free to draw for an extended period of time and employ as much iconicity 
as they desire and the medium affords (Fay et al., 2008; Fay et al., 2010; Garrod et al., 
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2007; Garrod et al., 2010; Healey et al., 2002; Healey et al., 2007; Theisen et al., 
2010).  Another paradigm puts additional limitations on the medium of sign 
production that reduces participants’ ability to portray iconic features in their 
drawings by using an apparatus that distorts and transforms marks by simulating a 
scrolling notepad (Galantucci, 2005). 
 
Galantucci’s (2005) experiment also differs from the others in that messages to 
communicate do not come from a pre-given list of concepts.  Instead, participants 
play a computer game in which they try to achieve certain shared goals.  Discrete 
locations in the simulated environment, or ‘rooms’, are placed on a grid, with each 
assigned its own unique visual representation in the form of familiar images – for 
example, a triangle or flower.  There are variations on the exact terms of play and 
number of rooms, but the task generally involves a number of rounds in which an item 
is randomly placed in one of the rooms, and to win points players have to find the 
item and end up at its location together.  To succeed at the task, participants must 
communicate via the drawing pad in order to coordinate their movements in the 
environment.  Because the constrained medium prevents them from doing so by 
directly portraying images associated with rooms, they must develop some other 
strategy to communicate effectively. 
 
A final dimension in which these studies differ from each other is in having 
participants engage in interactive communication – repeatedly exchange drawings 
about the same concepts, with participants alternating communicative roles – to track 
how sign form changes over time (Fay et al., 2008; Fay et al., 2010; Garrod et al., 
2007; Garrod et al., 2010; Theisen et al., 2010).  In these studies, pairs or small groups 
of participants communicate a single list of concepts over a number of rounds and 
switch between acting as sender and receiver.  Consequently, each person draws and 
matches the same concepts multiple times and will share these experiences with their 
partner or partners.  All interactive communication experiments use an unrestricted 
drawing apparatus.  The signs from the initial rounds of these studies will first be 
described along with the signs created in the other studies under the unrestricted 
design (Healey et al., 2002; Healey et al., 2007) as well as those from Galantucci’s 
(2005) restricted design.  Following that, the findings regarding sign changes over 
time will be reviewed. 
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In experiments with an unrestricted drawing medium (Fay et al., 2008; Fay et al., 
2010; Garrod et al., 2007; Garrod et al., 2010; Healey et al., 2002; Healey et al., 2007; 
Theisen et al., 2010), it was found that participants’ drawings were iconic and 
indexical.  In Healey et al.’s (2007) study, musical pieces were represented either 
through pictorial depictions of concepts evoked by the piece or metaphorical iconic 
depictions that resembled the musical structure (the crossmodal underpinnings of this 
kind of iconicity will be discussed in Chapter Three, section 2).  In studies on the 
effects of interactive communication (Fay et al., 2008; Fay et al., 2010; Garrod et al., 
2007; Garrod et al., 2010; Theisen et al., 2010), drawings from initial rounds were 
fairly elaborate and included many features corresponding to features of referents. 
 
Although signs created by participants in Galantucci’s (2005) medium-restricted 
design differ from those in the unrestricted version in being less directly pictorial, 
they similarly appear to be nonarbitrary.  Under these conditions, three different 
systems of signs developed: one based on numbering the rooms according to their 
location on the grid, one based on depicting the rooms’ assigned visual labels in some 
way, and one based on the spatial layout of the game map.  The manner in which each 
of these systems makes use of nonarbitrary features will be addressed in the 
discussion section below. 
 
In addition to finding communication was initiated with nonarbitrary signs, 
experiments on the effects of interactive communication also investigated how signs 
changed over time and use (Fay et al., 2008; Fay et al., 2010; Garrod et al., 2007; 
Garrod et al., 2010; Theisen et al., 2010).  Under these conditions, drawings start out 
relatively complex and elaborate but over rounds of exchange lose many of their 
features and simplify (See Figure 2.1 for an example from Garrod et al., 2007).  From 
such results, it is claimed that arbitrary, symbolic signs develop from nonarbitrary 
signs through interactive communication. 
 
Two methods have been used to determine the sign status of interaction-derived 
drawings.  The first measures graphical complexity – based on the amount and 
arrangement of lines or ‘ink’ contained in drawings – from early and later rounds.  
The second method tests how well naïve outsiders are able to guess from their 
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Figure 2.1. An example series of drawings for ‘computer monitor’ from Garrod et al. 
(2007; pg. 978).  ‘Block’ number indicates the round in which a drawing was 
produced.  ‘CF’ is a convention used in the paper for a particular experimental 
condition, the details of which are not discussed here. 
drawings the concepts intended to be represented by interacting partners, again 
comparing early versus late rounds.  Final drawings were found to be less graphically 
complex than early drawings, a result paralleled by a decreased ability for outsiders to 
guess final drawings compared to early ones.  The observed simplification in form 
and reduced transparency for outsiders are said by the authors to indicate signs have 
become arbitrary and symbolic.  In addition, partners converge on shared signs to 
communicate the same concepts, from which it is claimed that conventional, symbolic 





















2.2.1 Nonarbitrary initiation 
The first major finding of these experiments is that communication was initiated and 
established through nonarbitrary representations.  It is first important to note that this 
conclusion is in fact an assumption, as none of the studies tested or documented how 
participants perceived and interpreted their signs.  Nevertheless, there are reasons in 
this case to accept the conclusion as sound.  For the unrestricted design (Fay et al., 
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2008; Fay et al., 2010; Garrod et al., 2007; Garrod et al., 2010; Healey et al., 2002; 
Healey et al. 2007; Theisen et al., 2010), participants’ successful communication 
without explicit feedback on their success or other means of understanding messages, 
together with the presence of many features of drawings that appear to correspond to 
features of the intended referents (see Figure 2.1 for an example), strongly suggests 
these features were recognized as iconic and/or indexical.  The nonarbitrariness of 
signs is not as immediately apparent in Galantucci’s (2005) restricted design, but a 
close examination of the three systems that were adopted reveals that these also likely 
relied on iconic and indexical representations. 
 
First, the system based on depicting features of rooms’ labels most clearly relies on 
nonarbitrary representation by portraying one or more distinct iconic features of those 
labels.  For example, portraying a room’s assigned shape by drawing the same 
number of marks that corresponds to the number of vertices in that shape.  Figure 2.2a 
shows one pair’s signs, which use three ticks to represent the triangle’s three angles, 





Figure 2.2. Example sign systems from Galantucci (2005; pg. 747).  a. Drawings 
that represent the number of vertices in rooms’ images. b. Drawings that represent 
the spatial layout of the game environment. c. Drawings that represent numbers 
assigned to each room. 
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Although mediated by prior knowledge of a symbolic system, or through reference to 
other structural aspects of the environment, the other two systems similarly rely on 
nonarbitrariness.  First, the spatial system involved mapping the drawing space onto 
the layout of the game environment and using spatial relations between marks in the 
drawing space to refer to the different rooms.  For instance, a right angle with its 
corner oriented to the top left of the drawing pad represents the room located at the 
top left of the grid (see Figure 2.2b).  Thus, the organization of the drawing space is 
iconic of the organization of the game environment.  Second, the numeration system 
involved assigning a number to each room, and making the corresponding number of 
ticks on the drawing pad to refer to a room by way of this number (see Figure 2.2c).  
This system is akin to Cartesian coordinates, though rooms were not necessarily 
ordered in the same direction.  Numeral-coordinate signs are icon-index hybrids (see 
Chapter 1, section 3 for a discussion of sign-type blends), in that marks are iconic of 
the abstract quantities represented by numerals that were associated with particular 
rooms.  This strategy is made possible by knowledge of symbolic numerals and the 
convention of numbering quadrants on a grid, but the way in which the information is 
communicated is via nonarbitrary signs. 
 
Finally, a separate reason may explain why more minimal, less elaborately 
nonarbitrary forms were able to ground communication in this context.  Unlike 
experiments with an unrestricted drawing medium, a consequence of the game play in 
Galantucci’s (2005) task is that participants received feedback on their partners’ 
intended meaning for the drawings they produced.  In navigating the environment 
together and attempting to accomplish shared goals, participants could find out what a 
drawing was intended to represent through the course of play even if they did not 
correctly understand it when it was initially produced.  In this way, feedback provided 
additional support to reduce uncertainty and establish the meaning of signs on top of 
the nonarbitrary information contained in the drawings’ features. 
 
The role of feedback as a support or substitute for nonarbitrary representation in 
establishing communication is further illustrated by Scott-Phillips et al.’s (2009) 
experiment mentioned above.  In this design, pairs of participants played a computer 
game in which they have to move around on separate grids composed of four colored 
squares and end up on a square that is the same color as the one their partner is on.  In 
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each round, both players are placed on new grids with a distinct pattern of colors 
(some of which are also on their partner’s grid, some of which are not).  Players can 
see each other’s grids as well as each other’s movements on the grids, but they cannot 
see the colors of their partner’s squares.  Players can move around for an unlimited 
amount of time, and once each thinks they are on the same color, they can choose to 
end the round.  After a round has ended, players are told if they were successful, and 
the pattern of colors on their partner’s grid is revealed.  To succeed in this scenario, 
players must develop a strategy to represent specific colors as well as the presence or 
absence of colors.  Given these conditions, the only medium available for participants 
to create signs is through their actions in the environment, which affords little, if any, 
opportunity for nonarbitrary representation.  Nevertheless, some pairs successfully 
establish communication by designating distinct patterns of movement on the grid as 
representations of color information.  This experiment is an example of establishment 
without nonarbitrary signs; however, feedback in the form of being able to see each 
other’s color patterns after each round does the work of indicating for players their 
partner’s intended meaning.  It was also found that the perceptual salience of the color 
red led partners both to end up coincidentally on this color before any coordinated 
strategy was developed, which in itself helped to bootstrap communication.  When red 
was removed from the color inventory in a follow-up experiment, the success rate of 
pairs dropped substantially.  Shared perceptual bias is therefore also an important 
component for establishment in this case, but without the feedback at the end of a 
round, players would not be able to know that their partners also intended to end up 
on a red square.  If this additional information were not available, the probability that 
participants could map meanings onto signals correctly is extremely low. 
 
This blend of feedback and limited nonarbitrariness highlights an important aspect of 
emerging communication systems.  For a novel sign to be understood and 
communication established, a receiver must be able to identify a producer’s intended 
referent.  In the absence of a shared symbolic system like language, as simulated in 
most of these experiments, people appear to rely on iconic and indexical 
representations to convey meaning.  Information contained in the features of signs 
themselves allows for a receiver to interpret their meaning correctly without the need 
for much aid from additional information.  The sign alone does not of course fully 
indicate meaning, as implicit information and inference from context are also 
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involved.  Factors like shared situational awareness, intention reading and perceptual 
biases, which can be thought of as ambient information that colors and frames any 
instance of communication, are always at work when interpreting a specific sign in a 
specific context and will also aid in reaching the intended interpretation (the role of 
these factors will be more closely examined in section 4 below on computational 
models).  These studies demonstrate that nonarbitrary signs are able to do much of the 
work in conveying meaning and reducing uncertainty, and thereby lessening the 
burden on inferential resources. 
 
When nonarbitrary representation is not available, the work of connecting sign to 
meaning must be fully accomplished by some other route, such as feedback.  Before 
discussing feedback further, it warrants mentioning that inferential strategies based on 
contextual factors in some cases can on their own do the work of grounding signs.  
This is part of some processes by which new symbols are spread to other users, a 
topic which will be addressed in more detail in section 2.2.3 below on 
conventionalization.  However, in theory the same factors could allow the initiation of 
communication even if nonarbitrariness is not used or perceived.  This is possible if 
the context of communication is tightly constrained, with a very limited set of 
potential referents, such as under experimental conditions.  In more naturalistic 
settings it would require an information-rich communicative superstructure in which 
interlocutors are aware of each other’s attentional states, goals and knowledge about 
the current situation.  This level of contextual resources would support comprehension 
and ensure a correct interpretation is reached, even if no information is available from 
sign form or feedback.  Although it may be possible for inference alone to enable the 
establishment of communication in this way, the necessary communicative 
environment presumably must result from preceding experience in which extensive 
shared knowledge and attentional focus has been acquired and shaped over time.  It is 
difficult to imagine how such a situation could come about without previous 
communication of some sort, which brings the question back to the establishment of 
communication in the first place.  Thus, it is likely that in the context of establishing 
communication, contextual resources alone may not be a reliable means to ensure 
novel signs could be understood without the aid of nonarbitrary representation. 
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When contextual information is insufficient, it is also possible for a sign system to 
develop without the aid of nonarbitrary information if communicators have access to 
feedback, which similarly serves to indicate the meaning of a sign.  Feedback in this 
sense is when communicators are explicitly told, outside the communicative act itself, 
if a signal is correctly interpreted by the receiver, which indirectly indicates its 
meaning.  Experiments that limit (Galantucci, 2005) or almost entirely eradicate 
(Scott-Phillips et al., 2009) the ability to utilize nonarbitrary signs critically depend on 
the presence of feedback for successful communication and the development of a sign 
system.  In these experiments performance in the shared task and the information 
made available when players are told of their success or failure allows participants to 
infer if they correctly interpreted a signal and, usually, their partner’s intended 
message.   
 
Although feedback can accomplish grounding similar to nonarbitrary representation 
in this way, there are issues regarding its role in explaining symbol emergence for 
present purposes.  The ecological validity of relying on feedback to bootstrap sign 
systems in natural settings is somewhat in question, as it rarely occurs in child 
language acquisition (Lust & Foley, 2004).  Moreover, feedback essentially amounts 
to a disruption of the communication process; it is meta-information on the outcome 
of a communicative exchange that is presented apart from the exchange itself after it 
has taken place.  Feedback can perhaps then be thought of as a proxy for nonarbitrary 
information, which is a direct and naturalistic mechanism to indicate meaning.  
Assuming communicators do not have direct knowledge of each other’s intended 
meanings and must distinguish them from larger contexts of other possible meanings 
in the moment of communication, it seems that, in the absence of other mechanisms, 
nonarbitrary representations are the primary way to initiate successful referential 
communication.  Including feedback in experiments on novel communication 
systems, then, is akin to an assumption that communicators would be able to indicate 
meaning or at least reduce uncertainty through nonarbitrary representations of some 
kind.  The nature and role of nonarbitrary information in this process will be 
addressed further in section 4 below on computational models.  For now, the point to 
emphasize is that when people must communicate without language, the default 
strategy is to do so by creating iconic and indexical signs. 
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One final point to note is that the success rate of participants in developing sign 
systems is lower in experiments that decrease or prohibit the utilization of 
nonarbitrary representation.  Of the ten pairs in Galantucci’s (2005) study, three pairs 
took over an hour to establish a system, two more pairs took over two hours to do so, 
and one pair never succeeded at all.  The results of Scott Phillips et al. (2009) study 
are even more striking, wherein only seven out of twelve pairs successfully developed 
a sign system.  In a follow-up experiment in the same study that removed the 
possibility for a strategy based on perceptual salience of colors, the number of 
successful pairs dropped to two out of twelve.  In contrast, unrestricted nonarbitrary 
representation seems to be an effective and immediate way to establish 
communication and construct a sign system (Garrod et al., 2007; Fay et al., 2010).  
Thus, not only is feedback a less ecologically plausible mechanism, it is also not 
guaranteed to enable sign systems to emerge at all.  
 
2.2.2 Nonarbitrary to arbitrary 
Before discussing these methods and findings, it is important to note that based on the 
ideas presented above on sign interpretation, we must conclude that the status of these 
experimentally derived signs cannot be known with certainty.  The perceptions of 
participants – whether they were relying on resemblance, concrete association or 
arbitrary mappings to interpret forms – were not examined or documented.  Therefore, 
evidence of their status as made available in these studies is indirect and suggestive.  
Data obtained provide some indications of sign type, and from these experimenters 
have concluded drawings became symbolic.  However, with an explicit consideration 
of sign interpretation in mind, alternative conclusions can also be reached from the 
same data.  I will examine previous studies’ analyses and the inferences made from 
their results and present an alternative analysis that reaches a contrasting conclusion.  
This conclusion will be based on the inferred interpretations of two separate, coherent 
perspectives in this experiment, those of interacting partners versus naïve outsiders. 
 
Complexity measures will not be addressed in detail here, as they are wholly form-
based and therefore largely uninformative for identifying sign type.  Given the trends 
observed in the cultural evolution of writing systems, in which forms change and 
simplify over time (Olson, 1996), simplified sign form likely does correlate with 
arbitrariness, which is why this method may in some circumstances be a useful tool 
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for identifying symbols.  However, they do not necessarily coincide, and it is the 
particular circumstances of these experiments that create precisely the conditions 
under which the two can become divorced.  Why this is the case will become clear in 
the following discussion. 
 
While checking the guesses of naïve outsiders appears to be a more perception-based 
method, it too proves to be problematic for effective sign assessment.  Comparing 
outsiders’ guesses to the meanings intended by partners with an interactive history 
amounts to comparing interpretations of the same form across separate contexts.  
Interacting partners have acquired unique common ground and awareness that an 
outsider does not share, and these differences constitute distinct contexts.  It is in fact 
arguable that the drawings were not signs for outsiders at all, as they were not 
encountered as part of a communicative process.  Communication is recipient- and 
sender-specific; messages are designed with a particular addressee in mind, and 
addressees interpret messages with regards to their producer’s identity (Clark & 
Marshall, 1981).  Drawings were not intended and tailored for outsiders, and outsiders 
were not aware of who produced the drawings and for what purpose.  Because these 
essential aspects of communication are not present in the task of guessing, it is 
questionable whether we should consider outsiders’ guesses as a coherent context of 
communication, which in itself would call into question the claim for symbols.  
Nevertheless, for the sake of argument, we will accept that the drawings were signs 
for outsiders.  Even if we do so, however, there are reasons to conclude these were not 
symbolic. 
 
First, consider the implications of blending sign interpretations from the two separate 
contexts of partners and outsiders.  When assigned meanings for a form do not align 
across these contexts, it is taken by the authors to indicate the form is arbitrary.  
However, as the ‘whiskers’ example from the preceding chapter demonstrates (section 
3.3.2), the relationship between form and meaning exists within a context.  The 
meaning of the same form in one context has no bearing on its meaning, and therefore 
semiotic status, in another context.  The reason the image from the example is 
symbolic of ‘an underground international nuclear arms trader’ is because the people 
who use the sign for this purpose have chosen intentionally to represent the meaning 
arbitrarily with this collection of lines.  In contrast, the image functions as an icon for 
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‘whiskers’ in another hypothetical context because its users designed it to resemble 
whiskers, recognize this resemblance and use it to represent that concept.  Therefore, 
in the same way, the relationship between form and meaning for signs developed 
through interactive communication exists in the interpretations of interacting partners.  
If we grant that the drawings were signs for outsiders, this relationship will similarly 
be determined by their interpretations.  Although we do not have direct knowledge of 
participants’ interpretations of signs, there is evidence to suggest forms were in fact 
perceived as nonarbitrary for both interacting partners and outsiders.  The context-
internal perceptions for each of these cases will be examined in turn. 
 
Interacting partners who actively changed a form over time can recognize iconic 
features that remain in final stage drawings, and they are very likely relying on this 
recognition to interpret the signs.  For instance, in the ‘computer monitor’ example 
from Garrod et al. (2007; Figure 1), it is clear from the sequence of drawings that the 
final image depicts a highly salient and easily recognizable feature of the second and 
all subsequent drawings: the computer tower.  The drawing at this stage includes the 
depiction of an associated object and not the referent itself, but this simply means the 
sign has become indexical and iconic, by virtue of reference to earlier drawings of the 
same referent.  The fact that partners maintain an unbroken chain of reproduced 
previous iconic features strongly suggests they are recognizing that iconicity, and 
therefore interpreting drawings as nonarbitrary signs. 
 
On the other hand, for outsiders, who are asked to match drawings to a list of 
concepts, it is useful to consider what this task involves.  Given no evidence to the 
contrary, we must assume that guesses are made by searching for iconic features in 
drawings that match features of referents in the list of concepts provided (in fact, it is 
unclear what other strategy would be used).  Guessers therefore would perceive a 
resemblance (and possibly an association) between the forms and the meanings to 
which they choose to match them.  For example, we can imagine that an outsider 
encountered the final ‘computer monitor’ drawing in Figure 2 and searched the list of 
concepts for what it might look like.  One concept in Garrod et al.’s (2007) list is 
‘parliament’.  The shape of the drawing is somewhat tower-like, and this outsider 
could see the image as resembling Big Ben, and therefore as representing parliament.  
If guesses are based on resemblance between form and chosen meaning in this way, 
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then outsiders are also interpreting signs as nonarbitrarily representing meanings.  The 
fact that outsiders perceive different nonarbitrary features than the drawings’ creators 
is not equivalent to arbitrariness, but rather independent icon- and/or index-based 
interpretations from separate contexts. 
 
As laid out in Chapter 1, the features that distinguish and define symbols are i) that 
users interpret forms as arbitrarily representing meanings and ii) users share those 
arbitrary form-meaning mappings.  However, in these studies, according to the 
alternative analysis presented here, neither of those cases holds (see next section for a 
discussion of point ii).  Thus, it is not clear that the conditions simulated in these 
experiments are major forces in spurring the development of symbolic 
communication.  This analysis also indicates that users do not appear to create 
symbols intentionally – either de novo or by transforming their own previously 
established nonarbitrary signs – which further  
supports the position outlined in Chapter 1 that an explanation for the emergence of 
symbols should avoid appealing to insight and deliberate invention.  
 
The low success of outsiders to guess interactors’ intended referents may not reliably 
indicate sign type, but it does indicate something relevant to sign interpretation, what 
I will call transparency in form.  Transparency in form – or outsiders’ ability to guess 
how a form is used as a sign in reference to a particular context of communication – is 
an indicator of the likelihood that intended nonarbitrary features will be perceived (in 
Sonesson’s (1997) terminology, a form that is transparent exhibits primary iconicity).  
In other words, guessability can be thought of as the likelihood for a form to be 
misinterpreted with respect to its users’ intent.  Low-guessability nonarbitrary signs 
are perhaps ‘potentially symbolic’ for non-users, though the question then becomes 
how outsiders are exposed to a form, perceive it as arbitrary, understand it is a sign 
nevertheless and then come to interpret it as representing the same meaning used by 
its creators (or perhaps some other meaning).  In order to see how transparency in 
form could lead to symbols, it is likely interaction-derived signs must somehow be 
transmitted beyond the individuals that participated in their development, which 
would require additional social dynamics on top of interactive communication alone.  
Thus, transparency in form tells us something about the possibility for symbolic 
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If the prediction that interaction-derived signs are not symbolic is correct, it not only 
raises issues with conclusions regarding how arbitrary signs are created, but also 
claims that conventionalization of symbols occurs as well.  It may be that the 
conventionalization of still-nonarbitrary signs observed in these studies is not 
representative of the process of conventionalization for symbols.  Because the 
mechanisms underlying the interpretation of nonarbitrary signs differ from those of 
symbols, the processes of transmission and reaching shared interpretation may 
similarly differ. 
 
Nonarbitrary signs, given sufficient transparency of form and/or interactional history, 
are interpretable from their form and implicit sensory and associational knowledge.  
Correctly understanding the intended referent of a particular nonarbitrary sign created 
by an individual in a particular context will of course require some inference from 
additional details of the context of communication.  Nevertheless, this process is 
largely accomplished by information contained in a sign’s form – in other words, 
successful interpretation is somewhat guaranteed by the nature of the communicative 
act itself.  Arriving at shared use of nonarbitrary signs, then, simply requires 
communicators to imitate and replicate signs they have understood by virtue of direct 
form-meaning relationships.  This kind of imitation appears to occur with nonarbitrary 
signs in interaction experiments, and other studies have shown that speakers with a 
pre-established symbolic system who are engaged in a dialogue will similarly align in 
their use of linguistic structures (Garrod & Pickering, 2009).  Thus, the imitative 
element underlying conventionalization of signs – whether nonarbitrary or symbolic – 
seems to result from a general feature of human social psychology.  Given that, the 
aspect of the conventionalization of novel arbitrary signs that requires explanation is 
how these are first correctly interpreted.  Section 4 below, covering computational 
models of symbol emergence, will explore this issue in more detail.  Presently we can 
note that the reviewed experiments, under the current analysis, do not demonstrate 
with certainty the conventionalization of novel symbols, as they do not involve the 
use of arbitrary signs. 
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2.3 Summary and discussion 
 
The central finding of experiments on emerging sign systems is that communication is 
initiated by way of nonarbitrary representations.  If the ability to create such 
representations is not available or substantially restricted, some other mechanism is 
needed to ground forms in meanings by allowing communicators to access each 
other’s intended messages; however, the ecological validity of this latter route to signs 
is questionable, and therefore less relevant to the emergence of symbols in human 
evolution.  Following that, we can reason that, in naturalistic settings, the relationship 
between a form and meaning is first established through iconicity and indexicality 
based on shared sensorimotor knowledge (together with inference from ambient 
information) before other communicative forces could cause that relationship to shift 
to an arbitrary interpretation of signs.  Thus, we can conclude that symbolic 
representations, when they do arise, somehow develop out of the nonarbitrary 
representations created to enable the initiation of communication.  This is in line with 
the hypothesis of bodily mimesis, which holds that the transition from nonhuman 
communication to symbolic language would have involved an intermediate stage of 
nonsymbolic, referential communication, from which symbols emerged. 
 
It is also important to note that, in the absence of additional supporting mechanisms, 
nonarbitrary signs shown capable of effectively establishing communication are 
representationally potent.  That is, their forms typically embody many iconic features 
and robustly portray and/or indicate their referents.  As the opportunity for 
nonarbitrariness is diminished, successful communication relies more and more on 
feedback. While these experiments preclude pointing, this strategy is similarly potent, 
as referents can be indicated with little uncertainty.  The capacity for rich nonarbitrary 
representation in establishing communication is central to arguments presented in this 
thesis and will be revisited in Chapter 3. 
 
In addition to lending support to the bodily mimesis hypothesis, these studies also tell 
us something about the potentiality of a transition from nonarbitrary to symbolic 
communication.  As argued here, graphical communication experiments show the 
persistent, continued use of nonarbitrary signs under multiple communicative 
conditions, including different mediums of expression, purposes motivating 
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communication and social dynamics.  If this conclusion is accepted, it suggests 
symbols are not guaranteed to arise in a given situation even if the potential exists, in 
this case by virtue of users that understand and use symbols regularly.  Despite the 
fact that interpretations of signs as arbitrary can ‘fall out’ of communication through 
signs generally in modern communicative environments (Chapter 1, section 3.2.3), 
and despite the known advantages of symbols (Chapter 1, section 3.3), it appears that 
some circumstances impede or at least do not promote a transition from nonarbitrary 
to symbolic signs.  In addition, it appears users do not deliberately invent symbols, 
further demonstrating the need to look for other forces apart from intention and 
insight.  Thus, it is important to identify the factors that could in fact cause or allow a 
transition to take place. 
 
Under certain conditions iconicity and indexicality are powerful and effective means 
of communication, and it seems people will continue to employ these strategies even 
though they have prior knowledge of symbol use and the possibility for symbol 
creation exists.  For such nonarbitrary signs to become symbolic, their forms must 
somehow become disconnected from their meanings in the mind of some user or 
users.  If a transition does take place, it will therefore likely occur unintentionally, 
resulting from a misinterpretation on the part of communicators.  Because, at least in 
modern settings, a symbolic interpretation of an intended nonarbitrary sign involves a 
misperception of iconic or indexical features, if and how a transition occurs will 
depend on the semiotic profile of the medium of expression and the social dynamics 
of communication.  If a medium has a high capacity for iconicity and multiple 
features of a referent are depicted in a sign, the more likely it is that those features 
will be recognized and the intended nonarbitrariness of the sign preserved.  If 
communicators have extensive common ground and shared understanding of the 
communicative circumstances, the more likely they are to correctly interpret each 
other’s signs as intended.  Thus, the interaction of these two factors in a given 
circumstance will influence whether symbolic interpretation arises. 
 
The conditions of experiments on interactive communication do not appear to have 
spurred such a transition, which probably results from a combination of both signaling 
medium and transmission dynamics.  The graphical medium is easily exploited for 
iconicity, and participants make use of this capacity to establish communication.  
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Although many iconic features produced in early rounds are lost in later ones, the 
shared history of interacting partners ensures recognition of those features that 
continue to be portrayed in drawings.  These dynamics result in low transparency in 
form, as described above, though a break in the nonarbitrary connection between form 
and meaning for sign users likely has not yet taken place, and this transition may 
result from the additional involvement of outsiders in communication via interaction-
derived signs. Even if outsiders would potentially interpret reduced signs as arbitrary, 
however, it is not clear from these studies how such signs move beyond the limited 
context of interaction.  Imagine that after an interactive exchange like those described 
above takes place, one member of the pair or group is asked to communicate the same 
concepts to a new person.  The person from the interactive pair knows that an outsider 
who did not witness their development will not understand final stage signs used with 
the previous partner, and would therefore not use them to communicate with the new 
individual.  Instead, we expect a reversion to more elaborately iconic forms that can 
be understood without prior knowledge.  Thus, it is not clear how interaction-derived 
signs would be used with outsiders, and therefore also not clear how transmission 
would occur.  Precisely how interactive communication combined with other 
transmission processes could result in initially nonarbitrary signs becoming symbolic 
is likely an important and potentially fruitful line of research into the origins of 
symbols.  Some preliminary findings from a very recent study (Caldwell, under 
review) suggest that a combination of interactive communication and vertical 
transmission to newcomers may lead to symbolic interpretations of signs, although 
this design also involved direct feedback, so it is unclear if and how this factor 
influenced the transition. 
 
The argument that these studies also do not demonstrate conventionalization of 
arbitrary signs reveals how the different interpretive processes underlying 
nonarbitrary signs and symbols have implications for how signs come to be shared.  
Namely, the transmission – and by extension conventionalization – of novel symbols 
requires mechanisms for correctly interpreting signs that are not necessary for – or at 
least less critically involved in – nonarbitrary communication.  The emergence of 
symbols from nonarbitrary signs, then, involves two kinds of grounding.  First, 
communication is established and signs grounded by way of nonarbitrary 
relationships between form and meaning.  A transition to symbols breaks this 
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relationship, and their forms must be grounded in meaning through other, additional 
mechanisms.  I will refer to the initial grounding of communication as establishment 
and reserve grounding for the further establishment of shared arbitrary signs, as this is 
how the phenomenon is commonly referred to in other contexts.  The question of 
grounding will be addressed in section 4, and the roles of both establishment and 
grounding in the emergence of symbolic communication will be discussed at the end 
of the chapter. 
 
While the studies examined here may not demonstrate an actual symbolic 
transformation, it is of course still possible for initially nonarbitrary representations to 
become arbitrary and conventionalize through other or additional means.  This 
process appears to have occurred in modern sign languages (Frishberg, 1975), and the 
next section will examine research on newly developed sign languages in order to 
understand how it could take place.   
 
3. Developing signed languages 
 
The study of established signed languages like American Sign Language as a mode of 
communication has shown that gesture can be used symbolically and function as a 
fully linguistic device, in contrast to the primarily nonarbitrary role in which it 
generally operates when accompanying speech (a topic covered in Chapter 3).  The 
discovery of deaf communities in which people did not share an established sign 
language and new sign systems are in the process of development has shed light on 
how gestures could become symbolic.  The findings of this research will be reviewed 
briefly, followed by a discussion of its implications for the question of symbol 
emergence. 
 
3.1 Summary of findings 
 
Research on deaf communities found that in situations where people do not share an 
established sign language, they nevertheless engage in communication through iconic 
and indexical gestures.  Over time these initially nonarbitrary gestures take on all the 
properties of language, including arbitrariness and syntax, among other features 
(Meir, Sandler, Padden & Aronoff, 2010; Sandler, Meir, Padden & Aronoff, 2005).  
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This transition is observed by comparing the signs of different cohorts, or generations, 
in a system’s development.  In contrast to the signs produced by later cohort 
members, the gestures of signers from early stages of a new language appear to be 
overwhelmingly iconic and are more elaborately so, involving larger and longer 
movements of the body depicting a greater number of a referent’s features.  While 
much iconicity seems to remain in later stages, signers also use many gestures that 
appear to be symbolic. 
 
Meir et al. (2010) describe how the emergence of new signed languages has been 
observed in two types of settings: i) small, tight-knit and fairly isolated groups, and ii) 
larger, more diverse communities with more exposure to outside influences. Small-
group languages usually arise in isolated villages with an above average occurrence of 
congenital deafness, and therefore a much more concentrated level of deaf individuals 
in the population.  Due to the high proportion of signers and the dense, multiplex 
social relations characterizing these communities, hearing individuals frequently will 
also learn and use the sign language.  Large-group languages arise when many deaf 
individuals from different backgrounds are brought together, often in an institutional 
setting such as a school.  Al-Sayyid Bedouin Sign Language (ABSL) exemplifies a 
small-group origin language (Senghas, 2005), while Nicaraguan Sign Language 
(NSL) emerged in a large-group setting (Senghas, 1995). 
 
Meir et al. (2010) show that differences in group size and dynamics influence the 
development of sign systems and the resulting languages along a number of 
dimensions.  Large-group derived languages typically have more extensive 
grammatical marking and less lexical variation than small-group languages.  The 
more systematic structure of large-group languages is thought to be related to the 
social and communicative demands that arise when many people without common 
backgrounds must communicate with each other; when less understanding is shared 
through common cultural knowledge and experience, information must be more 
explicitly expressed in communication (this argument is akin to Wray and Grace’s 
(2007) claim that language structure is related to the social structure of its speakers).  
There is also generally more contact with outside influences and other sign languages 
in large-group settings.  Because individuals in small-group settings are typically 
more intimate and share a great deal of knowledge and experience, much of what is 
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communicated will not need to be explicitly encoded in the signing system.  In 
addition, due to the relative isolation of these communities, there is very little 
influence from other cultures or sign languages.  Meir et al. (2010) argue that the 
features of small-group settings are more naturalistic and representative of the context 
in which languages first arose. 
 
Another major finding regarding small-group languages is the prevalence of lexical 
variation, or the use of multiple forms to represent the same meaning (Meir et al. 
2010).  For example, 70% of signs have three or more variants in one small-group 
derived language, Providence Island Sign Language (PSL), and many common lexical 




New signed languages like ABSL and NSL illustrate that iconic gestures can undergo 
reinterpretation to become symbolic and shared by members of a community.  These 
studies do not directly address how signs are deemed to be symbolic, though we can 
probably presume this in part involved asking signers about their own perceptions of 
signs.  Nevertheless, there is strong evidence to suggest these claims are true and 
signers interpret many gestures as arbitrary. 
 
First, purportedly symbolic signs show low what has been called here transparency in 
form (section 2.2.2); the meaning of gestures for non-users is not readily interpretable 
from features of sign forms.  Even with knowledge of intended referents, a 
nonarbitrary relationship between form and meaning is not immediately obvious, 
which increases the likelihood that sign users, like non-users, do not perceive such a 
relationship.  As argued previously, transparency in form is not a definitive indicator 
of a symbolic relationship, though in many cases the two are correlated.  The reason it 
is an unreliable method for interactive communication experiments described above is 
because the experimental conditions create the precise circumstances under which 
nonarbitrariness would be intended and perceived in minimal, simplified forms – a 
situation in which signs are used by those who both created them and witnessed the 
loss (and retention) of some nonarbitrary features.  In contrast, for developing sign 
languages many, if not most, sign users in later generations were not participants in a 
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sign’s creation and most of its development, and therefore not privy to the historical 
knowledge that would allow remaining nonarbitrary features, if they exist, to be 
perceived.  While still not definitive, low transparency in form in this particular case 
much more strongly suggests signs are symbolic for users. 
 
Second, as mentioned above, many signs show high levels of lexical variation, or low 
levels of conventionalization.  Importantly, signs that show this kind of variation are 
precisely those that are considered iconic.  Because these gestures are understandable 
by recognition of nonarbitrary form-meaning relationships, they do not need to be 
conventionalized in order to communicate effectively.  Signs that are considered 
symbolic do not show the same kind of variation, and this higher level of 
conventionalization likely results from an arbitrary form-meaning relationship, which 
demands shared cultural knowledge between users to function effectively. 
 
Finally, the lexicon of the most recent cohorts contains words that are not found in 
earlier cohorts and refer to meanings that are not as amenable to nonarbitrary 
representation.  For example, members of the most recent NSL generation have a sign 
for ‘believe’, a meaning for which the earliest cohort does not have a sign (Pyers & 
Senghas, 2009).  The abstract, second-order nature of a concept like ‘believe’ could 
account for its absence in earlier stages, and its creation by later users was likely 
enabled by their having access to an established, at least partially symbolic, sign 
system.  Furthermore, because it is not immediately apparent how best to portray the 
meaning of ‘believe’ iconically and/or indexically, it again decreases the likelihood 
that users perceive its sign as nonarbitrary.  Although each of these reasons 
individually is not unequivocal evidence that purported symbols are in fact symbolic, 
taken together in combination strongly suggests we can safely accept the conclusion 
that some gestures in emerging sign systems transition from nonarbitrary to symbolic. 
 
An important finding from this research is the fact that the transition from 
nonarbitrary, pantomime-like communication to symbolic, language-like 
communication spanned multiple generations.
6
  The changes that resulted in arbitrary 
                                                
6
 The term ‘generation’ is used here in the broad sense to denote distinct groups 
separated by time.  For ABSL and other village sign languages groups correspond to 
the more specific sense of adult-child, family generations.  NSL generations, on the 
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signs, grammatical marking and other linguistic qualities arose when new groups of 
signers were exposed to the founders’ and previous generations’ communication 
system.  This is in line with the conclusion reached above regarding experimental sign 
research (section 2) that transmission to outsiders who were not a part of a sign’s 
creation and development is likely a key causal element behind an established 
nonarbitrary sign becoming symbolic.  Like the simulated communities in Fay et al.’s 
(2008) study, members of founding populations have direct or indirect knowledge of 
signs’ development.  When new individuals who were not involved in this process 
join the community, their acquisition of the system serves to sever signs from their 
historical origins, allowing new interpretations of form-meaning relationships to take 
place.  As further evidence to the role of generational transfer, we can make a direct 
comparison and look to novel sign systems that do not get passed on to new users.  
Homesign is a term used for the gestures developed by deaf children born to hearing 
parents who do not use or learn a sign language (Goldin-Meadow, 2003).  The signs 
used by children to communicate with hearing individuals are not adopted by others, 
and these gesture systems never fully take on the linguistic qualities found in 
developing sign languages (Goldin-Meadow, 2003).  Thus, in naturalistic settings 
wherein a population creates nonarbitrary gestures to establish communication, it 
appears transmission to new individuals is a critical mechanism in transitioning from 
nonarbitrary to symbolic interpretations of signs. 
 
While generational transfer broadly can be pointed to as a mechanism behind such a 
transition, the precise circumstances that lead intended nonarbitrary signs to be 
interpreted as symbolic remain unclear.  It may be that child acquisition is a major 
factor, as new generations in NSL and ABSL are made up of either children entering 
the school or deaf children born into the village.  Because children lack much of the 
knowledge and experience held by adults, they will not recognize as easily all the 
nonarbitrary features that an adult might perceive.  However, transmission to children 
is not a theoretical necessity, at least in the modern communicative environment, so it 
is also possible that certain social and communicative dynamics instigate symbolic 
interpretations of signs.  Although child acquisition may not significantly affect or 
change the process of symbolic reinterpretation itself, it could speed the process of 
                                                                                                                                       
other hand, are new classes of students entering the school and learning signs from 
more senior students. 
 68 
conventionalization of new symbols by increasing the number of symbolic 
interpretations held in the population that could potentially spread to others. 
 
Similar to the question of reinterpretation, the precise details underlying the 
conventionalization of newly interpreted symbols are not apparent from this research.  
We can reason that some other communicative supports apart from transparent form-
meaning relationships allow arbitrary signs to be understood and adopted by new 
users.  Because developing sign languages arise in natural settings, direct feedback 
likely plays a minimal role.  The following section on computational models explores 
other possible mechanisms, and the details of both reinterpretation and 
conventionalization will be addressed in the general discussion at the end of the 
chapter. 
 
Although developing sign languages offer important insights into the emergence of 
symbolic communication, we can note some interesting caveats that suggest this 
phenomenon might not exactly mirror how the process took place in human evolution.  
First, these languages arise in a rich setting of symbolic culture and communication.  
Symbolic representation is ubiquitous in the larger cultural milieu of modern 
societies, and its prevalence may in some way support and structure developing sign 
systems.  Deaf individuals are fully aware that hearing people communicate with each 
other through sound, images and orthography, much of which would presumably 
appear arbitrary, and therefore symbolic, to an observer.  This knowledge of symbolic 
communication and culture likely influences the expectations and cognitive mindsets 
of signers, which in turn could effect how signs are interpreted, learned and 
transmitted.  While these factors may not be solely responsible for spurring symbolic 
interpretations of signs, they may affect a transition to conventionalized, symbolic 
communication in other ways.  One possibility is that the process takes place more 
rapidly, though there may be more subtle affects that are difficult to predict. 
 
A second distinction worth noting is that sign languages – both new and 
institutionalized – retain a great deal of iconicity and/or indexicality (Perniss, 
Thompson & Vigliocco 2010).  Many lexical items appear to be based on nonarbitrary 
features, and even some grammatical relations are expressed through iconic use of 
space (Meir, 2002).  Spoken language also makes use of nonarbitrariness (a topic that 
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will be examined more closely in Chapter 3), though it seems to be to a lesser extent 
than signed languages.  This persistent and pervasive use of nonarbitrary 
representation is related to the relatively high degree of lexical variation mentioned 
previously. Conventionalization is especially low in new signed languages, but even 
well-established, highly institutionalized signed languages show considerable lexical 
variation.  For example, 28.6% of signs in American Sign Language have three or 
more variants (Washabaugh, 1986; cited in Meir et al., 2010).  To understand this it is 
important to note that lexical variation as used by the authors appears to be neither the 
same as sociolinguistic variation like phonological or phonetic differences across 
dialects nor equivalent to synonymy.  For example, Meir et al. (2010) describe how 
the word cat in ABSL has three versions, and each depicts a different set of cats’ 
features – one involving whiskers, another footprints and the third the action of a cat 
licking its front paws.  The forms for these three signs bear little or no resemblance to 
each other, but nevertheless all resemble the same referent in some way.  Thus, this 
kind of variation is not analogous to accent variation, wherein related social groups 
pronounce what is recognizably the same word with distinct yet similar sounds.  
There are also reasons to conclude the phenomenon is not simply synonymy.  Because 
these signs were elicited in an experimental setting, we can assume signers were given 
explicit, specific and basic meanings and asked for that word in their language.  A 
context such as this leaves little room for nuances in meaning that could give rise to 
multiple potential translations for signers to offer.  Instead, sign variation probably 
results from the fact that some referents have many salient features, and nonarbitrary 
representation allows for the same meaning to be conveyed by portraying multiple, 
distinct sets of features.  From the evidence available, then, it appears these findings 
on lexical variation are genuine dissimilarities in conventionalization with spoken 
language, which suggests the process of conventionalization in the emergence of 
vocal symbols may differ from that of sign languages in important ways. 
 
Reduced conventionalization and continued reliance on nonarbitrariness ultimately 
follow from perhaps the most fundamental difference in circumstances – modality of 
communication.  As discussed in Chapter 1, section 3, the medium in which signs are 
conveyed will affect interpretive processes as a function of its capacity for different 
types of representation.  The gestural modality allows for many opportunities to 
represent nonarbitrary features, and new signed languages demonstrate that people not 
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only exploit this possibility in order to establish communication but also continue to 
use nonarbitrary signs even after symbolic communication – a superior strategy in 
many ways (Chapter 1, section 3.3) – arises.  This suggests that when the medium in 
which signs are conveyed has a high capacity for nonarbitrariness, symbolic 
reinterpretation may be somewhat limited.  In other words, if nonarbitrary features are 
easily representable and recognizable, people will continue to use and correctly 
perceive nonarbitrary signs even if they have knowledge of symbols otherwise.  In 
addition, the fact that the purportedly more advantageous strategy of symbolic 
communication is not more exploited by signers suggests the theoretical advantages 
of symbols are not especially relevant for communication in practice.  This is further 
evidence that pointing to advantages of symbols may not be a satisfactory explanation 
for their emergence (Chapter 1, section 2.4). 
 
In addition to taking place in a different modality, communication in signed languages 
is distinct in that it occurs in a single modality.  Human communication is typically 
carried out in multiple modalities simultaneously – both vocal and gestural 
(multimodality will be discussed in detail in Chapter 1).  The fact that signed 
languages are limited to gesture alone likely affects how both reinterpretation and 
conventionalization occur.  The presence of two channels of expression means signs 
produced together in separate modalities will be perceived relative to one another, 
which will in turn determine the modality in which symbols arise.  The fact that 
gestures become symbolic in developing signed languages may be largely a 
consequence of gesture being the only available channel for this transition occur, and 
therefore not necessarily representative of the process under normal circumstances of 
human communication.  The following chapters will discuss these issues further, 
including the specific features of each modality, their interaction and how 
multimodality relates to the emergence of symbolic communication in human 
evolution. 
 
3.3 Summary and discussion 
 
Despite the fact that a number of details remain in question, research on developing 
sign languages reveals important large-scale features of emerging symbolic 
communication.  In line with experimental studies, it shows that communication is 
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established with nonarbitrary representation.  When humans who do not possess 
knowledge of a language need and desire to communicate with each other in natural 
settings, they do so initially by creating iconic and/or indexical signs.  In this case, it 
seems the medium of gesture allows for a sufficiently rich and informative 
nonarbitrary communication system to develop that can further support the emergence 
of a different kind of representational strategy.  Gesture is able to establish 
communication, from which symbolic interpretations arise through certain 
transmission processes that occur when naïve outsiders join the community and learn 
the sign system.  In addition, communication through the gestural modality allows for 
these novel symbols to be grounded for others and conventionalize.  The capacity for 
gesture to enable both of these processes presumably lies in its high potential for 
nonarbitrary representation, and this quality together with the unimodal nature of 
communication likely accounts for many of the differences between signed languages 
– both developing and institutionalized – and spoken language.  The aim of following 
chapters will be to investigate the particular features of typical human communication 
and how the two processes of establishment and conventionalization would be 
realized in that context. 
 
 
This and the previous section have been informative predominantly on the subject of 
the interpretation component of symbolic communication.  For experimental studies, 
we cannot confidently accept results on conventionalization, as the presence of 
symbols remains in question.  In addition, the conventionalization of novel signs is a 
group-level phenomenon and involves complex interactions between multiple 
individuals over time, and is therefore difficult to directly observe in natural settings.  
The following section will review computational research focusing on 
conventionalization that models this complexity and scale. 
 
 
4. Computational models 
 
We can first acknowledge which aspects of the emergence of symbolic 
communication computational simulations can help us to understand.  Hutchins and 
Johnson (2009) argue that models implemented thus far assume prior knowledge of 
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intentional representation and therefore do not address the emergence of a symbolic 
medium or symbolic capacity, only the emergence of structure in a symbolic medium.  
In other words, it is left unresolved how the ability and/or inclination to use signs to 
communicate (be it through iconic gestures, arbitrary sounds or some other form) may 
have itself arisen.  In the terms of this thesis, the criticism is that simulations of the 
kind conducted so far take for granted the interpretation element of signs generally – 
that communicators create and perceive intentional, referential representations – and 
only address the conventionalization of arbitrary signs in a population.  This claim 
may be well founded, as models involve the direct transfer of messages between 
agents.  However, we can accept models’ assumption of interpretative abilities, as the 
state in the emergence of symbolic communication under examination here similarly 
assumes the ability for this type of representation through bodily mimesis, though 
what kind of interpretation users have of signs is of course relevant (how the capacity 
for bodily mimesis relates to a prior ability to interpret symbols will be addressed in 
chapter 3).  While this means the computational models reviewed here cannot tell us 
how signs become interpreted as symbolic, they can nevertheless inform our 
understanding of how new symbols, once they come about, could spread throughout a 
population and conventionalize.  Conventionalization in the context of simulations is 
when all agents in a population hold the same signal-meaning mappings, which is 
referred to as convergence. 
 
Because the focus of this section is the conventionalization of symbols, it will be 
examining the concept of grounding discussed above (section 2.3).  When a new 
arbitrary sign is used, its receiver must somehow correctly identify the meaning that 
sign was intended to convey.  Successful grounding allows for particular arbitrary 
sign-meaning mappings to be understood and adopted by other individuals, and thus 
potentially spread throughout a population, leading to convergence.  The following 
sections will explore the mechanisms underlying these related phenomena by first 
reviewing how the symbol grounding problem has been addressed by various 






4.1 Symbol grounding 
 
The problem of symbol grounding follows from the fact that symbols, being arbitrary, 
have no direct or immediately knowable connection to their referents.  As famously 
illustrated by Quine (1960), upon hearing an unknown word, there is no way to know 
with full certainty and precision its intended referent.  That is, it is not immediately 
clear how communicators come to adopt shared word-to-meaning mappings because a 
given context of speaking in theory affords an infinite number of possible 
interpretations. 
 
One area in which symbol grounding has been the focus is child language acquisition, 
which involves learning an established symbolic system of word-meaning mappings.  
Traditionally, abilities related to intention reading and sharing attentional states are 
proposed as mechanisms that allow children to identify correctly the target object 
referred to by utterances directed at them (reviewed in Smith, Smith, Blythe & Vogt, 
2006).  Computational and mathematical models have demonstrated that cross-
situational learning strategies also enable the acquisition of vocabularies (Smith et al., 
2006; Smith, Smith & Blythe, 2011).  Cross-situational learning is when signals are 
mapped to meanings by eliminating potential signal-meaning pairs based on their co-
occurrences across different contexts of communication.  For example, say a signal, 
s1, occurs in three different contexts consisting of three objects each, {o1, o3, o6}, {o1, 
o2, o3} and {o2, o3, o5}.  By comparing the common contexts of s1, one can infer that 
it refers to o3, as this is the only object present across all contexts.  Cross-situational 
learning is therefore one mechanism that can reduce uncertainty in vocabulary 
learning and helps to resolve the problem of symbol grounding in the acquisition 
process.  Although cross-situational learning aids in mapping signals to meanings in 
this way, we can note that it is not strictly a grounding mechanism in itself and is 
more a further learning process that operates on the output of the grounding process.  
That is, it does not connect signals to meanings in the communicative exchange itself 
by indicating meaning but instead rules out competing pairings over the course of 
multiple communicative exchanges.  Nevertheless, for present purposes we can treat 
cross-situational learning as a grounding mechanism as it accomplishes similar ends. 
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Research in artificial intelligence has also shed light on the phenomenon of symbol 
grounding (reviewed in Steels, 2003 and Roy, 2005).  These studies demonstrate that 
communicating robots can coordinate mappings between signals and meanings that 
correspond to sensory information.  Typically, members of a population of robots 
endowed with one or more sensory channels attempt to communicate with each other 
about features of their shared environment.  Successful grounding relies on the ability 
of communicators to access each other’s attentional states via perceptual information.  
In this way, signals become associated with aspects of perceptual content.  The 
‘pragmatic feedback’ (Steels, 2003) embodied in robots’ interactions allows a hearer 
to correctly identify a speaker’s intended referent by coordinating its sensory channels 
to focus on the same environmental feature to which the speaker is attending.  The 
mechanism for establishing shared attention states has been implemented as direct 
access to a speaker’s current sensory inputs (equated to pointing) (Steels & Kaplan, 
1998) and eye-gaze tracking (Roy, 2005). These strategies partially mirror some 
aspects of the human strategies for establishing joint attention, though a number of 
other, less well understood mechanisms are also involved (Steels, 2003).  Error 
feedback is another method of establishing reference, but it has been shown to be 
functionally equivalent to reliably precise joint attention (Vogt & Coumans, 2003), as 
both mechanisms serve to reduce the context of communication to one object. 
 
The reviewed research indicates that symbols can be successfully grounded in 
meanings, either through situated, embodied interaction or a certain type of learning 
strategy.  Successful grounding is one element that ultimately leads to successful 
convergence.  Grounding can take multiple forms – be it cross-situational learning 
strategies or various methods of establishing joint attention.  Different types of 
grounding will have differential effects on the extent of convergence in emerging 
communication systems.  The following section will discuss the ways in which 
successful convergence has been attained in various models. 
 
4.2 Models of convergence 
 
A vast number of studies have been carried out that model the emergence of shared 
vocabularies.  However, these can typically be classed into a few distinct categories 
based on the parameters of their designs.  For example, a number of studies simulate 
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joint attention and/or corrective feedback strategies for grounding symbols 
(Baronchelli, Felici, Caglioti, Loreto & Steels 2005; De Jong, 2000; Steels & Kaplan, 
2002; Steels & Vogt, 1997; Vogt 2001).  Other studies test emergence using cross-
situational learning strategies, though fewer of these exist (A.D.M Smith, 2001; Vogt, 
2000a, Vogt, 200b).  (A review of the literature can be found in Cangelosi & Parisi, 
2002.)  These strategies will be discussed in more detail below, but due to this overlap 
in factors underlying conventionalization, a comprehensive review of the modeling 
literature will not be carried out here.  Instead, a selection of representative designs 




Models of emerging symbolic systems vary along four main parameters: grounding 
mechanism, population structure/transmission dynamics, learning method and 
signaling method.  Some of these parameters may overlap and interact.  For example, 
learning method and signaling method (see below) may be in some ways related to 
grounding strategy, demonstrated most clearly in A.D.M Smith’s (2001) cross-
situational learning model.  Nevertheless, it is possible and useful to separate these 
mechanisms to some degree in order to understand how shared symbolic systems 
emerge. 
 
A grounding mechanism may be one of those discussed above.  Precise joint attention 
serves to limit communication to a single signal-meaning pair, which will be referred 
to as ‘perfect context reduction’.  All models discussed use perfect context reduction 
except A.D.M. Smith (2001), which relies on cross-situational learning. 
 
Population structure and transmission dynamics will dictate the total number of agents 
communicating with each other, which agents communicate with which other agents 
and if the members of a population change over time.  The studies under review use 
either a closed-group or replacement method (Mesoudi & Whiten, 2008).  Closed-
group structures consist of a static population wherein all members communicate with 
each other with equal probability (i.e., horizontal transmission alone).  The 
replacement method differs in that at regular intervals certain members of a 
population are removed and replaced by new members with no previous experience 
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communicating or learning a vocabulary.  The replacement structure implemented by 
K. Smith (2002) simulates a specific type of iterated learning (Kirby, 1999), which is 
the process by which the output of one agent is used as the input of another agent, 
whose output is then used as the input for the next agent, and so on.  While closed-
groups involve iterated learning, in that as part of the process of building individual 
vocabularies agents produce signals that other agents receive as input, and those 
agents go on to produce signals for other agents, there is not a uni-directional, linear 
transmission structure.  Transmission is entirely vertical in Smith’s (2002) 
replacement groups; new members learn from signal-meaning pairs produced by 
existing members, but new members do not communicate back to existing members 
or with each other.  In addition, new members in replacement groups will influence a 
developing signaling system differently than members that remain in a closed-group 
over time.  Members of each new generation begin at an initial state of no 
communicative experience and learn from existing ‘speakers’.  Repeated learning by 
new individuals and the removal of agents with acquired vocabularies shapes a 
developing communication system by amplifying the effects of the particular learning 
biases agents possess (Kirby, Dowman & Griffiths, 2007).  In contrast, it is the 
accumulated experience of a static set of agents in closed-groups that influences how 
their vocabularies are shaped over time. 
 
Learning strategy determines how agents associate signals and meanings.  The most 
basic learning strategy is simple positive association, wherein relationships between 
signals and meanings (whether measured in frequency counts or connection weights) 
are strengthened whenever they co-occur.  The learning method modeled in most of 
these studies is a somewhat more robust one that includes negative disassociation, 
referred to as lateral inhibition.  In lateral inhibition, connections between co-
occurring signals and meanings are increased, while at the same time connections 
between those and other meanings and signals, respectively, are reduced.  This type of 
learning functions as a bias for one-to-one mappings between signals and meanings – 
or a bias against homonymy.  A.D.M. Smith (2001) models cross-situational learning, 
which involves tracking an inventory of potential signal-meaning pairs based on all 
previous contexts of individual signals experienced with multiple meanings.  Agents 
come to map signals to individual meanings over time based on their co-occurrence 
and the co-occurrence of that signal with other meanings.  This strategy involves 
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continually tracking and updating accumulated signal and meaning co-occurrences by 
eliminating previously stored potential signal-meaning pairs when contradictory 
evidence is found in new contexts.  It is important to note that cross-situational 
learning tracks frequencies for all meanings in an observed context.  Keeping track of 
every potential meaning allows a learner to use past experience to hone in on a correct 
meaning pairing by comparing the meanings experienced in each new context with all 
those in past contexts. 
 
Signaling method in most models is generally straightforward and simply involves a 
speaker choosing signals based on strength of association with meanings.  A.D.M. 
Smith’s (2001) model again differs in this respect, as he employs a mechanism called 
an obverter (Oliphant & Batali, 1997) for signal selection.  With an obverter strategy, 
agents design messages so that they themselves would understand them; for a given 
meaning, a signal is selected with the strongest co-occurrence relationship with that 
meaning based on their own communicative history.  K. Smith (2003) argues that an 
obverter also amounts to a bias for one-to-one mapping. 
 
In previous studies, successful convergence on a shared vocabulary depends crucially 
on the implementation of particular features specified above and/or a combination 
thereof.  This review will look at three major paradigms and their prototypical models 
in order to show some of the different ways in which convergence can be attained. 
 
4.2.3 Routes to convergence 
The most basic model has been carried out with both robots (Steels, L., F. Kaplan, A. 
McIntyre, & J. Van Looveren, 2002) and simulated agents (Baronchelli et al., 2005; 
Vogt & Coumans, 2003; Steels & Kaplan, 1998).  In this paradigm, simulations begin 
with a population of agents with the ability to produce and receive signals, but they do 
not start out with a vocabulary or share any sort of signaling system.  Thus, agents do 
not initially have a way to correctly interpret signals by way of a common code, and 
instead must, through some other means, obtain knowledge of the signaler’s intended 
meaning.  All of these models provide grounding for signals in this way through 
perfect context reduction.  In addition, all implement closed-group population 
structure and lateral inhibition learning.  Given these conditions, after a period of 
repeated communication events populations attain high communicative accuracy (at 
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or above 95%), which indicates convergence on a shared signaling system.  Vogt & 
Coumans (2003) showed that these results hold for population sizes of up to twenty 
agents.  Steels & Kaplan (1998) also tested how removing the mechanism for joint 
attention affected outcomes by making the context of communication include the 
entire meaning space – in other words, testing perfect context reduction versus zero 
context reduction.  Simulations in which context reduction was hindered did not result 
in successful convergence, demonstrating the mechanism is crucial for convergence in 
this paradigm (Steels & Kaplan, 1998). 
 
K. Smith’s (2002) model, which also implemented perfect context reduction, 
compared the effects of different learning strategies and iterated learning on the 
construction of shared vocabularies.  As mentioned previously, the population 
structure was based on the replacement method, which removes some agents and 
introduces new ones into a population each generation.  Instead of repeated bi-
directional communication between the same set of agents, his model simulates 
repeated learning by new agents from ‘utterances’ produced by a subset of the 
existing members of the population.  Agents that comprise a population at the start of 
each simulation begin with random associations between signals and meanings.  
Smith found that populations with no initial shared vocabulary can construct a shared 
system and reach convergence only when learning institutes lateral inhibition, which 
translates to a bias against homonymy.  Subsequent work (Smith, personal 
communication) further showed that when the replacement method was not 
implemented the same results hold, indicating this particular population structure is 
not critical to convergence.  Perfect context reduction is likely a critical element for 
successful convergence in this model, as it is what allows agents to associate the 
correct meaning with a given signal, though this was not specifically tested.  
However, K. Smith (2002) demonstrates that this grounding mechanism on its own is 
not sufficient.  Under such conditions, a certain type of learning is required to shape 
vocabularies as they are acquired by agents in each new generation. 
 
A.D.M. Smith’s (2001) model is similar to those already discussed in that agents 
begin simulation runs with no shared vocabularies.  Beyond that, it is distinct along a 
number of dimensions.  First, communication events are not limited to a single signal 
paired with a single meaning; instead, ‘hearers’ receive a signal together with a 
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context of meanings (this parameter was varied, but the standard size was five).  
Agents use cross-situational learning to build their individual vocabularies over time 
through experience of multiple, overlapping signals and contexts.  The obverter 
signaling mechanism also exploits structural knowledge of agents’ lexicons and 
previous experiences with other agents to determine what signal-meaning pairs are to 
be produced by a ‘speaker’ in a given communication event. Smith found that 
populations consisting of two agents would eventually converge on a shared signaling 
system.  Vogt & Coumans (2003) replicated Smith’s model and tested the effects of 
varying population size.  They found that – unlike models with perfect context 
reduction – populations of ten or more agents no longer reach high communicative 
accuracy, and thus do not converge on a shared vocabulary.  Cross-situational 
learning and obverter signaling can therefore lead to the emergence of shared 
vocabularies, though under more limited conditions. 
 
The reviewed models have identified some mechanisms that, given certain conditions, 
can reliably lead a population of agents to associate the same signals with the same 
meanings and successfully communicate with each other.  In two of the three model 
types, some sort of joint attention-related device is critical for establishing shared 
reference (Steels et al., 2002; Steels & Kaplan, 1998; Smith, 2002).  The third 
illustrates that a special kind of learning strategy together with obverter signaling can 
also lead to convergence, though its ability to do so begins to break down as the 




These models demonstrate that, under certain conditions, arbitrary sign-meaning 
mappings can become conventionalized across a population.  Successful convergence 
in these cases depends on a small number of critical factors, which can be described in 
terms of the parameters discussed above (section 4.2.1). 
 
In two of the three paradigms, perfect context reduction as a grounding mechanism 
and lateral inhibition as a learning strategy appear to be key to reaching convergence.  
K. Smith (2002) showed that a bias against homonymy underpins convergence, even 
with perfect context reduction.  Steels & Kaplan (1998) confirmed that absence of 
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direct access to intended meanings prevents convergence, even if agents possess such 
a bias.  This learning strategy is relatively simple, and humans regularly exhibit it in 
linguistic settings (K. Smith, 2002); therefore, we can safely take this type of learning 
as a given for present purposes.  The parameter of most interest here, then, is perfect 
context reduction, which we can attribute to some mechanism for establishing joint 
attention.  Steels & Kaplan (1998) did not vary reduction by degree, so it remains 
unclear if convergence would be possible at smaller context sizes.  Given the results, 
however, we can conclude that for these conditions, joint attention is critical to 
successful symbol grounding. 
 
A. Smith’s (2001) model shows that other mechanisms can ground symbols without 
the aid of perfect context reduction.  However, its ability to support successful 
convergence is less robust than models that implement perfect context reduction, as 
demonstrated by Vogt & Couman’s (2003) extended analysis.  In addition, as 
mentioned above, cross-situational learning is not strictly a mechanism for grounding 
signs in the moment of a communication event, and is instead more a general learning 
strategy that supports the convergence process over time.  Furthermore, Smith et al. 
(2011) found that human learners apply a weaker form of cross-situational learning 
when referential uncertainty is high and exposures to a word do not occur 
consecutively – conditions that presumably more closely reflect those of emergence.  
Given the less robust convergence results with cross-situational learning, its less 
direct role in individual communicative acts and its weaker application in real-world 
settings, joint attention appears to be the more powerful and relevant mechanism 
concerning the conventionalization of symbols.  As such, the role of joint attention 
will be the focus of the remainder of this thesis. 
 
If grounding by way of joint attention is the central factor underpinning 
conventionalization, it is by extension necessary to consider how it is achieved in 
human communication.  A diverse suite of abilities are thought to be involved in 
establishing and maintaining joint attention, including gesture recognition, eye-gaze 
tracking, shared task awareness, script execution and recognition, and emotion 
recognition and synthesis (Steels, 2003).  Therefore, in understanding how novel 
symbols could have been conventionalized in the context of human evolution, we 
should consider how these mechanisms operate in human communication. 
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5. General discussion 
 
Research on emerging sign systems offers important information regarding the 
establishment of communication, the factors underlying shifts in sign interpretation 
and the processes by which novel arbitrary signs are transmitted beyond their original 
creators and become shared across a population. 
 
In the absence of a common symbolic system, nonarbitrary representations allow 
people to express meaning and understand each other’s messages.  Direct or indirect 
feedback can also serve to bootstrap communication, though it i) is less effective 
(Scott-Phillips et al., 2009) and ii) has questionable ecological validity (Lust & Foley, 
2004).  Moreover, it appears the establishment of communication is not guaranteed 
when the medium of expression does not afford sufficiently large representational 
capacity (Galantucci, 2005).  Therefore, signs that embody rich and robust 
nonarbitrary representation are likely needed to construct a communicative 
foundation, and it is from this foundation that new interpretations of signs can arise. 
 
Once communication through nonarbitrary signs is successfully established in this 
way, the possibility for symbols presents itself, at least in the context of modern 
human communicators observed in experiments and the field.  Intended nonarbitrary 
features in signs may not be recognized by others, who then interpret the sign as 
arbitrary, and therefore symbolic.  As evidenced in experimental sign research and 
developing sign languages, it is a combination of form-meaning relationship and 
transmission dynamics that underlies the transformation from nonarbitrary to 
arbitrary.  Complexity in form and extensive common ground tend to ensure 
nonarbitrary features are perceived, while simplicity in form and lack of shared 
knowledge increase the likelihood of misperception.  The interaction of these two 
factors will determine if signs are misperceived and become detached from their 
nonarbitrary origins for an individual, opening up the possibility for shared symbols 
to emerge.  In this way, how signs are perceived is ultimately responsible for 
determining if a sign becomes arbitrary, which indicates that we should look to and 
consider the effects of the particular features of the modality through which signs are 
communicated.  That is, the physical and semiotic qualities of a modality and/or 
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modalities are causally relevant to the question at hand and can help to formulate our 
explanation. 
 
Of course, misperception does not automatically lead to or guarantee this outcome.  
Signs must not only be misperceived, they must also be reinterpreted as symbolic.  
Furthermore, for symbolic communication to emerge in a population, individual 
reinterpretations must be used with and adopted by others.  A consideration of the 
details of these two prerequisites will help to frame our explanation of how symbols 
came about in human history. 
 
How might misinterpretation of a nonarbitrary sign result in reinterpretation of the 
sign as symbolic?  Assuming that communication is preserved and meaning is 
successfully conveyed, this process requires both skilled intention reading and some 
kind of contextual support.  First, the signer’s communicative intent itself must be 
recognized so that an interlocutor will attempt to interpret the sign in the first place.  
We might expect this prerequisite to hold generally, as such intention reading is the 
foundation on which the act of referential representation rests.  However, this will 
also be affected by the number, qualities and relative communicative roles of the 
modalities through which expression takes place, when more than one are used 
simultaneously as in human communication.  These issues will be addressed in the 
following chapter, but for present purposes we can reason that with an awareness of 
communicative intent in place, and after failing to perceive any meaningful features in 
the sign’s form, a receiver might infer an intended meaning based on other context-
based factors.  If the receiver concludes the sign represents a meaning that appears 
arbitrarily related to its form, that sign has become a symbol for this individual. 
 
The critical point in this process lies in correctly identifying (at least part of) signers’ 
intended meaning despite misinterpreting their representations.  In other words, 
because the nonarbitrary sign is arbitrary for its recipient, it must be grounded in 
information apart from form.  Broadly, this grounding could be accomplished via two 
routes.  One, proposed by Tomasello (2008), involves an observer witnessing others’ 
successful nonarbitrary communication without recognizing their signs as such.  The 
observer may not understand a sign as intended but could nevertheless infer its 
meaning based on the interlocutors’ subsequent actions.  In this scenario, form is 
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successfully mapped to meaning by virtue of others’ correct interpretations.  The 
other possibility is that a direct recipient could infer intended meaning based on other 
sources of information in the context.  This possibility rests upon the ability to 
identify a signer’s focus of attention, and therefore involves the same grounding 
mechanisms discussed above (section 4.1). 
 
After a newly reinterpreted symbol has been grounded for an individual, it must also 
be grounded for others in order for conventionalization to occur.  The details of this 
process are similar but not identical to the initial reinterpretation of novel symbols.  
Again, communicative intent must be recognized while not perceiving nonarbitrary 
features in a sign, and intended meaning is inferred from other factors.  Unlike initial 
reinterpretation, the possibility for retrieving meaning from observation of others’ 
successful use of nonarbitrary signs is not available.  Inference from contextual 
information alone allows new symbols to be correctly interpreted and adopted by 
others, which requires that interlocutors can otherwise maintain a shared focus of 
attention.  Thus, while contextual inference based on joint attention is one possible 
route for reinterpretation, it is crucial to the subsequent spread of novel symbols.  This 
suggests the conventionalization process requires a rich and supportive 
communicative superstructure in which novel arbitrary signs could be used, with 
overall comprehension and shared understanding maintained so that intended form-
meaning relationships could be correctly interpreted. 
 
It is of course true that observation could again serve as a grounding mechanism once 
multiple individuals share symbols.  Indeed, it is likely an instrumental amplifier in 
the conventionalization process; as more people share a symbol and communicate 
with it, the more opportunities there are for observational transmission to others, 
therefore increasing the speed at which the symbol spreads throughout the remaining 
population.  However, how symbols become shared by more than one individual to 









Research reviewed in this chapter has illuminated key factors for emerging symbolic 
communication in the abstract.  In addressing the issue in the case of human 
evolution, it is also necessary to consider the particular characteristics and 
circumstances of human communication.  Medium of expression determines 
representational capacity of signs, and by extension influences how signs are 
perceived with regards to nonarbitrariness and arbitrariness.  Therefore, we must also 
examine the modalities through which humans communicate and the way each is used 
to convey meaning.  The following chapter will explore the multimodal nature of 








Preceding chapters have helped to frame the question of symbol origins in the 
abstract, in terms of theory and general processes.  A further important factor that 
influences how symbols arise is the modality or modalities through which 
communication takes place, and this element will vary depending on the specifics of 
the communicators and their situated experience.  Therefore, to address the specific 
question of how symbolic communication emerged in human evolution, it is essential 
to consider the particular features of human communication – the anatomical and 
cognitive attributes of the communicators themselves.  This chapter will first discuss 
these issues and situate the present inquiry in an embodied perspective, which will 
serve to further frame our question and construct the explanatory landscape from 
which an answer can be derived. 
 
Human communication is not limited to symbolic speech, and a substantial amount of 
information is expressed through other semiotic strategies in the vocal channel as well 
as bodily movements.  Some of these additional forms of communication are also 
referential, if not symbolic.  As such, it is important to understand how meaning is 
represented in these other ways, and in addition, if and how it is related to symbolic 
communication.  The first two sections of this chapter will be devoted to exploring the 
two major modalities of human communication: vocal and gestural.  Topics addressed 
include how each is utilized to convey meaning, how each operates in language and 
how the two interact anatomically and semiotically.  Following that, conclusions 
regarding the multimodal nature of communication will be discussed in the context of 
human evolutionary history in order to characterize the communicative conditions 
from which symbols would have emerged.  Finally, in order to better understand how 
nonarbitrary signs in each modality are perceived and interpreted, their semiotic 




With these ideas in place, the remainder of the chapter will directly address the 
question of symbol emergence in human evolution, including a critique of existing 
theories and solutions made available from the ideas and evidence presented in this 
and preceding chapters. 
 
2. The vocal modality 
 
The traditional view of language is that the words of speech are symbols and 
arbitrarily refer to their meanings (Hocket, 1960; Saussure, 1959).  Symbolic 
communication thus conceived is the expression of meaning through arbitrary sounds.  
As the characterization of speech as predominantly symbolic is uncontroversial and 
widely acknowledged, this aspect of vocal communication will be accepted as a given 
and not reviewed in detail.  However, non-symbolic aspects of vocal communication, 
which typically are not emphasized in discussions of language, warrant further 
review. 
 
While vocalization is no doubt the primary domain of symbolic communication in 
normal circumstances, the modality potentially can represent via nonarbitrary 
semiotic strategies, and some argue this is a general and pervasive quality of spoken 
language (Perniss, Thompson & Vigliocco, 2010).  New research has begun to 
explore precisely how nonarbitrariness works in the vocal channel and the extent to 
which it exists in the words of speech. 
 
Vocalizations are auditory and have a temporal aspect, and can therefore resemble 
sounds and sonic events.  Vocal iconicity is commonly known as onomatopoeia, 
examples of which are English words like crackle or buzz that are meant to mimic 
certain noises.  Vocal iconicity appears to be limited, however, as different languages 
often use completely different sounds to mimic the same noises.  For example, in 
English the sound a pig makes is pronounced /oI!k/, while in Japanese it is /bu:/.  This 
inconsistency suggests the iconic connection between vocal sounds and their referents 




Although auditory resemblance through vocalization is somewhat limited, speech 
sounds can also be used to nonarbitrarily represent in a way that is not directly iconic.  
By way of crossmodal associations, sonic forms can resemble forms in non-auditory 
modalities (Nuckolls, 1999; Simner, Cuskley & Kirby, 2010).  These crossmodal 
associations are based on relating sounds to experiences in vision, touch, taste and 
olfaction, and these are often used to depict movement, size, shape,  
color, and texture (Hinton, Nichols & Ohala, 1994).  One example of words that 
appear to derive from crossmodal associations is what are known as mimetics in 
Japanese, which refer to psychological or physiological states, manner of motion, the 
temporal structure of events, and affective content associated with events and states 
(Kita, 2008).  For instance, the word koro is used to describe a light object rolling 
while the word goro describes a heavy object rolling – that is, the higher frequency, 
voiceless /k/ sound is associated with light-weightedness while the lower frequency, 
voiced /g/ sound is associated with heaviness.
7
  Finally, in addition to speech sounds, 
suprasegmental features of vocal language like prosody can also convey information 
nonarbitrarily, like intensity and size.  For example, pronouncing the word big with a 
low voice and extending the syllable beyond the expected rhythm in order to convey 
largeness. 
 
While the specific cognitive mechanisms responsible for crossmodal associational 
abilities are not yet well understood (Ahlner & Zlatev, 2010), a growing body of 
research suggests speakers naturally use these abilities to map forms to meanings 
(Perniss et al., 2010).  Moreover, multiple studies have demonstrated that some 
crossmodal biases are shared across cultures (reviewed in Cuskley & Kirby, in press), 
indicating that specific sound-to-other-modality associations may be universal.  For 
instance, the pitch-to-size association cited above has been found across cultures 
(Kita, 2008).  Shared biases of this sort provide an opportunity for resemblance 
between forms and meanings in different modalities to be perceived and used for 
                                                
7
 Although mimetic words appear to be nonarbitrary via crossmodal associations in 
this way, they differ from typical nonarbitrary gestures (discussed below) in that they 
are fully conventionalized items in the Japanese vocabulary.  This conventionalization 
likely exists because mimetic words largely exhibit secondary iconicity (a concept 
developed by Sonesson, 1997 and discussed in Chapter 1), which means their form 
alone would generally be insufficient to convey meaning without learning the specific 
association beforehand. 
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communicative purposes.  Thus, the vocal modality has the potential for 
nonarbitrariness beyond direct iconicity.  Kita (2008) notes, however, that the types of 
events and states that can be referred to through crossmodal iconicity are somewhat 
restricted. 
 
Ahlner & Zlatev (2010) characterize nonarbitrariness in spoken communication using 
the distinction between primary and secondary iconicity mentioned in Chapter 1 
(Sonesson, 1997).  Primary iconicity, in the terms of this thesis, is when a sign has 
high transparency in form (Chapter 2, section 2.2.2) – when meaning is sufficiently 
interpretable from recognition of features depicted in a form.  Secondary iconicity is 
when correspondences between form and meaning are only perceived after becoming 
aware of a sign relationship.  Once the referent is known, form-meaning similarities 
that would not otherwise be perceived immediately become apparent.  Ahlner & 
Zlatev (2010) review research on cross-cultural comprehension of mimetic words and 
note successful interpretation only occurs when two preconditions are met.  First, 
participants are presented with a list of familiar words in their own language to match 
with unfamiliar words, giving them prior knowledge of specific meanings and 
allowing them to search for features of those meanings in the list of unfamiliar words.  
Second, the list of familiar words must be made up of antonym pairs, which highlights 
salient distinctions in meanings and further aids in the search for form-meaning 
correspondences.  Ahlner & Zlatev argue these results indicate that much of what is 
considered sound symbolic in spoken language in these experiments does not actually 
rely on perceptions of nonarbitrariness as the dominant strategy for interpretation.  
They go on to note that, as novel signs generally start out as iconic, such words may 
have shown greater primary iconicity in the past when they served to establish 
communication.  But because these words become conventionalized, any pressures to 
retain iconic features are eased, thus allowing their forms to change through learning 




The evidence shows that, in addition to the traditionally recognized function of 
conveying arbitrary symbols, the vocal modality can be used for nonarbitrary 
representation. Furthermore, its representational capacity is expanded by the ability to 
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perceive resemblance crossmodally between vocal forms and other non-auditory 
sensory experiences.  Thus, in addition to communication through conventional 
symbolic words, vocal signs can be created and interpreted based on shared sensory 
knowledge and shared perceptual biases. 
 
While much of speech presumably is perceived as arbitrary and understood as 
symbolic by speakers, it is of course possible that, separately from known mimetic 
words, some nonarbitrariness is perceived in some words by some individual 
speakers.  However, these are likely idiosyncratic and it is highly improbable that any 
particular perception is held by a large portion of the population, and therefore not 
utilized as a communicative device.  Taking into account these possible exceptions, 
we can nevertheless accept that, proportionally and on a population-level of analysis, 
the majority of speech is interpreted as symbolic.  
 
Interestingly, although the vocal modality can convey meaning in these non-symbolic 
ways, nonarbitrary vocalizations are highly conventionalized and incorporated into 
the vocabulary of a language.  One reason for this lexicalization may be in part 
because most vocal signs are symbolic and conventionalized by necessity, which 
could instill an expectation or bias for conventional vocal forms.  Another, perhaps 
more important reason is that nonarbitrary words show low transparency in form, 
which means additional information is required initially to connect form to meaning.  
As Ahlner and Zlatev (2010) state, earlier forms of these modern words may have 
carried more nonarbitrary features, which would boost their communicative capacity 
somewhat and perhaps enable interpretation in the absence of conventional 
knowledge. 
 
While it may be that nonarbitrary vocalization has greater potential for referential 
capacity than the examples found in modern language, we can nevertheless note that 
the physical qualities of the modality itself place substantial constraints on this 
capacity, particularly in regard to human perception and action.  Human interaction 
with the world is dominated by rich and detailed visual-spatial experience.  Even with 
the aid of crossmodal associations, sounds can resemble aspects of this experience to 
only a limited degree.  For instance, vowel quality can evoke a very general idea of 
shape, such as roundness versus sharpness.  This information, on its own, only hints at 
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the larger meaning of a message.  More fine-grained features of a specific intended 
referent must be identified for correct interpretation to occur, which requires 
additional information from some other communicative resource (see Chapter 2, 
sections 2.2.1 and 4.1 for what these might be).  This argument is not to suggest that 
nonarbitrary vocal communication is trivial or irrelevant to human communication.  
The nonarbitrary information it does carry enriches and likely eases communication, 
and although the current discussion is focused on referential communication of 
semantic content, the importance of affective information often carried in vocalization 
should not be underestimated.  Concerning the capacity to convey sufficiently 
numerous and specific features of a referent for effective comprehension, however, 
the vocal channel is inherently restricted.  Of course, a more informative approach to 
the issue of representational capacity would be to take a relative perspective and 
consider how the vocal modality compares to other representational channels, which 
will be addressed in section 5 after the gestural modality has been examined in turn. 
 
One final point to address is the idea of non-conventional nonarbitrary vocal 
communication.  Mimetic words are not the only way vocalization is nonarbitrary.  As 
mentioned above, stress and intonation patterns overlaying speech can convey some 
nonarbitrary features.  Spontaneously produced, idiosyncratic nonarbitrary 
vocalizations have not been studied or documented to the degree that gestures have, 
though it is quite easy to think of examples from everyday communication - for 
instance, to embellish storytelling.  In addition, iconic or cross-modally iconic 
vocalizations are often produced when ‘acting out’ an idea, like when a child pretends 
to be an airplane and makes noises associated with planes at the same time as using 
their body to resemble the shape and movement a plane.  At the very least, the ability 
to create nonarbitrary vocalizations is not in doubt.  Such vocalization pervades 
natural communication yet, like other forms of nonarbitrary communication (see 





Until relatively recently, gestural communication was a relatively under-researched 
topic.  Following the seminal works of Kendon (1972) and McNeill (1994), increasing 
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interest in gesture has resulted in an abundance of new research. Technological 
advancements that allowed for detailed analysis of hand, arm, facial and other bodily 
movements aided this research, and it has become clear that gesture, in the broadest 
sense, serves multiple important functions in natural communication. 
 
The term gesture can encompass a wide assortment of communicative body 
movements that differ from each other in important ways.  Therefore, it is first 
necessary to limit the scope of discussion and identify the type or types of gestures 
that are the relevant to this thesis and the present examination of human symbolic 
communication specifically. 
 
3.1 Delimiting gesture 
 
Bodily movements of various types can be categorized by i) the kind of information 
they convey, ii) their semiotic status and iii) when and how they are produced in 
relation to other communicative processes.  Regarding i), some gestures are related to 
emotion and express mood, tone, intensity or other affective information (Ekman & 
Frieson, 1969; Maricchiolo, Gnisci, Bonaiuto & Ficca 2008), while others are 
representational and carry semantic content (McNeill, 1992).  It is this second 
category – gestures that function as signs – that are of interest here. 
 
Within the set of representational gestures, further distinctions can be made along 
dimensions ii) and iii).  Regarding ii), these gestures differ in the type of sign they 
embody – whether they are nonarbitrary or symbolic.  McNeill (2000, 2005) also 
divides them according to point iii), whether they are produced in accompaniment to 
speech.  A number of classification systems have been proposed (Burling, 2005; 
Chawla & Krauss, 1994; Efron, 1972; Hadar, 1987; Hadar & Pinchas-Zamir, 2004; 
McNeill, 1994, 2005; Rauscher et al., 1996), but perhaps due to the relatively short 
history of gesture studies, no single one has been adopted universally.  Because 
McNeill’s (1994, 2005) system is widely accepted and provides the most 
comprehensive and clear categorization of gesture types based on both function and 
form, it will be used for this discussion.  Under McNeill’s system, there are four types 
of gesture: gesticulations, pantomime, emblems and signs. 
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Gesticulations are nonarbitrary gestures that are produced while speaking.  They can 
be iconic and/or indexical, like movements that portray actions and entities or 
pointing to refer by way of spatial location.  Gesticulations are grouped into iconics, 
metaphorics (also iconic, but these depict abstract concepts or relations) and deictics.  
There are also certain gesticulations called beats that are more abstract and related to 
the rhythm of speech and discourse structure.  They are simple in shape and 
movement, consisting of small flicks or oscillating actions and generally reflect how 
the accompanying speech fits into a larger discourse organization. 
 
McNeill (2005) has since claimed that the semantic content contained in a given 
gesticulation is of much greater theoretical interest than its classification, as during 
natural gesture realization these four subcategories are not mutually exclusive.  For 
example, beats can be superimposed onto any of the other categories, and an iconic 
gesture can simultaneous express deixis if the body part portraying the iconic shape is 
moved in a direction to indicate the location of the referent. 
 
Pantomime is the production of nonarbitrary gestures in the absence of speech and is 
used when the auditory channel is compromised or unavailable, such as in a loud 
factory or in play.  Typical examples of pantomime are the movements produced in 
the game of charades, in which players ‘act out’ an idea in silence for others to guess 
using iconic and/or indexical gestures. 
 
Emblems are described as gestures that seem to be arbitrarily related to their 
meanings, and, as a result, are conventionalized.  An example is the action of pointing 
to one’s temple and rotating the forefinger in a circular motion, which means 
something along the lines of ‘crazy’.  Emblems typically occur with speech but are 
also used on their own. 
 
Signs are gestures that constitute words and/or grammatical functions in sign 
languages and exhibit all the same properties of spoken language, most notably a 
greater proportion of conventionalized and arbitrary signs. 
 
According to McNeill, gesticulations have a unique relationship to speech not found 
in other gesture types.  Gesticulations are closely tied to the symbolic code of 
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language – that is, they co-occur in tight temporal and semantic coordination with 
another form of meaning expression.  Moreover, a gesticulation typically must be tied 
to the utterance with which it occurs in order for the full meaning to be interpretable.  
To illustrate this obligatory conjunction with speech, McNeill (2005) describes a 
speaker who gestured an arc shape with his hand while saying ‘he grabs a big o[ak 
tree and he bends it way back]’ (pg. 6, coding original): 
 
His hand rose from the armrest of the chair as he said “oak” (left 
bracket), reached its apex with “he”, at which moment there was a 
brief prestroke hold (underlining); the hand then moved downward 
and to the side during the boldface section (the stroke – the part of 
the gesture depicting the actual ‘bending back’)… At this point there 
was a poststroke hold and a new gesture began. 
During the stroke phase, the hand appeared to grasp and bend 
back an object with some thickness.  Such a gesture has clear 
iconicity – the movement and the handgrip; also a locus (starting 
high and ending low) – all creating imagery that is analogous to the 
event being described in speech at the same time (a comic book 
character bending back an oak tree). 
…The bends-it-back gesture is meaningful only in conjunction 
with the utterance of “bends it back.” (pgs. 6-7) 
 
Evidence to support this claim of necessary coordination comes from a study by 
Hadar & Pinchas-Zamir (2004), which demonstrated that, although at times it may be 
possible to infer some very general meaning from gesticulations isolated from speech, 
without access to concurrently spoken words, the specific meaning that a gesture 
represents is unrecoverable. 
 
In contrast to gesticulations, other gesture types do not require any additional 
information for their meanings to be understood.  Emblems have conventionalized 
meanings and can convey that information without the aid of speech.  As pantomime 
does not occur with speech by definition, it must depict referents through more 
elaborate nonarbitrary representation than is normally found in gesticulations.  
Although gestural sign languages and vocal speech utilize separate modalities, and 
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therefore co-production is theoretically possible, signers find it very difficult to use 
speech and signs simultaneously.  A later study by Fontana (2008) found evidence for 
this disharmony of speech and sign by showing that the performance of both systems 
suffers when participants attempted to produce both at the same time. 
 
McNeill (2005) goes on to contrast gesticulations and other gesture types with regards 
to resemblance to a linguistic system, level of conventionalization and 
representational characteristics.  These contrasts are used to highlight how 
gesticulations exhibit qualities that are wholly distinct from and complementary to 
those of signs and speech.  The details of his proposal will not be reviewed here, but 
the overall argument is that these qualities are a consequence of the different semiotic 
status of gesture types and their relationship to speech. 
 
3.1.1 Discussion 
Put in the terms introduced in Chapter 1 in the discussion of semiotics, one aspect of 
McNeill’s categorization is to separate nonarbitrary and arbitrary representations.  
Gesticulations and pantomime are nonarbitrary, and this characterization is fairly 
uncontroversial.  Emblems are said by McNeill to be arbitrary, though their semiotic 
status is arguably less clear-cut.  While emblems are not as obviously iconic, it may 
be that some nonarbitrariness is perceived in their forms.  For instance, the example of 
the gesture for ‘crazy’ given above in some ways depicts features related to the 
meaning; it is head-oriented, and craziness is thought to reside in the brain; the 
circular movement of the finger implies something along the lines of disorder, which 
is another concept associated with insanity.  The fact that emblems are 
conventionalized could help to explain why their semiotic status is less certain, as 
nonarbitrary features are not the sole carrier of meaning when shared cultural 
knowledge of form-meaning mapping is available.  In this way, emblems may be 
thought of as largely exhibiting secondary iconicity (Sonesson, 1997; Chapter 1, 
section 3.2.1).  Finally, signs are more straightforwardly arbitrary.  Of course, not all 
signs are arbitrary (Chapter 2, section 3), but as arbitrary gestures are found in sign 
languages with much greater frequency than in any other setting, they are a useful 
prototype for this category.  Thus, the gestural modality, in various circumstances, is 




Another primary distinction between McNeill’s categories is relationship to speech.  
Manual signs (in McNeill’s terms) are not used frequently by hearing people while 
speaking, most obviously because the vocal modality is already occupied with symbol 
production.  Emblems are used both with and without speech, and this less 
dichotomous relationship mirrors the uncertainty of their semiotic status.  In contrast 
to the incompatibility of speech and arbitrary gestures observed in bilingual signers, 
gesticulations are easily, naturally and frequently produced at the same time as 
speech.  Finally, pantomime is defined by an absence of speech and typically only 
occurs when the vocal modality is restricted in some way.  Taking into account a 
gesture category’s relationship to speech in this way helps in determining which 
gesture type or types are most relevant to the emergence of symbolic communication 
in human evolution, and each of these cases warrants further discussion. 
 
First, the fact that manual symbolic signs do not occur with speech is in large part due 
to their being a non-normal mode of communication.  Enculturation in modern 
language that takes place during typical human development renders vocalization the 
default and predominant vehicle of symbolic communication.  The gestural modality 
overwhelmingly is only enlisted for this function when auditory channels are 
compromised.
8
  More tellingly, when signing and speaking are attempted at the same 
time by bilingual hearing individuals, production is disrupted in both modalities.  
Thus, bodily symbolic signs are disassociated with vocal symbolic communication 
not only as a result of culture and development, but also due to an apparent 
fundamental incompatibility at the level of simultaneous online processing.  Even 
though gesture appears to be an integral component of human communication, 
symbolic gestures like those of sign language are not an integral part of symbolic 
communication as this thesis seeks to understand it – as it occurs in typical and 
natural conditions.  The existence of bodily symbolic signs and the conditions in 
which they do occur are still important clues for an investigation of symbolic 
communication and are considered elsewhere (Chapter 2 and in section 6 below).  
However, in identifying the unique characteristics of typical human communication 
                                                
8
 Some isolated exceptions are manual systems that have been developed in response 
to culture-specific taboos on using spoken language to communicate with certain 
people and/or about certain topics (Kwek & Kendon, 1991). 
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generally, around which we can formulate an explanation of symbol emergence, 
bodily symbolic signs will not be a central focus. 
 
Emblems are again a somewhat problematic case.  Although emblems can be 
produced while speaking, they can also be – and often are – used as a substitute for 
speech.  If emblems are in fact sometimes arbitrary, perhaps this partial disassociation 
is due to a difficulty in processing like that between signed and spoken language.  
Alternatively, it may be that these highly conventionalized gestures carry the bulk of a 
desired message and speakers employ them unimodally simply for efficiency.  Given 
the human propensity for imitation, it is not surprising that conventionalized gestures 
– arbitrary or nonarbitrary – exist.  And this same phenomenon was also likely in 
action in the stages of human evolution of interest here.  However, as emblems do not 
show an obligatory and intimate connection to the primary mode of symbolic 
expression, we will for now consider them a minor feature. 
 
By definition pantomime is fully disassociated from speech.  While it is unrelated to 
symbolic communication this way in an online sense, nonarbitrary gestural 
communication like pantomime is still relevant to the question of symbol origins and 
will be addressed at a later point.  For now, one issue regarding the distinction 
between pantomime and gesticulations should be mentioned.  In other writings, 
Singleton, Goldin-Meadow & McNeill (1995) have argued that the two stem from 
quite different cognitive systems.  Nonarbitrary gestures do take on different qualities 
when people are asked to mime short events as compared to their co-speech 
gesticulations in describing the same event in words, notably becoming more strictly 
ordered and analytic – that is, more speech-like (Goldin-Meadow, 2008).  However, 
gesticulations and pantomime share many features, arguably more fundamental ones 
than those distinguishing them.  Both are explicitly communicative representations – 
signs, in the terminology of Chapter 1 – and both are clearly based on sensorimotor 
knowledge of actions and objects.  From the perspective of hierarchical models of 
cognition (A. Clark, 1997; Damasio & Damasio, 1994) the neural systems underlying 
production and comprehension of each likely overlap a great deal, and as both involve 
voluntary, referential communication, this overlap would extend beyond low-level 
sensory systems.  Differences between the two in form and execution seem 
attributable to matters of attention and context, and thus do not warrant distinct 
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cognitive explanations.  Given that pantomime embodies many semiotic qualities of 
interest to this thesis, specific questions of how it relates to gesticulations, vocal 
communication and the emergence of symbols will be considered later in this chapter 
and in following chapters. 
 
Finally, gesticulations only occur with speech and nonarbitrarily represent meaning 
directly related to the meaning concurrently expressed in words.  As such, this type of 
gesture is directly relevant to characterizing human symbolic communication 
accurately.  The fact that the manual modality is utilized as a complementary semiotic 
strategy to express simultaneously part of a message also conveyed in vocal symbols 
suggests the nature of language may be more complex than traditional conceptions of 
symbolic communication as speech in isolation. 
 
To better understand the particularities of human communication regarding these 
issues it is necessary to further explore gesticulations and how the gestural and vocal 
modalities interact during the expression of symbols.  The following section will 
provide a brief overview of research on gesture and language and discuss its 
implications for the questions at hand. 
 
3.2 Speech and gesture 
 
This section will present research on the relationship between speech and gesture, 
examining the anatomical and semantic links between the vocal and gestural 
modalities; how gesture affects cognition and communication; and finally gesture and 
language in ontogeny.  For purposes of simplicity, the term gesture will be used for 
the remainder of this section to refer to co-speech gesticulations unless otherwise 
explicitly stated. 
 
3.2.1 Semantic content and co-expression 
McNeill (2005) describes how gesture is co-expressive but non-redundant with 
speech.  It is co-expressive in that the meaning embodied in a gesture is linked 
semantically and temporally with the corresponding meaning conveyed in speech 
(McNeill, 1994).  However, gestures do not carry only meanings explicitly expressed 
in words, and oftentimes gestures are used to represent aspects of an overall message 
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that are in fact absent in speech.  In other words, the two modalities jointly express an 
underlying idea, some features of which may be expressed in speech only, in gesture 
only or in both modalities at the same time.  In many cases gesture alone carries 
meaning that is crucial to conveying an intended message.  This has been 
demonstrated experimentally by showing that speakers express in gesture information 
required to understand an intended message while omitting it from speech (Melinger 
& Levelt, 2005), with one study finding that 90% of gestures produced in face-to-face 
conversations conveyed some crucial information not included in the accompanying 
speech (Bavelas, Gerwing, Sutton & Prevost, 2007).  In addition, if common ground 
is established (H.H. Clark, 1996; Chapter 1, section 3.2.2) – a feature of 
communication in natural settings – speakers use gesture to convey an even greater 
proportion of content (Holler & Wilkin, 2008). 
 
Examining gesture production cross-linguistically has helped to shed light on the 
interaction of speech and gesture, as different languages have different ways of 
expressing semantic features lexically, morphologically and syntactically (Kita, 
2009).  Kita and colleagues (Kita & Ozyürek, 2003; Kita, Ozyürek, Allen, Brown, 
Furman, & Ishizuka, 2007) have found that speakers represent an event in gesture in a 
similar way to its representation in speech, which means that gestures are influenced 
not only by the images on which they are based, but also by the specific structure of 
the coordinated speech.  The connection between linguistic structures and gesture 
execution has been further illustrated in a study of an aphasic patient (Kemmerer, 
Chandrasekaran & Tranel, 2007), whose gestures produced while attempting to speak 
exhibited features of English verb and preposition constructions. 
 
Wagner, Nusbaum & Goldin-Meadow (2004) tested the representational status of co-
speech gestures and conclude they constitute propositional representations with 
semantic content, not merely visual-spatial sensorimotor representations.  Similar 
findings in neuroscience indicate that co-speech gestures are enlisted specifically for 
semantic processing, and their meaning is used to reduce semantic ambiguity (Holle 
& Gunter, 2007; Kelly, Kravitz & Hopkins, 2004; Ozyurek, Willems, Kita & Hagoort, 
2007; Skipper, Goldin-Meadow, Nusbaum & Small, 2007; Wu & Coulson, 2007; Xu 
et al., 2009).  In line with these findings, when processing utterances listeners do not 
discriminate between vocal and manual sources, incorporating information conveyed 
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in gesture into their understanding of a verbal expression (Kelly, Barr, Church & 
Lynch, 1999; Kelly, Ozyürek & Maris, 2010; McNeill, Cassell & McCullough, 1994).  
From such evidence, McNeill et al. (1994) argue that the speech and gesture channels 
‘smoothly combine into a single idea unit’ (pg. 235) and propose that both production 
and comprehension in linguistic communication involve the integration of the two 
modalities. 
 
3.2.2 Cognitive and communicative benefits 
The act of gesturing affects memory and other aspects of cognition for both speakers 
and listeners in intriguing and what may at first appear surprising ways. Various 
methods of restricting movement and thereby preventing gesturing have been shown 
to cause speech dysfluencies (Morsella & Krauss, 2004; Rauscher, Krauss & Chen, 
1996; Rime, Schiaratura, Hupet & Ghysselinckx, 1984), and another study 
demonstrated this effect is not simply a byproduct of overt restriction or memory 
demands that could arise when participants are asked not to gesture (Alibali, Heath & 
Myers, 2001).  Other research has found that producing simultaneous gestures 
enhances children’s performance in picture naming tasks (Pine, Bird & Kirck, 2007), 
and similar effects have been found in aphasics (Hanlon, Brown & Gerstman, 1990).  
In addition, the number of gestures people produce while speaking increases as the 
cognitive demands of a task increase, indicating doing so aids performance on the task 
in some way (Alibali Kita & Young, 2000; Hostetter, Alibali & Kita, 2006; Kita & 
Davies, 2009; Morsella & Krauss, 2004; Wesp, Hesse, & Keutmann, 2001).  Gesture 
can also aid speakers’ memory for information not related to the content of speech, as 
gesturing during an unrelated task was found to increase memory for information 
encountered in a previous task (Goldin-Meadow, 2003b; Wagner, Nusbaum & 
Goldin-Meadow, 2004). 
 
Some researchers contend the role of gesture in speech production is facilitative, 
(Iverson & Goldin-Meadow, 2000; Krauss, Chen & Chawla, 1996; Rauscher et al., 
1996), meaning that gesturing facilitates access to symbolic words while speaking.  
However, others argue based on research on stuttered speech that this may not 
necessarily be the case.  Mayberry & Jacques (2000) examined the gestures produced 
during periods of stuttering and found that these do not appear to be compensating for 
the degraded content and structure of speech.  Instead, fewer, not more, gestures 
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accompanied stuttered speech compared with fluent speech.  In addition, gesture 
execution was precisely temporally aligned with speech execution despite the many 
interruptions caused by stuttering.  The authors interpret these results as indicating 
that the coordination of speech and gesture takes place before either is expressed in 
production.  If so, this would mean gesture is not primary to and enabling the retrieval 
of spoken words but is instead accessed and produced in precise alignment with 
speech. 
 
Gesture has been shown to have beneficial memory effects for hearers as well as 
speakers.  Recall of speech is significantly better for speech-plus-gesture utterances 
than speech alone, and this holds at the word (Kelly et al., 1999; Kelly, McDevitt & 
Esch, 2009), sentence (Feyerseisen, 2006) and discourse level (Beattie & Shovelton, 
1999).  In addition, judgments regarding the intention of indirect speech acts are 
significantly more accurate with speech-plus-gesture utterances than both speech-only 
and gesture-only combined (Kelly et al., 1999).  
 
3.2.3 Ontogeny 
Developmental research demonstrates evidence for initial and emerging connections 
between the vocal modality, manual modality and language.  A phenomenon known 
as the Babkin reflex, wherein newborns respond to pressure applied to their palms by 
opening their mouths, illustrates the early and direct anatomical links between oral 
and manual modalities (Iverson & Thelen, 1999).  ‘Manual babbling’ observed in 
infants co-occurs with vocal babbling, and such manual actions do not also correlate 
with other motor milestones (Bates & Dick, 2001).  Iverson & Thelen (1999) cite 
these initial biases for hand-mouth coordination as establishing a firm connection that 
becomes increasingly elaborated as language development progresses. 
 
Bates & Dick (2001) review research on the word stage of language development.  At 
around eight to ten months of age children begin to show evidence of word 
comprehension, and this is correlated with the first uses of deictic gestures. 
Comprehension and production of pantomime are both correlated with auditory 
language comprehension (Bates & Dick, 2001), indicating that the interpretation of 
meaningful gesture is in some way fundamentally related to the interpretation of 
speech.  This connection is made more apparent by the delay of both word 
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comprehension and early gestural production in ‘late talkers’ as well as children with 
certain brain injuries, signaling that the understanding of symbolic representation and 
first expression of nonarbitrary representation emerge simultaneously in the vocal and 
manual modalities. 
 
Other studies have examined precisely how children coordinate the vocal and manual 
modalities in their early utterances.  Children’s early communicative acts are typically 
combinations of deictic gestures and vocalizations (Bates & Dick, 2001; Capirci & 
Volterra, 2008; Pizzuto & Capobianco, 2005).  The most frequent utterances made by 
children have been found to be deictic gestures plus spoken words (Capirci & 
Volterra, 2008; Iverson & Goldin-Meadow, 2000).  Capirci & Volterra (2008) found 
that meanings expressed in children’s early gestures do not necessarily precede the 
same meanings being expressed vocally, as expression in both could appear at the 
same or different times. 
 
Children’s use of gesture in intermediate stages of language development has not been 
studied as extensively as earlier stages.  However, one of the few studies undertaken 
investigated how speech and gesture develop in the different languages of bilingual 
children (Mayberry & Nicoladis, 2000).  The authors found that the emergence of 
iconic and beat gestures coincided with the onset of longer, sentence-like utterances, 
and this occurred differentially in the separate languages.  For example, if children 
were at the multi-word stage in one language, they would produce iconic and beat 
gestures with these longer utterances; however, if they remained at the one-word stage 
in the other language, they never produced the same types of gesture when speaking.  
Mayberry & Nicoladis (2000) argue these findings demonstrate that gesture 
development is not independent from, but actually corresponds to, language 
development. 
 
The course of language and gesture development also sheds light on the nature of 
meaning representation and expression.  In the case of non-normal development, 
children with Specific Language Impairment (SLI) perform poorly on tests of 
nonarbitrary gesture imitation, even while some perform at normal levels on other 
movement tests (Iverson & Thelen, 1999).  Deloach (1995) found that understanding 
of iconic representation occurs only after language development is under way.  A 
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more recent experiment designed to test children’s recognition of iconicity showed 
that this skill does not reliably emerge until around 26 months – at the same time as or 
after the development of some verbal skills (Namy, 2008).  Namy contends her results 
challenge the traditional view that iconicity facilitates the use of symbols and suggests 
that a more general understanding of referential representations may underlie the 
recognition of both iconic and symbolic representations.  This claim is supported by 
another study that found children’s ability to map iconic numerical signs (fingers) 
onto various quantities of toys showed no advantage over their ability to do so with 
arbitrary signs (Arabic number symbols), with performance on arbitrary signs 
reaching even slightly higher than iconic ones (Nicoladis, Pika & Marentette, 2010).  
 
3.2.4 Gesture as language 
Based on the wealth of research demonstrating how the meaning physically expressed 
in gesture is done so synergistically in conjunction with speech, some authors claim 
that gesture is not merely a by-product or accompaniment to language, but is in fact 
an intrinsic component of language.  McNeill (2005) contends that language is 
fundamentally multimodal, and the two modalities in coordination constitute a unified 
speech-gesture system.  Bates & Dick (2001) argue that the coupled developmental 
trajectory of vocal and gestural communication demonstrates that the cognitive 
systems underlying the perception and spontaneous production of speech are shared 
by those for the perception and spontaneous production of gesture.  Along the same 
lines, Iverson & Thelen (1999) note that very early sensorimotor biases linking oral 
and manual modalities initiate a deep connection and eventually ‘cascade into a 
single, coupled, communicative system, where the mental aspects of expression are 
manifest in movement’ (pg. 36).  Similarly, according to Gallagher (2005), gesture 
and speech are part of a common psychological structure, forming a complementary, 
coupled system of meaning expression.  In other words, on this view, gesture is not 
related to language, gesture is language. 
 
Somewhat more anomalous examples provide evidence to support the position that 
nonarbitrary co-speech gestures are not merely communicative, but specifically 
linguistic.  Congenitally blind speakers, who have never observed gesturing 
themselves, do so in a virtually identical manner to sighted speakers, even when their 
addressee is also blind (Iverson & Goldin-Meadow, 1998).  Anecdotal evidence also 
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comes from patients with missing limbs from birth who claim to experience ‘phantom 
gesturing’ while they speak (Ramachandran & Blakeslee, 1998). 
 
A remarkable pathology case study conducted by Cole, Gallagher & McNeill (2002) 
further informs this issue.  Due to a previous injury, the patient lacked all 
proprioceptive abilities and could not direct even the most basic bodily movements 
without conscious, visual monitoring.  However, when visual access to his hands and 
arms was blocked experimentally, he continued to produce unconscious, unmonitored 
co-speech gestures, and these remained consistent with normal measurements in 
timing and shape.  The authors argue these findings indicate that linguistic meaning 
itself – not simply the motor system – is responsible for gesture production. 
 
3.2.5 Discussion 
The evidence presented here has revealed a deep connection between vocalization and 
bodily gesture, in parallel with an equally strong relationship between symbols and 
nonarbitrary representations as they are expressed in the corresponding modalities.  
Speakers coordinate the two modalities spontaneously, utilizing complementary 
semiotic strategies to communicate through both. 
 
The reviewed research demonstrates that nonarbitrary gesture is intertwined with 
symbolic expression, being intimately involved in processes of both speech 
production and comprehension.  It is influenced not only by the communicative 
context of speaking, but also by the specific structures of a speaker’s linguistic 
system.  Kita and Ozyurek’s (2003) cross-linguistic study shows that the way 
meaning is manifested in gesture is directly related to the way meaning is conceived 
and expressed in speech.  This suggests gestures are not simply a product of spatio-
motor control, but are instead part of the linguistic system, constrained and shaped by 
its grammatical and semantic properties.  These results also provide insights into the 
nature of gestural meaning.  Participants, regardless of language, regularly encoded 
direction in their gestures while never including this information in speech.  Direction, 
in this case, was an essential component of the speakers’ intended message.  That 
such a necessary feature was expressed in gesture indicates it is a critical component 




The benefits associated with co-speech gesture also highlight its linguistic nature. The 
communicative benefits gained by hearers is not unexpected, as gestures carry 
meaningful information related to speech and not utilizing this information would be a 
sub-optimal strategy for comprehension.  The cognitive benefits for speakers, 
however, are somewhat more difficult to interpret.  As noted above, many authors 
contend that gestures are playing a facilitative role in word (or larger linguistic unit) 
retrieval or conceptualization processes for speaking (Alibali et al., 2000; Hostetter et 
al., 2006; Kita & Davies, 2009; Pine et al., 2007; Rauscher et al., 1996).  The 
characterization of facilitative would seem to imply that gestural processes are 
primary to those of speech, involving some sort of priming or feedback system.  
However, the full data set presented indicates that the two processes are simultaneous; 
gesture is not facilitating the expression of meaning in speech, but instead is 
concurrently expressing an underlying meaning that may or may not be verbalized.  
Because speech and gesture representational systems are shared (Chapter 1, section 
4), this activation is likely simultaneous, which suggests gesture is not an aid for 
finding words but a parallel output that is a natural consequence of expressing 
meaning in words.  If the data are interpreted to mean that human communication is, 
at its core, multimodal – that intended meaning is expressed through the 
complementary channels of vocalization and bodily movements – a much simpler 
explanation is available for the observed cognitive effects.  Speech dysfluencies from 
gesture restriction – both experimentally- and self-imposed – may not be signaling 
gesture’s role in accessing linguistic units and could merely be the result of inhibiting 
the most natural form of expression.  Reduced memory for incidental information 
could also be explained by this account.  If speakers are not enlisting both modalities 
and distributing the cognitive burden of expression between them, other, more general 
cognitive capacities could suffer as a consequence of placing the full computational 
load onto the symbolic channel. 
 
Research on ontogeny shows that the anatomical and semantic coordination between 
the modalities is observable from the earliest stages of development.  Children’s 
ability to express meaning – to represent for communicative purposes – is not only 
multimodal and semiotically complementary, but that ability develops in perfect 
synchrony across the two modalities.  Meaning is initially represented in each 
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modality contemporaneously, and children immediately begin to co-express the same 
or combinations of meanings in both modalities simultaneously.  Importantly, gesture 
is not an alternative form of expression that children rely on to enhance their 
communication before verbal skills are sufficient.  Instead, gesture development starts 
and progresses along with vocal development; children’s earliest communication 
consists of multimodal, heterosemiotic utterances, and utterances remain multimodal 
as their language skills become more sophisticated.  Overall, developmental research 
corroborates evidence from adult studies for a unified, multimodal language system 
and suggests a joint representational foundation for symbolic speech and nonarbitrary 
gestures. 
 
The developmental parity of nonarbitrary and symbolic signs has another important 
implication.  The fact that the ability to understand and use both sign types arises 
together indicates that the capacity and inclination to interpret symbols is not a 
separate or higher cognitive phenomenon to interpreting nonarbitrary signs.  Instead, 
the capacity for intentional, referential representation appears to encompass all three 
representational strategies in one package.  A similar phenomenon is also displayed in 
children’s ability and inclination to imitate arbitrary behaviors in non-communicative 
practical tasks.  Horner & Whiten (2005) conducted an experiment wherein children 
watched an adult perform a task through a series of actions, some of which were not 
necessary to reach the desired goal.  Despite the fact that it would have been apparent 
from the children’s perspective that certain actions were unnecessary, they 
nevertheless copied the full series of both required and irrelevant behaviors.  These 
results, though not related to communication specifically, do illustrate that the skill 
and proclivity for learning and imitating arbitrary behaviors is a basic feature of the 
human imitative abilities that ultimately underlie and enable bodily mimesis, which 
further supports the idea that arbitrary signs would be learned and used in a similar 
way.  Thus, with this combined evidence in mind, we can reason that when the ability 
to communicate through nonarbitrary signs arose in human history, it also entailed the 
potential to use symbols. 
 
The key conclusion to draw from the review of gesture and speech is that human 
referential communication is fundamentally multimodal, heterosemiotic and 
coordinated.  That is, it appears the natural mode of linguistic expression is to i) 
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combine nonarbitrary and symbolic sign types; ii) differentially distribute those sign 
types between the vocal and gestural modalities; and iii) simultaneously produce 
semantically related signs across modalities. 
 
One point to note is that the assertion that nonarbitrary gesticulations are not primary 
to symbolic speech is specifically in regard to whether one representation type arises 
prior to another in online linguistic production and the course of cognitive 
development.  This sense of primary is separate from the question of whether one 
representation type appeared prior to the other in the emergence of symbolic 
communication in human history, and this claim does not necessitate or imply that 
one did not precede the other phylogenetically.  Similarly, this implication does not 
follow from the fact that nonarbitrary gestural and symbolic vocal development 
coincide in human ontogeny.  Both rely on the more general capacity to understand 
and use signs.  Once that is in place, the ability to acquire either type is equipotential.  
However, as shown in Chapter 2, these different semiotic types can and probably do 
appear at different times in an emerging symbolic system, with nonarbitrary signs 
preceding and laying the foundation for conventional symbols. 
 
To revisit the distinction between gesticulations and pantomime, it is a useful one in 
so far as it highlights the linguistic nature of gesticulations.  However, the definition 
of pantomime as gesture in the absence of speech obscures the related possibility for 
multimodal communication involving gestures without symbolic vocalizations.  
Nothing precludes gestures that are more elaborate and pantomime-like from being 
co-expressed with vocalizations, particularly nonarbitrary vocalizations.  Indeed, 
nonarbitrary vocalizations likely often do accompany gestures of this sort – for 
instance, imagine a child pretending to be an airplane or shoot a machine gun. The 
cases that McNeill (2005) focuses on appear to be exceptions and not the rule; either 
the vocal modality is artificially restricted (charades) or made unavailable by other 
atypical circumstances (a factory floor, loud concert, etc.).  Given the deep anatomical 
integration of vocalizations and gesture (section 3.2.3), we would expect expression to 
remain multimodal even when it involves pantomime-like gestures.  In a similar vein, 
although gesticulations require the accompanying words of speech in order to be fully 
interpretable, the same does not necessarily hold for pantomime-like gestures 
produced with nonarbitrary vocalizations.  When shared symbolic resources are made 
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unavailable, the gestural modality takes on a more representationally potent quality, 
and there is no reason this would be impeded by accompanying nonarbitrary 
vocalization.  Dual nonarbitrary, multimodal communication is central to the question 
of this thesis and will be addressed again later in this chapter (section 6). 
 
While it may be justified to conclude that gesture is not an add-on to language but 
partly constitutive of language (section 3.2.4), it is not necessary to take a side in the 
debate over the definition of language here.  We can acknowledge the semantic and 
anatomical relationship between speech and nonarbitrary gestures without being 
compelled to characterize those gestures as ‘linguistic’ or not.  The phenomenon we 
are seeking to understand the origins of is the particular mode of symbolic 
representation prevalent in natural human communication.  Having now reviewed 
how both modalities are typically utilized, we can accept this is accomplished 
primarily through vocal symbols.  However, it is now clear that embodied symbolic 
communication cannot be limited to this single modality and sign type in isolation.  
The fact that symbols are intrinsically linked to nonarbitrary signs as a consequence 
of multimodal expression means that our explanation must encompass both of these 
modalities and sign types. 
 
With these ideas in mind, we can now frame the question of where symbols come 
from in the context of embodied human communication.  The specific question now 
becomes: How did the observed combined system of coordinated symbolic 
vocalizations and nonarbitrary gestures emerge?  To begin answering this question, 
we must further explicate the initial conditions from which we presume emergence 
would have taken place, first outlined at the beginning of this thesis (Chapter 1).  The 
following sections will seek to characterize these conditions through a brief inquiry 
into the evolutionary roots of multimodal communication, followed by a comparison 
of each modality’s unique physical qualities and semiotic capacities. 
 
4. Phylogenetic history 
 
Previous sections have put forth evidence demonstrating that multimodality is a core 
feature of modern human communication.  Given that the topic of this thesis reaches 
back through evolutionary time, it is necessary to understand the phylogenetic history 
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of the observed semantic and temporal coordination between modalities.  As 
multimodality is a feature of symbolic communication, and symbolic communication 
is a trait that arose after the human lineage split from other primates, we must 
determine how it fits into the explanatory framework of symbol emergence.  Put in 
specific terms, for the present analysis we must decide if the available evidence 
suggests multimodality followed symbolic communication, if it arose simultaneously, 
or if it preceded the development of symbols.  Each scenario has different 
implications and raises distinct questions.  If multimodality followed symbols, is it 
perhaps a consequence of the new mode of communicating?  If the two developed 
simultaneously, is it an indication that the cognitive or communicative requirements 
of symbolic communication demand the operation of two channels of expression?  If 
it was already in place prior to symbols, did multimodality somehow contribute to its 
emergence?  These questions can be answered, at least in part, by looking to human 
evolutionary history, a major source of evidence for which is found in comparative 
research on primate communication. 
 
4.1 Multimodal communication 
 
First, we should separate two conceptually independent aspects of coordinated 
multimodality in language: anatomical and semantic.  It is theoretically possible to 
have anatomical coordination – associated activation of manual and vocal systems – 
without semantic coordination, or even the complete absence of semantic content or 
communicative purpose.  The simultaneous oral and manual activity observed in the 
early behavior of infants is an example of this latter possibility (section 3.2.3).  
Indeed, it seems communicative, and specifically semantic, coordination arises over 
the course of development from initial anatomical links (Iverson & Thelen, 1999).  In 
addition, it may not be possible to find non-human examples of semantic 
coordination, as the referential status of primate communication remains in doubt 
(Chapter 1, section 4.3).  As such, we can, for the moment, consider multimodal 
behavior in primates generally without the need to find semantic coordination 
specifically. 
 
Before reviewing the evidence, it is worth noting that, similar to research on human 
communication, which only recently took a multimodal perspective, primate research 
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has focused largely on the vocal and manual modalities in isolation.  Slocombe, 
Walker & Liebal (2011) argue that a long-running unimodal bias in the discipline has 
obscured the complexity of primate communication and the possibility that it is 
fundamentally multimodal.  Despite the lack of attention paid to the topic, the few 
studies that have taken a multimodal approach provide some evidence to address this 
question. 
 
In a wide review of primate research, Fitch (2006) notes that vocalizations are usually 
found to accompany ape manual displays.  Slocombe et al. (2011) describe a number 
of studies on primates, as well as other mammals, that found vocal and bodily signals 
are produced together and integrated into complex messages.  An additional and 
intriguing bit of evidence comes from a study on chimpanzees’ atypical, voluntary 
vocalizations (Meguerditchian & Vauclair, 2010), which are distinguished from 
species-typical vocalizations that are generally innate and under less voluntary 
control.  Meguerditchian & Vauclair observed that atypical, intentional vocalizations 
accompanied gestures produced while attempting to communicate with a human.  In 
their review, Slocombe et al. (2011) conclude primate communication is inherently 
multimodal and note that the available data ‘highlights the continuity in multimodal 
communication across human and primate species. This suggests that language may 
have evolved through an integrated combination of vocal, gestural and facial 
communication, rather than a unimodal system’ (pg. 923). 
 
4.2 Voluntary control and flexibility 
 
A related issue in primate communication concerns the different levels of flexibility 
and voluntary control exhibited for each modality.  Ape gestures are generally 
recognized as being culturally acquired and voluntarily produced.  Ape vocalizations, 
in contrast, have traditionally been and continue to be viewed by many as largely 
innate and involuntary (a view exemplified in Tomasello, 2008), consisting of a fixed 
inventory of species-specific calls produced automatically in response to certain 
conditions.  However, recent research suggests ape production may be more flexible 
and voluntary than once thought (Hopkins, Taglialatela & Leavens 2007; Yamaguchi 
& Izumi, 2008). 
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Regarding species-typical vocalizations, chimpanzees appear to modify their food 
calls according to the type and quantity of discovered food (Slocombe & Zuberbühler, 
2007).  In addition, chimpanzees have been shown to produce atypical vocalizations 
when motivated – for instance, when attempting to elicit food that is out of their reach 
from a human trainer (Megherditchian & Vauclair, 2010).  Interestingly, exposure to a 
human cultural environment appears to result in innovative vocalizations.  Hopkins & 
Savage-Rumbaugh (1991) found that, in addition to species-specific calls, the highly 
enculturated bonobo Kanzi produced four additional vocalizations not observed in 
other bonobo groups.  Taglialatela, Savage-Rumbaugh & Baker (2008) later 
demonstrated that Kanzi’s vocalizations systematically vary based on semantic 
context, indicating he has learned, at least to some extent, to produce vocalizations to 
convey referential meanings.  The atypical capacities evident in these examples, if 
rare, nevertheless suggest intentional and flexible multimodal communication has 




The evidence suggests that multimodal communication has ancient phylogenetic roots 
– not only in the primate lineage but also apparently widespread throughout the 
mammalian class.  The vocal and bodily modalities are used together to convey a 
message through simultaneous expression of related information – that is, the 
modalities are coordinated.  The presence of this trait in nonhuman primates and other 
species indicates a common evolutionary origin that arose long before the human 
lineage split from other primates. Thus, we can assume that anatomical, and by 
extension communicative, coordination preceded the emergence of symbolic 
communication. 
 
Although intentional and flexible vocal production appears to be diminished in 
comparison to that of gesture and not exhibited by all apes in all circumstances, the 
latent capacity for it observed in atypical cases suggests the trait, or the capacity for it, 
was present in the human lineage and available to be utilized if instigating conditions 
arose and further elaborated the behavior.  Thus, we can also assume that voluntary, 
open-ended vocal communication accompanied the same kind of communication in 
the gestural modality.   
 111 
 
These assumptions, together with the reviewed research on bodily and vocal 
communication in this chapter, findings from emerging sign systems (Chapter 2) and 
arguments for the bodily mimesis hypothesis (Chapter 1) allow us to pinpoint the 
situation-specific starting conditions from which our explanation of the emergence of 
symbolic communication can proceed.  These starting conditions are the premises on 
which an explanation should be built.  As indicated previously, we assume that 
referential communication is a behavior already in place.  Given that the vocal and 
gestural modalities co-express meaning, we assume that communication is 
multimodal and coordinated.  Given that communication is initiated through 
nonarbitrary signs and both modalities can be used to this end, we assume vocal and 
gestural signs are both nonarbitrary.  In summary, the position taken in this thesis 
holds that the initial embodied conditions in human history out of which symbols 
emerged consisted of multimodal, coordinated, nonarbitrary communication. 
 
Finally, an important implication of these premises is if multimodality is a trait that 
predates the emergence of symbolic communication, it is therefore not a feature that 
requires explanation. This interaction and synergy between modalities evident in 
embodied experience is an irreducible and indelible feature of communication, one 
that not only constrains an explanation of the origins of symbolic language, but one 
that can also inform it.  Thus, given that multimodality was an aspect of the 
conditions in which symbol emergence took place, we can also consider how this 
factor may have contributed to the process.  In other words, multimodality itself is a 
potential causal force and should be incorporated into our explanation. 
 
 
5. Representational comparison 
 
We have now seen how vocal and gestural forms operate in modern communication, 
as well as the representational qualities of each modality.  The evolutionary premises 
outlined above entail a prior state in which symbols are not present and 
communication is via nonarbitrary signs expressed in both of two modalities.  The 
endpoint of our explanation is the semiotic differentiation observed today in symbolic 
vocal and nonarbitrary gestural communication.  A transition from nonarbitrary to 
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symbolic signs depends in part on how sign form features relate to meaning, and this 
is influenced by the modality through which signs are expressed (Chapters 1 and 2).  
As such, it is necessary to compare the semiotic capacities of the vocal and gestural 
modalities to understand how differences in the way meaning is represented could 
affect processes related to a transition. 
 
First, we can note that both modalities have equal capacity for symbolic 
representation.  As arbitrary signs are not bound by resemblance, they are free to take 
any form, which means the entire space of possible forms in both the gestural and 
vocal modalities is potentially arbitrary.  Moreover the existence of manual sign 
languages illustrates that gestures can be used symbolically to the same effect as 
vocalizations.  Thus, in theory and practice, the modalities are equivalent in the 
capacity to convey arbitrary signs.  However, due to the distinct physical properties of 
gestures and vocalizations, there are critical differences in how each actualizes 
nonarbitrary representation and in how forms are interpreted in regard to arbitrariness 
and nonarbitrariness. 
 
Our experience of the world is in large part through visual-spatial dimensions, and 
bodily representations are similarly visual-spatial.  As a result, rich, complex and 
salient aspects of experience can be represented in a gesture (or combinations of 
gestures).  Gestures can directly resemble a referent along multiple dimensions 
simultaneously, such as size, shape, movement, and intensity.  Gestures can depict 
actions and events, but they can also portray static objects or entities by positioning 
body parts to resemble their shape or creating the outline of a form in space – and 
both object and action can be incorporated into a single gesture.  In addition, because 
bodily representations have the potential to depict many different features of a given 
referent, the particular way one is represented can vary widely according to the 
demands of a particular context.  This allows communicators to flexibly adjust gesture 
forms to highlight those features most salient and appropriate for the present situation.  
Finally, deixis by way of embodied pointing gestures is a powerful representational 
strategy, as it can identify a referent with relative precision. 
 
Although crossmodal connections enable the vocal channel to nonarbitrarily represent 
features apart from the auditory, this capacity is much more limited in terms of 
 113 
transparency in form (Chapter 2, section 2.2.2) in comparison to gesture.  As 
discussed above (section 2), vocal forms can depict referents with only low precision 
and evoke very general qualities.  Because this renders them rather blunt 
representational instruments, it reduces communicators’ ability to craft signs that 
highlight salient aspects of a specific context as communicative demands shift.  This 
lower capacity is reflected in Ahlner & Zlatev’s (2010) characterization of vocal 
nonarbitrariness as a matter of secondary iconicity – resemblance between form and 
meaning is recognized only after the sign relationship between the two is established 
otherwise.   
 
The argument that vocalization has a lower capacity for nonarbitrary representation is 
borne out in a recent experiment.  Fay and Lim (2010) adapted the design of 
interactive communication studies described previously (Chapter 2, section 2.1), using 
vocalization and gesture as the mediums of communication.  Pairs of participants 
attempted to communicate a list of concepts without using language in three different 
conditions.  Participants could use nonarbitrary vocalizations only, nonarbitrary 
gestures only or both nonarbitrary vocalizations and gestures together.  The success 
rate of pairs that could gesture was significantly higher than for those who could only 
vocalize.  Interestingly, the success rate of pairs that could use both was virtually 
identical to those who only gestured.  These results indicate that, when representation 
is limited to nonarbitrary signs, the gestural modality carries a markedly greater 




The first point we can note from this comparison is that, in the context of 
communication without symbols, gesture is a powerful and effective mode of 
expressing and sharing meaning. Due to the particular properties of the vocal and 
gestural modalities, the way in which gesture can resemble and represent referents is 
more varied and carries a greater amount of semantic content than that of the vocal 
modality.  In other words, the nonarbitrary relationship between a gesture and a 
referent is generally more robust and direct than between a vocalization and a 
referent.  Given that the establishment of communication in natural settings through 
sufficiently representationally potent nonarbitrary signs precedes and enables the 
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development of symbols generally (Chapter 2), we can reason that gesture, which 
possess these attributes to a greater degree than the other modality of communication, 
would have been an important factor in this process as it occurred in human evolution.  
Specifically, it provides additional information regarding the conditions from which 
symbolic communication emerged.  Because gesture carries greater referential content 
than vocalization, we can reason that in the context of our stated initial conditions – 
coordinated, multimodal, nonarbitrary communication – the bulk of referential 
communication was accomplished through the gestural modality. 
 
The comparison of modalities allows us to further explicate the question of the origin 
of symbols first refined in section 4 above.  Our stated initial conditions consists of 
communication via a combined system of nonarbitrary vocalization and gesture, 
which through some means transitions to a combined system of symbolic vocalization 
and nonarbitrary gesture.   Given that the modalities have equal potential for arbitrary 
representation, the question can be framed as: Why did a transition to symbols result 
in vocal symbols and nonarbitrary gestures instead of nonarbitrary vocalizations and 
gestural symbols?  In theory, of course, we could ask why both are not arbitrary, or 
why one did not disappear as a communicative tool once symbols were established or 
other logical possibilities.  However, psychological considerations regarding the 
incompatibility of simultaneous symbolic communication would preclude a scenario 
in which both went through a semiotic transition.  Similarly, the principle of 
evolutionary continuity would suggest that an established – and presumably useful 
and perceptually salient – communicative resource (vocal or gestural) would not be 
lost and continue to be utilized through and after any transition in the other modality.  
Thus, we can justifiably limit our question to the issue of why one modality became 
symbolic while the other remained nonarbitrary as opposed to the opposite scenario. 
 
These differing capacities for nonarbitrary representation and correspondingly 
different communicative roles have important implications regarding sign 
interpretation, which is a critical factor in a transition to symbolic representation 
(Chapter 1).  The interpretive element of signs and these implications are critical to 
answering the question of symbols origins as it has been framed in this thesis.  With 
the necessary premises and explanatory devices identified, the following section will 




The ideas presented in this chapter have allowed us to frame and refine the question 
of the origin of symbols from an embodied perspective.  We have considered the 
qualities of the two major modalities through which human communication takes 
place, the nature of symbolic communication as it exists in modern human behavior, 
the evolutionary history of these behaviors and the differential representational 
capacities of the two modalities.  I have concluded that an adequate explanation of the 
emergence of symbols must incorporate multimodality and address how a 
homeosemiotic multimodal system bifurcated into the specific heterosemiotic 
multimodal system observed today.  This section will first examine existing work on 
this question in light of the evidence and arguments presented here in order to 
establish how far we have come in formulating answers, determine if proposed 
solutions should be modified and identify issues that still require explanation. 
 
6.1 Current theories 
 
The preceding sections have highlighted the representational and communicative 
potency of nonarbitrary gesture and the central role it potentially played in the 
emergence of modern language.  This idea has not gone unnoticed by other 
researchers, and a number of gesture-based theories of symbols origins have been 
proposed (Morgan, 1877; Burling, 2005; Paget, 1930; Wundt, 1916; Hewes, 1973; 
Corballis 2002; 2003; 2010; Gentilucci & Corballis, 2006; Arbib 2003; 2005; Arbib, 
Liebal & Pika, 2008; Rizolatti & Arbib, 1998; Tomasello 2008) along with, more 
recently, some multimodal theories (Goldin-Meadow & McNeill, 1999; Kita 2008; 
Kita, Kantarzis, & Imai, 2010; Kita, Ozyürek, Allen & Ishizuka,  2010; McNeill, 
Bertenthal, Cole & Gallagher, 2005; McNeill, Duncan, Cole, Gallagher & Bertenthal, 
2008; Mithen 2004; Zlatev, 2008a, 2008b).  With the exception of McNeill and 
colleagues, all of these have in common the premise that communication via 
nonarbitrary gesture preceded and enabled the emergence of symbols.  Some 
acknowledge multimodal communication generally (Goldin-Meadow & McNeill, 
1999; McNeill et al., 2005; McNeill et al., 2008; Zlatev, 2008), though only two 
consider the role of specifically nonarbitrary vocalization as well (Kita 2008; Kita et 
al., 2010a, 2010b; Mithen 2004). 
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These theories differ in many respects and approach the question from various 
perspectives.  For purposes of clarity, instead of a detailed review of each in isolation, 
they will be addressed in aggregate in terms of the specific explanatory requirements 
identified in this thesis.  We can assess whether they provide satisfactory explanations 
for the two factors underlying symbol emergence: interpretation and 
conventionalization (Chapter 1).  Moreover, they should account for the particular 
version of these observed in human communication, answering i) why did 
vocalizations come to be used as symbols and not gesture
9
, and ii) how did vocal 
symbols conventionalize?  In addition, these explanations will need to be consilient 
with the premises outlined here and general evolutionary principles (see Chapter 1, 
section 2). 
 
While these theories offer some insights into the question of symbol origins, a number 
of proposed solutions will be shown to leave critical explanatory gaps unaddressed or 
imply questionable evolutionary processes as solutions.  For example, the questions of 
interpretation and conventionalization are not always addressed explicitly or as 
separate issues demanding their own explanations.  Nevertheless, explanations 
concerning these are at times implicit in the arguments given and can be inferred to 
some extent when necessary.  Finally, this discussion will not always include specific 
arguments from every author regarding every issue, and will instead cite a selection 
that is representative of general categories of similar proposals. 
 
6.1.1 Interpretation 
The question of interpretation is a question of how signs come to be perceived and 
used as symbols.  Applying that question to human symbolic expression, we are 
further concerned with how vocal signs became symbolic.  Existing explanations can 
broadly be grouped into three versions, which I will refer to as switch, immediate and 
intra-modal.  Details of these versions will be addressed in the following sections, but 
a brief description and example of each will be useful to clarify the categorical 
distinctions. 
                                                
9
 That is, the primary channel for symbols under normal circumstances, 
acknowledging that some gestures are arbitrary and gesture is the mode of symbolic 
communication in sign languages. 
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Switch theories assert that symbols first arose in the gestural modality and at some 
point the vocal modality took over the role of symbolic representation (Arbib, 2005; 
Arbib et al., 2008; Burling, 2005; Corballis, 2002, 2010; Donald, 1991; Tomasello, 
2008).  An example of a typical switch scenario is found in Arbib (2005), in which he 




1. Simple imitation 
2. Complex imitation 
3. Protosign 
a. Pantomime 




Uniquely human communication first occurs through iconic gestures (Stage 3a).  
Symbolic communication arises when conventional gestures are invented to 
disambiguate pantomimic gestures (Stage 3b). Arbib also holds that communication 
was multimodal, and therefore vocalizations would accompany gestures (both iconic 
and symbolic), and these would be used to further disambiguate messages (Stage 4).  
Eventually, the associations built between vocalizations and gestures would allow 
vocalizations to convey meaning autonomously.  Thus, this scenario involves the 
reinterpretation of gestures as symbolic as well as a subsequent interpretation of 
vocalizations as symbolic – that is, it entails two switches: a semiotic switch within 
one modality as well as a semiotic switch across modalities.  The proposed switch 
between modalities is motivated by the fact that Arbib (2005) and other switch theory 
authors, for various reasons, typically exclude or downplay the role of vocalization 
prior to the development of symbols. 
 
Intra-modal theories (Kita, 2008; Mithen, 2004) argue vocalizations were originally 
nonarbitrary and eventually became symbolic, and these theories are, not surprisingly, 
based on research that emphasizes the nonarbitrary potential of the vocal modality.  
The most well-known of this version is Mithen’s (2004) proposal, which focuses on 
the evolution of music and language and holds that communication would have been 
                                                
10
 Arbib’s (2005) model also includes prior stages for grasping and mirror neurons, 
but these have been left out as they can be presumed for present purposes. 
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carried out through nonarbitrary vocalizations followed by nonarbitrary gestures.  
Through repeated association with communicated meanings, vocal phrases would 
eventually come to refer to those meanings symbolically.  Thus, intra-modal accounts 
entail a semiotic switch within a single modality. 
 
The immediate version holds that communication was multimodal and heterosemiotic 
at inception (McNeill et al., 2005; McNeill et al., 2008).  McNeill and colleagues are 
the primary proponents of this model and base their ideas on work on the semiotic 
relationship between speech and gesture.  According to this theory, there is no 
semiotic transition from nonarbitrary to symbolic within or across modalities, with the 
two modalities playing the same roles seen in modern language today. 
 
Given the distinct but overlapping versions found in these different theoretical 
categories, this discussion will consider separately reasons proposed for why signs – 
vocal or gestural – became interpreted as symbolic, as well as reasons proposed for 
why symbols became the domain of vocalization. 
 
6.1.1.1 Nonarbitrary to arbitrary 
Corballis (2002) and Arbib et al. (2008) both cite the process of ontogenetic 
ritualization as one that could cause a transition from nonarbitrary to arbitrary signs.  
However, as described in Chapter 1 (section 4.3), the movements involved in this 
process are arguably more akin to actions, not representations.  Along the same lines, 
any characterization of the initial movements as ‘iconic’ and the resulting ones as 
‘symbolic’ is somewhat questionable and more likely an artifact of analysis on the 
part of human observers (as argued by Tomasello, 2008).  Given the role of repeated 
use in altering the form of signs, and therefore potential interpretations of those signs 
(Chapter 2, section 2), processes similar to ontogenetic ritualization could have played 
some role in the development of symbols.  However, because the way ritualization-
derived gestures are perceived and understood is unknown, together with the fact that 
their representational status is questionable even for humans (Chapter 1, section 4.3), 
we can reason that this process does not directly speak to the critical issue of 
interpretation and is therefore not a satisfactory or sufficient explanation.  
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As mentioned above, some authors do not address the transition between nonarbitrary 
and symbolic signs directly or overtly in the terms of this thesis.  Even so, the 
language used to describe a transition from nonarbitrary to symbolic signs is 
indicative of how it is conceived to have taken place.  For example, Donald (1991) 
describes the development of symbols as an ‘invention’ to enhance conceptual 
abilities, a ‘solution’ that was conceived by an ‘inventor’ (pg. 219).  This implies that 
a communicative or conceptual problem existed, and one or more individuals 
deliberately formulated a solution.  In a similar vein, Arbib (2005) states that arbitrary 
symbols would have been used to disambiguate nonarbitrary representations (which 
are presumed to be inadequate communicative devices).  Again, there is an 
implication that nonarbitrary communication was flawed and demanded solutions, 
which led individuals to develop a new communicative strategy to meet these 
demands.  Explanations of this sort thus invoke the deliberate creation of symbolic 
signs by certain individuals or groups who have discerned specific advantages of 
communication through arbitrary signs over nonarbitrary ones.  As argued in Chapter 
1, however, an evolutionary explanation of the emergence of symbolic 
communication should avoid appealing to the insight of individuals generally, and in 
particular regarding the advantages of symbols, which may only become apparent 
after the fact.  Moreover, research discussed in Chapter 2 indicates that such 
intentional invention does not occur even by modern, symbol-experienced 
populations.  In addition, mimetic communication can be a remarkably effective 
communicative strategy (Donald, 1991; Fay & Lim, 2010), which calls into question 
the assumption that communicators would require or foresee reasons for any 
improvements.  Therefore, in sum, such arguments are likewise an unsatisfactory 
answer to the question of novel symbol use.  
 
Others avoid a transition in interpretation altogether and appear to assume that 
multimodal referential communication was a combination of arbitrary and 
nonarbitrary representation from inception (McNeill et al., 2005; McNeill et al., 
2008).  Vocalizations in these proposals are described as ‘code-based’ socially shared 
‘symbols’ (McNeill et al., 2008; pg. 125).  This view stems from the acknowledgment 
that the gestural modality has a much greater capacity for nonarbitrary representation 
than the vocal modality.  However, in emphasizing nonarbitrariness in the gestural 
modality, the nonarbitrariness of vocalization is overly downplayed – both in its 
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potential role previous to the development of modern symbolic language as well as its 
remaining nonarbitrary functions today (section 2 above).  Given the perceptual 
salience of nonarbitrary vocalizations and the fact that nonarbitrary signs are found to 
precede arbitrary ones across many types of emerging sign systems (Chapter 2), the 
assumption that vocalizations would be immediately and universally used and 
perceived as symbols is somewhat untenable.  In related writings, McNeill and 
Goldin-Meadow (1999) have argued that the vocal modality was used for symbolic 
representation precisely because it is not amenable to nonarbitrary representation, and 
that symbolic function was developed to compensate for this weakness.  This claim, 
similarly to those described above, implies insight into semiotic strategies and a 
deliberate effort to optimize or improve communication – in this case discerning the 
possibility to supplement mimetic gestures with arbitrary representations.  Thus, while 
this view takes into consideration the distinct semiotic capacities of each modality, it 
dismisses the possibility and use of nonarbitrariness in vocalization and therefore does 
not provide a satisfactory account of how nonarbitrary signs would come to be 
interpreted as symbolic.  Furthermore, in arguing that the vocal modality would be 
enlisted for symbolic representation because of its shortfalls, presumably to enhance 
communication through mimetic gestures alone, the argument is also questionable on 
evolutionary grounds. 
 
Mithen (2004) takes a multimodal perspective and holds that prelinguistic 
vocalization was nonarbitrary, though his emphasis is on the musical and affective 
qualities of the modality.  He claims that such vocalizations would have become 
associated with referents through repeated co-occurrence with meanings 
communicated through gesture and crossmodal connections activated by referents’ 
features.  By virtue of this association, vocalizations would eventually ‘come to refer 
to’ those meanings and ‘exist as words’.  Arbib (2005) also cites repeated co-
occurrence as a reason for vocalizations to be imbued with meaning and become 
autonomous symbols.  This explanation thus points to a process of ritualization that 
would cause initially indexical associations between non-referential forms and co-
occurring referential signs (or perhaps entities physically present in the context of 
communication) to become perceived as symbols (akin to Deacon’s (1997) claim that 
ritualization and indexical relationships underlie symbolic representation).  One issue 
with this view is that it does not actually provide an answer as to why the original 
 121 
perceptions of vocalizations as nonarbitrary and/or affective would be lost and 
reinterpreted as symbolic signs with semantic content.   That is, if vocalizations were 
interpreted as nonarbitrary and serving some communicative function, it is not clear 
without additional explanation why repeated associations with certain objects or 
entities would lead to a change in how such vocalizations were interpreted.  In 
addition, the characterization of nonarbitrary vocalization as non-referential
11
 is not in 
line with the way the modality is perceived in modern use and presumably how it was 
so prior to symbols.  Conveying affect and other non-referential information is of 
course an important function of the vocal modality (as well as gesture), but it is not 
the only one.  Referential vocal signs are also an important function, one that might 
have been even more prominent prior to symbolic language, when the primary mode 
of communication was through mimetic representation.  Given that nonarbitrary 
vocalizations are – or at least can be – signs, ritualization would not be necessary for 
them to be perceived as referential.  Moreover, the expected mode of representation 
would have been nonarbitrary, and as argued above, ritualization is an insufficient 
explanation for a transition to arbitrary interpretations of previously nonarbitrary 
signs. 
 
Finally, Tomasello (2008) notes the difficulties in appealing to the intentional creation 
of symbols and instead cites changing perceptions of signs in use as a more viable 
solution.  He describes a scenario, previously mentioned in Chapter 2, in which 
individuals develop shared iconic signs (perhaps akin to the interaction-derived signs 
from experiments described in Chapter 2, section 2) and use them to communicate in 
various situations.  Other individuals who happen to observe a communicative 
exchange involving these signs may not perceive the iconicity of the sign but could 
infer its appropriate meaning based on the reaction of the intended recipient.  In this 
way, an observer could interpret the sign as representing the correct or a related 
meaning, but for this observer it has become an arbitrary label – or symbol.  Thus, this 
                                                
11
 Non-referential may be an inaccurate way to describe signs with affective content, 
in that they do seem to refer to certain emotional states.  The more important 
difference between these and mimetic and symbolic signs may lie in the fact that 
affective signs appear to be innate, direct mappings between forms and feelings.  In 
contrast, the form-meaning relationships for mimesis and symbols are not instinctive, 
arise out of experience over time and can be created and understood spontaneously 
based on current communicative needs. 
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explanation incorporates the interpretive processes underlying all sign types and the 
potential for sign status to transition via new or different perceptions of a sign.  While 
these considerations are consistent with some of the ideas put forward in this thesis, 
Tomasello (2008) explicitly does not take a multimodal perspective as outlined here.  
Hence, his theory does not address the distinct semiotic capacities of each modality 
nor account for why certain signs over others would be perceived as arbitrary.  The 
following section on the semiotic split between modalities will discuss these issues 
further.  For now, we can recognize that this specific proposal offers a viable solution 
to the question of how symbolic interpretations of signs could arise, but not to our 
specific question regarding vocal symbols. 
 
6.1.1.2 Vocal versus gestural symbols 
For various reasons a number of theories postulate that symbolic communication first 
arose in the gestural modality, which is thought to be the modality through which the 
bulk of communication was accomplished (Arbib, 2005; Corballis, 2002; Donald, 
1991; Tomasello, 2008).  As a consequence, these switch versions are forced to 
provide an additional explanation for why the vocal modality is now the primary 
domain of symbols.  Oftentimes purported advantages of vocal over gestural 
communication are cited, including lower energy requirements, the ability to 
communicate in the dark and freeing the hands for instruction or manufacturing.  
However, it is unclear whether most of these hold in practice, as sign language users 
are able to engage in the same activities (Emmorey, 2005) and vocal symbolic 
language is arguably not required for many sophisticated cultural practices – for 
example, building and using boats (Gil, 2006) or teaching rug manufacturing 
processes (Jamie Tehrani, personal communication).  In addition, this solution once 
again relies on the insight of communicators and deliberate invention.  Such 
assertions have also been criticized by other authors on evolutionary grounds 
(Emmorey, 2005), as the highly contingent nature of evolutionary trajectories means 
the more likely outcome of an initially gestural symbolic system would be manual 
signed languages, not speech.  Finally, Corballis (2002) suggests the switch may have 
occurred because, according to him, speech is more arbitrary, and therefore the vocal 
modality would be more advantageous for symbolic communication.  Emmorey 
(2005) counters this line of reasoning, noting the many arbitrary signs found in signed 
languages and the absence of any evidence demonstrating that expression or 
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processing is hindered by nonarbitrary manual signs.  On general semiotic grounds, 
this suggestion also does not hold.  As discussed in section 5 above, vocal and 
gestural signs have an equal capacity for arbitrary representation, which means neither 
has a theoretical ‘advantage’ over the other for conveying symbolic signs.  While this 
suggestion acknowledges the modalities’ distinct semiotic qualities, it does not go on 
to consider how interpretive processes would have affected the way signs in each 
modality were perceived and used, and therefore does not constitute a sufficient 
explanation. 
 
Some intra-modal theories do not provide a reason for why one modality is now 
predominantly symbolic and not the other (Kita, 2008; Kita et al., 2010a, 2010b; 
Mithen, 2004).  Zlatev (2008) briefly mentions Corballis’s (2002) notion that the 
greater arbitrariness of the vocal modality as a possible cause, though the idea is not 
developed further.  Thus, while these theories are consistent with our premise of 
multimodal communication and avoid criticisms related to a switch, they do not 
directly address the question of heterosemiotic distribution across the modalities in 
regard to sign interpretation. 
 
The immediate theory (McNeill et al., 2005; McNeill et al., 2008), which assumes 
vocal signs were de facto symbols, seems to suggest that vocalizations were used as 
symbols because they are arbitrary.  In other words, because the modality could not 
be utilized effectively for nonarbitrary representation, vocal symbols were created in 
order to make the modality communicatively useful and match the referential capacity 
of gesture.  Again, this account appeals to the ability and inclination of 
communicators to identify potential improvements and design novel strategies to 
optimize communication.  Moreover, it does not answer why vocalizations were 




This review and discussion has revealed that the question of interpretation has not 
been thoroughly or sufficiently addressed in existing theories of symbol origins.  The 
explanations provided prove to be incomplete or otherwise unsatisfactory for a 
number of reasons, including by adopting premises not in line with those identified as 
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most appropriate here, not accounting for all the critical factors underlying symbolic 
communication identified in this thesis, invoking intentional acts that lack viability 
and/or misapplying or failing to apply concepts from semiotics.  Tomasello (2008) 
provides the groundwork for a solution by pointing to the potential for intended 
nonarbitrary signs to be mis- and reinterpreted as symbolic by certain individuals – a 
viable possibility made evident in the research discussed in section 4 above.  
However, relevant issues related to sign interpretation are left unaddressed, and as a 
result, a number of questions remain concerning a transition to the particular 
heterosemiotic, multimodal communication observed today. 
 
With the contributions and deficiencies in existing theories identified, a more 
comprehensive explanation can now be formulated that incorporates and makes use of 
the actions of interpretive processes and the consequences of each modality’s 
particular semiotic properties relative to each other.  After a similar review 




The question of conventionalization has received even less explicit attention and 
analysis than interpretation.  It may be that some authors assume the issue has already 
been resolved by computational models that demonstrate populations of agents can 
converge on shared vocabularies through communicative processes (Chapter 2, 
section 4).  However, as discussed in Chapter 2, the success of these models requires 
that specific conditions hold – namely, some reliable source of information must 
provide communicators with access to each other’s intended meanings, thereby 
grounding new arbitrary signs.  While cross-situational learning has been shown to 
aid this process to some extent when a meaning intended to be conveyed is not 
entirely certain (A.D.M. Smith, 2001), its effects are weakened as referential 
uncertainty increases (Smith et al., 2011).  In addition, cross-situational learning is 
perhaps better characterized as an extra-communicative process that can support the 
acquisition of a vocabulary as opposed to a direct sign-grounding mechanism in itself.  
In settings like those of emergence, uncertainty-lessening mechanisms internal to 
communicative acts like establishing joint attention are of central importance for 
ensuring symbols are grounded and conventionalization takes place.  Thus, 
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conventionalization should not be considered an automatically guaranteed outcome, 
and a satisfactory explanation for symbol origins in human evolution as offered in 
these theories should cite some mechanism or mechanisms that would accomplish this 
grounding. 
 
At times, some authors seem to conflate conventionalization with arbitrariness.  For 
example, likening pre-linguistic gestures to those of primates, Arbib and colleagues 
(Arbib et al., 2008) claim that ritualization processes would have led initially iconic 
gestures to be conventionalized and symbolic.  Similarly, Corballis (2002) argues that 
iconic gestures would become progressively abstract and symbolic while becoming 
conventionalized.  However, conventional signs are not necessarily symbolic, and the 
alterations in sign form resulting from ritualization and interaction processes may not 
correspond to a change in sign interpretation (Chapter 2, section 2).  Moreover, 
conventionalization through ontogenetic ritualization occurs between an isolated pair 
of individuals and does not typically spread to others. Therefore, this process would 
probably not play a major role in the conventionalization of arbitrary signs throughout 
a population.  Given that such processes do not account for transmission to others or a 
grounding mechanism underlying the large-scale spread of novel arbitrary signs, we 
can conclude this explanation does not sufficiently address the question of 
conventionalization. 
 
Many authors, as with interpretation, address the issue of conventionalization 
indirectly or only implicitly.  Kita and colleagues (Kita 2008; Kita et al., 2010a, 
2010b) argue that crossmodal nonarbitrariness would allow communicators to agree 
upon vocal labels.  The fact that such labels might not actually be symbolic in the first 
place aside, this account again relies on the intentional acts of communicators – in this 
case, the deliberate construction of shared vocabularies.  Or, if what is intended in this 
line of reasoning is that shared crossmodal nonarbitrariness would lead to 
communicators sharing vocal labels without the need for explicit agreement, the issue 
arises that conventionalization processes for arbitrary signs may differ from that of 
nonarbitrary signs.  In which case, convergence on shared signs due to common 
sensory associations is probably not an appropriate model and likely cannot account 
for convergence on shared symbols.  In another vein, McNeill and colleagues (2008) 
seem to imply that communicators would explicitly negotiate and agree on labels, as 
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no other explanation is given for how a code-based vocal system would come to be 
established.  For the same reasons cited previously, however, appeals to such 
intentional mechanisms are not a viable solution. 
 
Finally, Tomasello (2008) argues that conventional signs would develop from 
interlocutors’ imitation of each other’s iconic signs, which could then spread to other 
individuals who observe communication via these signs.  While this account provides 
a solution to how a sign could spread beyond a dyad or small group, some issues arise 
when we consider how this process might explain population-wide 
conventionalization.  The grounding mechanism that enables a hypothetical 
observer’s initial reinterpretation is indirectly provided by another’s correct 
recognition of an intended nonarbitrary gesture and their subsequent actions.  If we 
extend beyond these highly constrained circumstances, however, such information 
would not be available as a grounding mechanism if the observer attempted to 
communicate with a new individual using the gesture.  Neither information from 
nonarbitrary representations nor inference from others’ successful communication via 
nonarbitrary representations would be present to aid interpretation.  As described in 
Chapter 2, section 2.2.1, inference from ambient sources on its own can assist this 
process to some degree.  However, it is a relatively weak mechanism compared to 
other grounding sources and we should not assume such factors would be consistently 
available or sufficiently informative.  Therefore, implicit reliance on contextual 
inference as the primary means of grounding novel symbols in this way does not 
provide an adequate explanation for conventionalization. 
 
A related scenario that might be put forward from this view is the possibility that it 
would occur with a group of observers, perhaps children.  These observers could then 
use the gesture between themselves to communicate this meaning, and their behavior 
could then spread to others in a population who observe their interactions.  The 
problem with this scenario is that it requires both i) that multiple observers fail to 
recognize a gesture as iconic and ii) that all those who have done so assign the same 
or very similar meanings to the now arbitrary gesture.  Otherwise, the gesture would 
not be a functional communicative device between these individuals, despite their 
shared experience.  As this outcome requires that the same set of complex 
psychological processes occurs simultaneously across multiple individuals, it is a 
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highly unlikely possibility. Thus, while Tomasello (2008) addresses how a novel 
symbol is established (Chapter 2, section 2.3) for an individual, without any other 
means of providing reliable information to indicate meaning for others, this 
explanation does not fully account for how arbitrary signs could be grounded for 
others and conventionalize throughout a population. 
 
6.1.2.1 Summary 
The question of conventionalization demands an explanation of what factors could 
have grounded novel symbols.  Existing theories either provide no account at all, 
point to deliberate construction, or rely heavily on weak forces.  As with 
interpretation, then, substantial issues remain as to how conventionalization might 
have taken place. 
 
6.1.3 Discussion 
Together, existing origins theories go a long way in explaining how human 
communication evolved.  As a group, they recognize the necessity for a prior 
nonarbitrary mode of communication in establishing a symbolic system.  Multimodal 
theories address language as a coupled vocal-plus-gesture communicative system.  
Nevertheless, existing theories do not provide a complete explanation for the 
emergence of symbolic communication according to the criteria put forth here as most 
critical.  These theories thus far either have not addressed the question of symbol 
origins in these terms, have done so only superficially and/or invoke mechanisms of 
questionable validity to explain the creation and/or conventionalization of novel 
symbols.  Furthermore, processes of sign interpretation and consequences of the 
particular qualities of embodied human communication have not been fully mined to 
exploit their inherent explanatory potential. 
 
With the questions themselves, our explanatory framework and the current state of 
theoretical progress now comprehensively established, the following section will 






6.2 A model of emergence 
 
The question of symbol origins in the context of interest here hinges on i) how 
nonarbitrary signs became arbitrary and ii) how arbitrary signs conventionalized.  I 
have argued that answering these questions demands consideration of semiotic 
concepts, evolutionary principles (Chapter 1), general processes in emerging sign 
systems (Chapter 2) together with the particular features of embodied human 
communication (sections 2-5 above).  I will propose explanations for these two 
factors using the evidence presented and the concepts and principles developed thus 
far in this thesis, arguing that this perspective avoids problematic assumptions and 
implications and fills explanatory gaps in existing proposals. 
 
6.2.1 Interpretation 
As described in Chapter 1, symbolic interpretations of signs can arise in modern 
human communicative processes simply through a failure to recognize an intended 
nonarbitrary relationship between form and meaning.  In other words, unintentional 
misperception can lead to symbols without the need for individual insight or 
deliberate creation.  As argued in section 3.2.7 above, we can assume communicators 
engaging in bodily mimesis in the context immediately preceding symbols would 
possess a cognitive capacity for referential representation encompassing all sign 
types.  Therefore, this potential for symbols as misperceived nonarbitrary signs 
existed in our hypothetical circumstances.  Given the unviability of mechanisms based 
on deliberate invention, before reverting to appeals to them we should exploit the 
explanatory power of this element of signs to its full potential.  Thus, without 
evidence demanding the need for additional justifications, I am in agreement with 
Tomasello (2008) that a transition from nonarbitrary to symbolic was a consequence 
of misinterpretation. 
 
Apart from a general explanation for symbols, however, Tomasello’s account does 
not offer a satisfactory explanation for why vocalizations are now the primary domain 
of symbols.  This is due to his assumption that only gesture would be used for 
intentional, referential communication, which ultimately negates – or at the very least 
vastly diminishes – the possibility to explain why one modality came to dominate 
symbols without appealing to less plausible evolutionary and psychological processes.  
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That is, if we presume arbitrary signs arose in gesture because it was responsible for 
referential communication, we must then justify i) why the vocal modality would 
become voluntary and flexible and ii) why symbols would dominate it and not the 
modality in which they were already utilized.  As argued above (section 5), however, 
there is strong evidence to suggest referential communication at this point in human 
history was multimodal.  I will argue that taking this multimodal perspective together 
with explicit acknowledgment of sign interpretation processes can go beyond an 
explanation for the emergence of symbolic signs generally and inform the related and 
more specific explanation for the emergence of vocal symbols. 
 
Although the interpretive nature of signs provides an opportunity for a semiotic 
transition, that transition will depend on the specific semiotic and communicative 
characteristics of the representations and the channels through which expression takes 
place.  As described above, the modalities through which humans communicate have 
distinct semiotic profiles – namely, gesture has a greater capacity for nonarbitrary 
representation than vocalization, and as a result, gesture presumably would have been 
largely responsible for accomplishing referential communication.  These 
differentiated representational capacities and communicative functions entail that the 
nonarbitrary relationship between a gesture and its intended meaning is more likely to 
be perceived as such than that of a vocalization.  In other words, vocalizations are 
more apt than gestures to be misinterpreted as arbitrary.  Moreover, we can reason that 
misperception of a vocalization would not substantially disrupt communication, as the 
bulk of an intended message would be conveyed in and understood through gesture.  
Thus, sign reinterpretation and the establishment of symbolic reference could arise 
through natural processes inherent to any communicative exchange.  Acknowledging 
these aspects of embodied multimodal communication makes available a solution in 
which vocalizations take on a new semiotic function without invoking the deliberate 
actions of communicators to discern the potential for and create symbols. 
 
Importantly, this argument does not imply that only vocalizations would have been 
misinterpreted as symbols.  It is of course possible for nonarbitrary gestures not to be 
perceived as intended, and this no doubt took place frequently.  The crucial factor is 
the relative occurrence of this between modalities.  Lower nonarbitrary potential 
would lead more reinterpretations of vocal signs to arise than gesture.  We would 
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expect this larger proportion of individual, vocal symbolic interpretations to be 
amplified through cultural processes and eventually result in a greater proportion of 
symbolic vocal signs across a population.  This outcome is precisely what is observed 
in language today, with the vocal modality primarily – but not solely – symbolic, and 
gesture primarily – but not solely – nonarbitrary. 
 
It is also important to note that a sign being reinterpreted as symbolic for one 
individual does not necessarily mean others will also perceive it as an arbitrary 
symbol when that individual later uses it in communication.  Nevertheless, at least 
two factors suggest this would occur with some regularity in the case of vocalizations.  
First, the fact that communicators share perceptual biases increases the likelihood that 
what one individual interprets as arbitrary will be similarly interpreted by others – 
other factors like interactive history and common ground being equal.  Second, the 
low nonarbitrary potential of vocal forms would minimize any interference that might 
arise from possible nonarbitrary interpretations for a given context of use.  That is, 
this low potential means that if a vocalization could potentially be perceived as 
nonarbitrary to a particular referent, that potential connection would be relatively 
weak and therefore not perceived readily.  These factors of course do not guarantee 
novel vocal symbols would automatically be interpreted as such, but their overall 
effect would be to encourage similar perceptions. 
 
Aspects of the ideas outlined here may appear at first to be very similar to McNeill & 
colleagues’ proposals (section 6.1.1).  Their position holds that the particular 
heterosemiotic speech-gesture system observed today is in part due to the modalities’ 
distinct semiotic profiles.  However, that view differs to the one presented here in 
both i) underestimating the potential for and perceptual salience of nonarbitrariness in 
the vocal modality, and ii) implicitly adopting the questionable assumption that 
communicators would seek to optimize the communicative potential of each modality 
and be able to discern how to do so.  Regarding i), the vocal modality has nonarbitrary 
potential beyond direct iconicity by virtue of shared crossmodal associations, and 
nonarbitrary vocal signs are both incorporated into language and created on the fly 
when the need or inclination arises (section 2 above).  The capacity and pervasive use 
of nonarbitrary vocalization in modern behavior together with research indicating 
communication is established through nonarbitrary representation in natural settings 
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(Chapter 2) is reason to expect the vocal modality to, like gesture, first be used for 
nonarbitrary signs.  This in combination with factor ii) serves to obscure the possible 
role of unintentional interpretive processes in rendering vocalizations symbolic and 
may explain the assertion that the modality would have been used symbolically from 
the earliest stages of referential multimodal communication.  The reasoning appears to 
be that, because the vocal modality was so ineffective at nonarbitrary representation, 
it was put to use by communicators in a way that did not require that capacity and also 
complemented gesture.  It may be that the authors do not intend to make these specific 
claims as made explicit here, but their language and arguments are at the very least 
suggestive of them.  I contend that explicitly citing unintentional interpretive 
processes and accepting a more accurate characterization of multimodal 
communication that recognizes vocal nonarbitrariness clarifies the issue and avoids 
any potential misunderstanding or flawed implications that could result otherwise.  On 
the present view, then, the limited nonarbitrary capacity of vocalizations spurs greater 
misperceptions of symbols relative to gesture, which ultimately translates into the 
heterosemiotic system observed today.  In this way, vocalizations are rendered 
symbolic by the operation of blind psychological and large-scale cultural processes 
over time. 
 
In a related vein, Corballis’ (2002) suggestion that vocalizations would be used for 
symbols because of the modality’s more arbitrary nature is redolent of similar issues.  
The emphasis is placed on arbitrary capacity, the implication being that this would 
make vocalization more advantageous for conveying symbols.  However, as discussed 
above, the two modalities are equal in regard to capacity for arbitrariness – where 
they differ is in nonarbitrary representation.  With this difference alone, the semiotic 
transformative potential of interpretive processes is sufficient to explain why 
vocalizations became predominantly symbolic and not gestures. 
 
I have argued that incorporating sign interpretation and embodied human 
communication into our explanatory framework reconciles problems in existing 
symbol origins theories.  Doing so also allows us to formulate a more comprehensive 
and theoretically satisfactory account of the emergence of arbitrary vocal signs that 
maintains evolutionary and psychological plausibility.  These ideas, their implications 
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A shift in a population-wide communicative strategy from nonarbitrary to symbolic 
representation poses a substantial problem (Deacon, 1997; Donald, 1991).  Novel 
symbols resulting from individual reinterpretations will not be shared by others and 
will therefore be a less effective communicative resource than nonarbitrary signs, 
which are readily interpretable without knowledge of arbitrary form-meaning 
mappings.  Given this inherent reduction in communicative efficacy resulting from 
the initial use of novel symbols, and no previously established symbolic system or an 
expectation to acquire one, how would individually held arbitrary signs be understood 
and adopted by others?  Once nonarbitrary information contained in signs is no longer 
a reliable indictor of meaning, some other source must compensate for this loss in 
order for novel symbols to be interpreted as intended and adopted by others.  Thus, an 
account of the emergence of conventional symbols should explain how the tension 
between using novel symbols and successful interpretation of signs is resolved. 
 
The theories reviewed above were found largely to disregard the question of 
conventionalization or offer unsatisfactory accounts.  Tomasello (2008) describes how 
a sign form used between certain interlocutors could be adopted by an observer, and 
such a scenario likely would have been frequent and responsible for the spread of sign 
forms as symbols to some individuals.  However, as argued above, it does not 
adequately explain how a newly interpreted symbol might move beyond these highly 
constrained circumstances and propagate through a population. 
 
In the same way that the origin of symbolic interpretations is informed by the ideas 
and evidence outlined in this thesis, the question of conventionalization similarly 
benefits from and demands consideration of these issues.  In addition to embodied, 
multimodal communication, we can also incorporate evidence from emerging sign 
systems, the most relevant being computational models (Chapter 2, section 4).  While 
models have demonstrated shared vocabularies can arise through processes of 
exchange and learning, this only occurs when certain conditions are met. 
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The critical requirement for conventionalization is that symbols are grounded – that 
is, recipients are able to identify an intended referent and thereby adopt the correct 
form-meaning mapping (Chapter 2, section 4.3).  Modelers point to joint attention 
(Steels, 2003; Steels & Kaplan, 1998) together with cross-situational learning 
strategies (A.D.M. Smith, 2001; Smith et al., 2011) as mechanisms that would enable 
grounding and shared symbols in real-world settings.  While some models’ success 
has rested on simulating perfect joint attention (Steel & Kaplan, 1998; K. Smith, 
2002), those modeling cross-situational learning indicate attaining successful 
convergence can tolerate some level of referential uncertainty (A.D.M Smith, 2001).  
Nevertheless, weaker cross-situational learning strategies are employed in 
environments like those presumed for emergence (Smith et al., 2011), and its power is 
also diminished as uncertainty increases (Smith et al., 2011; Vogt & Couman, 2003).  
In consequence, establishing and maintaining joint attention remains integral to the 
conventionalization process.  Therefore, an adequate explanation demands a 
mechanism or mechanisms to achieve this.  
 
Again, we should avoid citing overt instruction or agreement as cause for shared 
arbitrary mappings to arise.  As mentioned in Chapter 2, a number of other socio-
pragmatic factors that do not rely on deliberate action are thought to underpin joint 
attention and symbol grounding in language acquisition (Tomasello & Farrar, 1986) 
including gesture recognition, eye-gaze tracking, shared task awareness, script 
execution and recognition, and emotion recognition and synthesis (Steels, 2003).  We 
can therefore look to how these more plausible mechanisms might have operated in 
symbol emergence and if they could have enabled conventionalization to take place. 
 
We can reason that most if not all of the joint attention aids listed above would be 
present in our hypothetical context, given the requirements and consequences of 
intentional, referential communication through mimesis.  Notably, gestural and bodily 
communication feature prominently in this list, and some researchers specifically cite 
pointing gestures as their presumed grounding mechanism, which is implemented as 
perfect context reduction (Steels, 2003; Steels & Kaplan, 1998; Chapter 2, section 4).  
While pointing is a particularly effective and direct type of nonarbitrary gesture, the 
preceding discussion of human multimodal communication shows that we should also 
consider the potential role of iconic and icon-index hybrid gestures as information-
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rich sources that could indicate communicators’ intended messages, particularly as 
identifying a referent through pointing will not always be an available strategy when 
communication is about referents displaced in time and space from the current 
context. 
 
Multimodal communication as described here involves the simultaneous expression of 
representations in two channels.  In the conditions preceding conventionalization, the 
utterances of interest presently are those conveying novel vocal symbols.  We would 
expect these vocalizations to be produced together with some sort of gestural sign.  
Furthermore, we can assume such gestures would frequently be manifested as 
nonarbitrary representations depicting a meaning related to the intended meaning of 
the accompanying vocal symbols.  In addition, given the representational capacity and 
perceptual salience of nonarbitrary gestures, we can reason receivers could reliably 
recognize gestures as intended – at least in part – and use them to interpret 
multimodal messages.  Likewise, we can posit that an intended arbitrary vocalization 
would not interfere with comprehension enough to impede communication; because 
of its relatively low representational capacity, any potential nonarbitrary incongruency 
between a vocalization and referent would be eclipsed by the referentially informative 
representation conveyed via gesture (indeed, a perceived mismatch between 
modalities may itself ensure novel vocal symbols are correctly interpreted as 
arbitrary).  In this way, the coordination of vocalization and gesture makes it possible 
for novel symbols to be used while maintaining effective communication.  The 
information made available in referentially potent gestures compensates for the 
presumed lack of information contained in the vocal modality, which allows others to 
recover intended messages and potentially adopt symbolic interpretations of 
vocalizations.  Thus, multimodal representation of the type embodied in human vocal 
and gestural communication provides a stable, organic grounding mechanism that 
could support the conventionalization of vocal symbols. 
 
As mentioned above, the initial use of arbitrary signs not yet shared by others is a less 
effective communicative strategy compared to nonarbitrary representation.  The 
inherent tension that arises in a transition from communication through nonarbitrary 
signs to conventional symbols can be resolved by considering how information is 
conveyed simultaneously by the two modalities.  The gestural modality is 
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disproportionately responsible for nonarbitrary referential communication.  This 
asymmetry both fosters arbitrary interpretations of vocalizations relative to gesture 
and ensures their use will not compromise communication.  As a result, the shift to 
what would initially be an inferior communicative strategy in one modality is enabled 
by the presence and qualities of the other modality. 
 
A useful analogy to draw is to the concept of genetic shielding (Deacon, 2009).  
Genetic shielding occurs when multiple causal sources initially serve the same 
function – for example, an organism that possesses both a gene responsible for 
manufacturing a certain nutrient and a regular food source that supplies the same 
nutrient.  Given this redundancy, it is possible for the gene to mutate because the 
presence of the food behavior ensures the original function continues to be served.  
The mutated gene may become nonfunctional or it may take on a new useful function 
in some other capacity.  Thus, by one source remaining devoted to the genes’ original 
purpose, an opportunity arises for that gene to develop a new one.  In nonarbitrary 
multimodal communication meaning is expressed through two channels at the same 
time to convey an overall message, creating a situation similar to genetic redundancy.  
If arbitrary vocalizations began to be used, nonarbitrary gestures would continue to be 
produced and available to aid interpretation.  Given gesture’s high representational 
capacity, it would be capable of supporting communication, to a degree, despite the 
loss of nonarbitrary information in the vocal modality, which would in turn enable the 
spread of accompanying vocal symbols to others.  Like the shift made possible 
through genetic shielding, one modality is free to undergo a semiotic transition 
because the other modality continues to carry out the function of communication 
while the new form of representation is adopted by others and becomes an effective 
communicative device in its own right. 
 
This analogy is of course not to dismiss signed languages, wherein conventional 
symbols arose in one modality alone.  Interestingly, however, signed languages are 
marked by having a large proportion of nonarbitrary signs (Perniss et al., 2010), while 
speech is characterized by a higher proportion of arbitrary words.  In addition, sign 
languages exhibit a lower degree of conventionalization than spoken language 
(Chapter 2, section 3).  In other words, typical symbolic communication as observed 
in language is unlike signed language in being a highly conventionalized system of 
 136 
predominantly arbitrary signs.  These differences may result from sign languages 
being unimodal and the particular features of the modality in which it takes place.  
First, we can note that signed communication is through a modality with a high 
capacity for nonarbitrary representation.  It may be that fewer signs are arbitrary in 
part because nonarbitrariness in gesture is easily recognized.  If fewer signs are 
misperceived overall, then we can reason arbitrary gestures would not come to 
dominate the modality as arbitrary words do the vocal modality.  Another factor may 
be that the use of novel arbitrary signs has a greater negative impact on unimodal 
communication, as it automatically knocks out the only channel through which 
meaning would normally be shared through nonarbitrary signs.  Of course, the 
capacity and effectiveness of gesture can still provide a larger communicative 
‘superstructure’ that supports joint attention and thereby conventionalization 
potentially to some degree, which could explain the emergence of a more semiotically 
mixed system like that seen in sign languages.  Nevertheless, it may that the greater 
potential for novel arbitrary gestures to disrupt unimodal communication than novel 
arbitrary vocalizations to disrupt multimodal communication can account for the 
observed differences with vocal language.  Thus, while conventional symbols can 
arise in a single modality, the presence of two channels with unequal representational 
capacities could be responsible for the more thoroughly arbitrary and conventional 
system found in speech. 
 
A point to emphasize is that this account holds that conventionalization of vocal 
symbols could occur through cultural processes like those modeled in computational 
simulations due to factors inherent to communication as it naturally takes place.  By 
recognizing that human communication is multimodal we are able to explore the 
consequences and consider its potential explanatory contribution.  Specifically, the 
presence and coordination of two information channels provides a built-in grounding 
mechanism, making it possible for conventional symbols to emerge without 
intentional construction. 
 
The ideas outlined here offer a more explicit and comprehensive explanation for 
conventionalization than existing theories.  Importantly, this proposal does not rely on 
insight and factors related to deliberate construction.  The next section will discuss 
implications and further questions that come out of this proposal. 
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6.2.3 Discussion 
I have argued that novel symbols would have arisen, not through creation in response 
to a discerned need or pressures for improved communication, but unintentionally 
when nonarbitrary signs are misunderstood – an inevitable consequence of any 
imperfect communication system.  Furthermore, I have argued that those symbols 
would have been vocal neither because the modality is a superior symbolic medium 
nor as a result of communicators’ awareness of its inadequacy as a nonarbitrary 
medium and their intentional attempts to develop a more effective communicative 
strategy.  Instead, the vocal modality would have become predominantly symbolic 
because its lower nonarbitrary capacity increases the likelihood that vocalizations are 
perceived as arbitrary.  In addition, I have argued that vocal symbols could have 
become shared and conventionalized because multimodal communication provides a 
grounding mechanism ‘for free’, which allows populations to coordinate arbitrary 
form-meaning mappings through cultural processes without overt agreement or 
construction.  The coordinated vocal speech and nonarbitrary gesture mode of 
communication observed today is, on this account, simply an epiphenomenal 
consequence of imperfect communication as it is carried out in embodied human 
experience. 
 
While indiosyncratic symbolic interpretations of signs will inevitably result from 
imperfect nonarbitrary communication, this does not necessarily entail the 
establishment of conventional symbols.  If conventionalization processes were not 
sufficiently supported by symbol grounding sources, shared symbol systems 
conceivably might not emerge, with communication remaining predominantly 
nonarbitrary.  In the case of symbols in human evolution, the factors underlying 
conventionalization are put in place and strengthened by virtue of the particular 
characteristics of human communication.  The way that misinterpretation of 
nonarbitrary vocalizations can become reinterpreted symbols that subsequently 
become shared across a population as described follows directly from the low 
nonarbitrary potential of vocal forms, the high nonarbitrary potential of gestures and 
their simultaneous expression.  In this sense, the potential for vocal symbolic 
communication to emerge through cultural processes stems from and is supported by 
the distinct embodied conditions of human communication, not from inherent 
superiority or a drive for progressively more complex systems of communication. 
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A point worth noting is that the transition from nonarbitrary signs to symbols in the 
context of multiple channels of expression as described here differs from the way it 
typically has been conceived thus far.  In research on emerging sign systems (Chapter 
2, sections 2 and 3) and many symbol origins theories the focus has been on how 
nonarbitrary signs could ground communication, and then how those same signs could 
become symbolic.  For example, in graphical communication studies, experiments 
involve looking at how drawings are created and change over time through use.  
Similarly, a number of origins theories involve nonarbitrary gestures bootstrapping 
the development of symbolic gestures (see theories discussed in section 5 above).  
When the process is framed in terms of multimodal communication, however, the way 
a transition might play out changes, as either or neither channel could in theory 
become symbolic.  In consequence, it becomes crucial to consider the semiotic 
properties and communicative contributions of the modalities relative to each other.  
In the conditions of human multimodal communication, gesture would have been 
primarily responsible for establishing communication, but, as argued here, it would be 
the vocal modality that underwent a transition to predominantly symbolic 
communication as a result of how vocal signs would be perceived relative to gesture.  
In this case, signs that enable effective and robust communication through 
nonarbitrary representation that could underpin the development of symbols can 
continue to serve that function even as symbols develop; because a separate channel is 
available that is not as vital to referential communication, symbols can emerge in it 
without sacrificing the powerful communicative contribution of nonarbitrary 
representation in the other channel.  Thus, multimodal communication creates 
opportunities not available in unimodal systems.  Exploring that potential as I have 
here makes it possible to account for the emergence of symbolic communication 
without extraneous appeals to external factors. 
 
One final point worth addressing is the changing role of gesture during and/or after 
the development of a fully symbolic vocal language.  Co-speech gestures 
(gesticulations, in McNeill’s (2005) terms) are typically less semantically specific and 
elaborate than pantomime-like gestures, which would have presumably been in 
greater use in our hypothetical pre-symbol environment.  The different characteristics 
of these two gesture types may arise simply from shifting cognitive demands that 
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would have resulted from the vocal modality coming to dominate referential 
communication after an extensive symbolic language was constructed.  If greater 
attention and cognitive resources would need to be devoted to accessing and using a 
learned, symbolic vocal code, the level of overt attention devoted to the gestural 
modality may decrease in response.  Based on the principle of continuity (Chapter 1, 
section 2) we would expect communication to remain multimodal and gestures 
continue to serve a similar function, and the shifting communicative weights and 
cognitive demands that would occur after the development of symbolic language 
could account for the nature of gesture as it is produced in accompaniment to speech. 
 
Donald (1991), Zlatev and colleagues (Zlatev, 2008; Zlatev et al. 2005), and 
Tomasello (2008) have argued that the abilities and behaviors underlying bodily 
mimesis are a necessary step in bridging the gap between primate communication and 
human language.  Given what is known regarding the biological and cultural 
differences between primates and humans, we can conclude that the evolution of 
bodily mimesis in the human lineage would have involved biological evolutionary 
forces as well as biological and cultural co-evolution.  The proposal here for bridging 
the gap between bodily mimesis and symbolic communication, however, suggests that 
we may not need to posit additional or independent causal forces to justify the 
emergence of symbols.  In other words, once the capacity for intentional, referential 
nonarbitrary communication through vocal and gestural modalities was in place, the 
development of conventional symbolic communication is achievable through ‘blind’ 
cultural processes alone.  This position adheres more closely to the principles of 
parsimony and continuity than existing symbol origins theories, but it also has 
important implications for the larger study of human cognitive evolution.  If, from the 
premises set out in section 4 above, coordinated symbolic vocal and nonarbitrary 
gestural communication is a potential direct consequence of psychological and 
cultural processes intrinsic to communication itself, it suggests we are not compelled 
to propose specific events or circumstances that would have created pressures for 
symbols.  In this case, the power of multimodal bodily mimesis and related capacities 
is revealed to have great evolutionary significance and important behavioral and 
cultural consequences, one of which, as I have argued, is the potential to establish 
conventional symbols. With the need for additional explanations negated, focus can 
be placed on the foundational abilities and behaviors that create the conditions in 
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which emergence can take place (Zlatev et al. 2005 discuss the evolutionary transition 
from primate cognition and bodily mimesis and provide a starting point for this line of 
research).  Thus, taking this perspective allows us to identify factors that represent 
significant turning points in human evolution and thereby focus our research efforts to 
reach a better understanding of how evolutionary forces could produce the human 
mind and culture.   
 
These arguments are not intended to suggest that all features of symbolic modern 
language can be accounted for by the conditions and processes outlined here.  
Specialized phenomena like phonology and syntax involve additional factors, which 
are beyond the scope of the present discussion.  A large body of research has taken 
conventional symbolic communication as a basis and addressed how particular 
aspects of language could arise, including compositionality (Kirby, 1999; Kirby et al., 
2008) and phonological structure (de Boer, 2000).  The present proposal locates this 
basis in evolutionary terms and provides a foundation for this type of research. 
 
Finally, a number of empirical questions are raised by the specific arguments and 
claims presented here.  I will address two immediately apparent questions, one 
concerning interpretation and the other conventionalization. 
 
In regard to interpretation, I have argued that vocal signs that were not recognized as 
nonarbitrary would, at least on some occasions, be perceived as symbolic and adopted 
as such even without the expectation to learn an established system.  This implies that, 
upon first hearing, what were perceived as arbitrary vocal forms would be attended to, 
understood as meaningful and remembered.  This is based on evidence from gesture 
and language research that indicates people integrate signs from the two modalities 
into a psychologically unified utterance, which suggests vocal and gestural signs 
would be processed with similar parity and coordination in pre-linguistic multimodal 
communication.  It is also possible, however, that the way each modality was 
perceived would be altered by the asymmetry in communicative content characteristic 
of the circumstances preceding conventional speech.  That is, the saliency, referential 
potency and resulting communicative dominance of gesture could itself impede the 
emergence of vocal symbols through unintentional cultural processes alone.  If 
gestures were primarily responsible for conveying messages, then what would be 
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largely uninformative perceived arbitrary vocalizations could be disregarded with 
little effect.  Indeed, the focus on gesture might distract recipients from vocal signs 
and hinder interpreting and learning them as symbols in their own right.  If this were 
the case, it would suggest the reasons for the emergence of vocal symbols put forward 
here are insufficient and we may in fact need to reconsider other factors in human 
history, including those asserted in existing theories, that could have caused 
vocalizations to be used as symbols.  The following Chapter will be devoted to an 
experiment designed to test the predictions that follow from these competing 
positions.  
 
In the case of conventionalization, I have argued that nonarbitrary gestures would 
have provided sufficient grounding for arbitrary vocalizations.  This implies that the 
kind of information made available in nonarbitrary gesture could indicate meaning 
with enough reliability to underpin convergence on shared signs in a population. 
Computational models have demonstrated that convergence can be reached when 
agents have unambiguous knowledge of intended referents, but such perfect 
circumstances lack ecological plausibility.  Other studies show that in the presence of 
some referential uncertainty convergence can be aided by cross-situational learning 
strategies, but mechanisms to constrain context sizes are necessary to ensure 
conventionalization is robust and reliable.  Information provided by gesture is only 
partial and does not indicate referents with perfect accuracy.  It could, however, serve 
to reduce the number of potential referents sufficiently to support conventionalization, 
though this possibility has not yet been tested.  In addition, models have not 
implemented multimodal signaling, nor, more specifically, the possibility for two 
types of representation and information.  It remains an open question whether partial 
information like that embodied in gesture and the presence of two signal channels 
could support convergence.  I will present a simulation designed to address these 




Human communication is carried out in two modalities (primarily) utilizing both 
nonarbitrary and arbitrary representations, though the distribution of semiotic types is 
uneven across these modalities.  Specifically, it is characterized by predominantly 
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symbolic vocal speech coordinated with predominantly nonarbitrary gesture.  It is this 
heterosemiotic, multimodal nature of modern language that is both the phenomenon to 
be explained as well as an explanatory resource in itself.  Existing theories that seek to 
explain the emergence of symbolic communication have either not provided a 
comprehensive account or implied – whether intentionally or not – the action of 
mechanisms and forces that are inconsistent with the foundational ideas and principles 
outlined in Chapter 1.  A more complete, theoretically satisfactory and clear 
explanation can be formulated by adopting an embodied perspective and using the 
broader range of available evidence reviewed in this Chapter (sections 2-4) and 
Chapter 2.  I have argued that symbolic vocal communication coordinated with 
nonarbitrary gestural communication is a highly probable trajectory for what would 
have begun as a homeosemiotic, multimodal communication system.  This outcome 
could arise through unintentional psychological and cultural processes, and thus the 







This chapter will investigate one of the specific claims regarding sign interpretation 
raised in the previous chapter.  First, I will review research that can inform our 
understanding of how vocal and gestural signs are processed and provide an 
experimental framework for investigating the questions at hand.  I will identify 
specific hypotheses to be tested to address these questions and describe a series of 
experiments designed to do so.  Findings will be discussed in regard to the focus of 
this thesis as well as their implications for the larger study of language and gesture, 




A number of recent studies have examined the relationship between speech and 
gesture.  These typically involve a comparison of how messages conveyed through 
unimodal or multimodal utterances affects how that information is interpreted and 
processed. 
 
Kelly et al. (1999) showed participants videos of speakers conveying multimodal 
utterances that included non-redundant information in gesture.  When asked to recall 
the speaker’s words specifically, participants referred to meanings expressed only in 
gesture, though many did not recall getting any information from gestures, indicating 
signs from the two modalities are integrated unconsciously and automatically.  In a 
follow-up study, Kelly et al. (2010) again found that gesture affects speech 
comprehension in this way but also that speech in turn affects gesture comprehension, 
demonstrating that inter-modality influence is bidirectional.  In addition, they found 
that gesture’s effect on speech comprehension persisted even when participants were 
told to attend to verbal information only, indicating that speech-gesture integration is 
an automatic, subconscious process. 
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In a similar vein, McNeill et al. (1994) investigated how listeners interpreted the 
telling of a narrative conveyed through speech accompanied by complementary, 
nonredundant gestures.  Based on participants' recollections, it was found that 
information from gesture is incorporated into listeners’ overall understanding of a 
story.  In addition, when participants were asked to retell the story, information they 
received through gesture was oftentimes realized verbally.  These results further 
indicate that meaning expressed in the two modalities is processed together as a single, 
unified whole. 
 
Research in neuroscience corroborates these findings.  Wu & Coulson (2007) measured 
ERPs while participants observed spontaneously produced speech-and-gesture 
utterances from a conversation.  It was found that semantic activations from viewing 
gesture are used in parallel with those from speech, and the authors claim the two are 
processed together to jointly build conceptual representations during discourse 
comprehension.  Others have found similar results indicating comprehension involves 
the simultaneous integration of the modalities (Cornejo, Simonetti, Aldunate, Ceric, 
Lopez, & Nunez, 2009; Ozyurek et al., 2007).  In a more fine-grained analysis, Kelly, 
Kravitz & Hopkins (2004) further demonstrated the connections between gestural and 
speech comprehension by showing that gestures are processed like words at both 
early and late stages of semantic processing, indicating the coordination of speech and 
gesture occurs at a deep semantic level. 
 
In addition to this evidence that gesture and vocal language are processed together, 
other studies have found that gesture actually improves memory for the accompanied 
speech.  Feyerseisen (2006) tested participants’ recall of sentences presented as 
speech-only or as speech with corresponding gesture.  Sentences with gestures were 
correctly recalled significantly more often than their speech-only counterparts.  Kelly 
et al. (1999) also found that recall of words from speech is significantly better when 
participants are presented with speech-plus-gesture utterances than speech alone.  
Beattie & Shovelton (1999) found overall accuracy for recalling stories is greater when 
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narration is presented through speech and gesture as opposed to speech alone.  In a 
somewhat different context, Kelly, McDevitt & Esch (2009) tested learning of new 
words in a foreign language.  They found the highest rates of word learning occurred 
when participants were trained on words presented with representational gestures, 
leading the authors to suggest that distributing semantic content between the two 
modalities enhances depth and strength of memory.  It is important to note that the 
training regime consisted of presenting new foreign words together with both a gesture 
and an English translation.  That is, the learning task involved tapping into 
participants pre-established symbolic representations. 
 
The reviewed research indicates that information from the gestural and vocal 
modalities is instantly and effortlessly combined and interpreted as a single unit.  In 
fact, in some cases the presence of gesture improves comprehension and memory for 
meaning expressed in speech.  The reason for this integration may simply be the deep 
anatomical and psychological connections between the two modalities (discussed in 
Chapter 3 section 3.2), which supports the proposal that vocalizations perceived as 
arbitrary would be attended to and potentially reinterpreted as symbols.  However, 
another possibility that cannot be excluded based on this evidence is that these 
findings result from pre-established connections between vocal words and gestures; 
each carries meaning related to the other, and additional sources of evidence indicate 
that this relationship is reflected in the two sharing a common representational. 
 
Research on the brain and language has demonstrated the direct involvement of 
sensorimotor representations in language processing.  Masson et al. (2008) observed 
brain activity while participants read sentences with words referring to manipulable 
objects and found that these words evoke the same neural activations for specific, 
appropriate hand movements for the corresponding objects.  Boulenger et al. (2006) 
tested how language influenced reaching movements and showed that presentation of 
action verbs facilitated reaching.  Moreover, the effects were body part specific – in 
other words, facilitation was greater with words for actions involving the body part 
employed in the reaching task.  Rueschemeyer et al. (2010) demonstrated that this 
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effect is bidirectional, finding that hand movements facilitated the processing of 
semantically related words for manipulable objects.  Glenberg & Kaschak (2002) also 
found a language and sensorimotor influence, but in this case an interference was 
observed when the direction in which participants were required to move conflicted 
with the direction conveyed in a sentence just read.  A number of other neuroscientific 
studies have demonstrated that words and sentences referring to body parts or actions 
activate areas of the motor cortex specific to those parts and associated actions (Aziz-
Zadeh et al., 2006; Hauk et al., 2004; Pulvermuller et al., 2005; Tettamanti et al., 2005; 
Willems et al., 2010).  Finally, Parrill, Bullen & Hoburg (2010) found no difference in 
the gestures produced in spontaneous narratives by participants who read a story in 
text versus those who watched a video, leading them to conclude that language 
comprehension involves simulation of sensorimotor representations to construct 
imagined perceptual experiences.  While these examples for the most part concern 
concrete, action-related words, there is also some evidence that the motor system is in 
part responsible for representing and processing abstract language.  In Masson et al.’s 
(2008) experiment, object-specific manual actions were evoked for sentences that 
contained no action words - for example, ‘John thought about the calculator’ (pg. 
878).  In addition, Glenberg et al. (2008) found that processing concrete and abstract 
sentences modulated the motor system in similar ways.  Though findings are not yet 
definitive, the overall picture suggests the sensorimotor system is at the very least 
involved in language processing generally and not solely for action-related words. 
 
Given that gestures are rooted in sensorimotor representations, we would expect the 
connection between vocal language and the sensorimotor system to extend to gestures, 
and some studies indicate this is the case.  Xu, Gannon, Emmorey, Smith & Braun 
(2009) found that comprehension of spoken language and gesture depends on a shared 
network of overlapping brain regions.  Hubbard, Wilson, Callan & Dapretto (2009) 
also showed that speech and gesture processing share a neural substrate.  Finally, and 
regarding abstract language, Cornejo et al. (2009) showed that gestural information is 
used in the comprehension of metaphorical expressions in speech.  Thus, words and 
gestures with related meanings appear to derive from overlapping representations, and 
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it could be that this common representational origin is responsible for the integrated 
and improved processing observed in the gesture studies described above. 
 
In order to determine whether vocalizations in the pre-symbolic context described in 
the previous chapter would be processed like words and language today, and therefore 
potentially reinterpreted as symbols, we would need to demonstrate similar results 
without the explicit involvement of participants’ established linguistic system.  One 
way to do this would be to measure if and to what degree new vocalizations are 
learned, which serves as an indicator of whether participants are attending to and 
potentially adopting vocalizations as meaningful symbols.  In addition, the task 
should not be an explicit learning task, like that in Kelly et al. (2009), as we must 
assume no expectation to learn a symbolic system on the part of communicators.  As 
such, our experiment can be a task in which participants attempt to guess the meaning 
of unfamiliar vocalizations.  After guessing, participants will be informed of the 
correct meaning, providing the opportunity for reinterpretation and learning.  In 
addition, to simulate the proposed misinterpretation-to-reinterpretation process 
outlined in the previous chapter, we would want participants to expect vocalizations 
to be nonarbitrary and base their guesses first on a search for meaning in vocal forms.  
By using vocalizations designed not to depict nonarbitrary features of their referents, 
we can expect participants will not successfully guess meanings and thereby interpret 
vocalizations as arbitrarily related to those meanings.  Finally, to demonstrate that 
acquiring meaning through a coordinated nonarbitrary gesture does not overshadow 
and remove vocalizations from interpretive processes, we can test whether 
presentation via multimodal utterances also results in vocalizations being learned and 
whether learning differs between the two.  The following section describes an 
experiment designed to address these questions. 
 
3. Experiment I 
 
This experiment will be a two-part task in which participants first watch videos of a 
person saying unfamiliar ‘words’ and attempt to guess their meaning.  Following that, 
 148 
participants will be presented with the words again and asked to identify their correct 
meanings.  The experiment will have to conditions: vocal-only (VO) and vocal-plus-
gesture (VG).  In the VO condition, words will be spoken with no accompanying 
gesture, and after guessing participants will be shown the correct meaning.  In the VG 
condition, words will be accompanied by a related nonarbitrary gesture, and afterward 
participants will be still the shown the correct meaning.  In the VG condition, we 
expect participants to interpret the meaning of the word based on the gesture and 
therefore guess correctly.  In all cases, participants have access to meanings and 
therefore the potential to learn the words.  In the VO condition, we expect participants 
to guess incorrectly and interpret the meaning of the word based on the feedback they 
receive after guessing. 
 
We expect that if we test participants’ memory for VO words, they will demonstrate 
learning.  In the VG condition, participants have access to meaning through gestures 
and do not need to attend to or utilize features of the vocalization in order to guess 
correctly.  In addition, it may be that the movements alone could be distracting.  
Therefore, one possibility is that participants in this condition will ignore or lose focus 
on words.  If this were the case, participants may fail to learn words at all or to a 
lesser extent than the VO condition.  Alternatively, if the words and semantically 
related gestures are perceived and processed as an integrated unit, learning patterns 
may be similar to the VO condition. 
 
The claims made in this thesis regarding the interpretation of novel arbitrary 
vocalizations predict certain results.  First, learning will occur in both the VO and VG 
conditions.  An additional expectation that follows from integrated processing is that 
the extent of learning – or the number of words remembered – will not be negatively 
impacted by gesture.  Thus, I predict that performance in the VO condition will not be 
higher than the VG condition.  The specific hypotheses we are testing are as follows: 
 
i) Words will be learned in the VO condition 
ii) Words will be learned in the VG condition 
iii) The number of words learned in the VO condition will not 
be significantly higher than the VG condition 
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If i) is correct, it suggests that novel arbitrary vocalizations would be interpreted as 
meaningful and potentially adopted as symbols.  If ii) and iii) are correct, it indicates 
integrated processing of meaningful representations in the two modalities occurs even 
in the absence of a pre-established representational connection.  By extension, that 
would suggest that communication through nonarbitrary gestures would not impede 
the interpretation of vocalizations as symbolic and therefore could also have 
functioned as an important grounding source for the establishment and 
conventionalization of novel vocal symbols. 
 
Finally, it is necessary to clarify how learning will be measured in order to test these 
hypotheses.  The type of learning involved in this task will be implicit, as participants 
are merely guessing word meanings and have no expectation to acquire or use the 
words.  Choosing a specific number or proportion of words remembered as a 
threshold for learning is somewhat arbitrary and not a very useful measure.  Instead, 
learning will be measured by deviance from chance. To make this a more robust 
indicator, our criterion for learning will be a highly significant deviation from chance 
– a p-value below .001.  If participants’ performance in correctly identifying 








The experiment was conducted using a one-way, within-subjects design comprising 
two separate tasks: a Guessing portion followed by a Testing portion. 
 
3.1.2 Materials 
The stimuli consisted of 40 words and 160 images of objects with familiar associated 
actions.  Images were used as meanings instead of translated English text to avoid 
explicitly activating linguistic, symbolic representations.  Objects were chosen from 
an inventory of 480 normative stimuli developed by Brodeur, Dionne-Dostie, 
Montreuil, Lepage & Op de Beeck (2010).  All objects had normativity ratings at or 
                                                
12
 Whether these are in fact arbitrary is also important to establish.  How this was 
checked is discussed in section 3.2. 
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above 3.5 (out of a maximum of 5) for ‘manipulability’, defined as how easily one 
could produce a gesture to represent the object.  40 of these objects were randomly 
assigned as the ‘correct’ meaning for each of the 40 words.  This was done i) so that 
nonarbitrary gestures could be created and correctly perceived by participants, and ii) 
to ensure the objects chosen to be gestured were not necessarily the ones with highest 
manipulability, as this in itself might affect the results.  The remaining objects were 
randomly assigned to the 40 words to serve as three additional potential meaning 
choices.
13
  Words were of Japanese origin and paired with objects randomly in order 
to reduce the possibility that their forms reflected a nonarbitrary relationship to their 
intended meanings.  Japanese was chosen because its phonological inventory and 
phonotactics involve distinctions found in many languages and could therefore be 
perceived by speakers of a variety of languages. 
 
A volunteer speaker was recorded saying the 40 words two times for each condition 
using a Kodak Zi8 digital video camera and AKG CK98 hypercardioid microphone 
with an Alice MIC AMP PAK II preamp.  For VO, the speaker spoke standing with 
his arms at his sides, facing the camera.  For VG, the speaker said the word while also 
producing an iconic or icon-index hybrid gesture depicting an action performed on or 
with the object.  These were edited into 80 4.5 second video clips and used for the 
guessing portion.  Figure 4.1 shows stills from videos for the two conditions.  With 
the same microphone, the speaker was audio recorded saying the 40 words in a sitting 
position, which were edited into 40 2.5 second clips and used for the testing portion.  
This was done to ensure the audio used in testing did not resemble the words spoken 
from any one condition more than the other. 
 
3.1.3 Procedure 
Participants were told that the experiment was designed to test how well people can 
guess the meaning of words in a foreign language (only participants with no 
experience with Japanese were included).  Specifically, they were told it was based on 
the concept of onomatopoeia and that words somehow ‘sound like’ their meanings.  
This was done to create the expectation for nonarbitrariness and encourage 
                                                
13
 Random assignments were checked for the possibility that the gesture for a correct 
object could be confused with one of the ‘incorrect’ objects, and in a small number of 
cases objects were reassigned.  
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Figure 4.1. Stills from videos for the word meaning ‘drum’ in the VO condition 
(a) and VG condition (b) 
a. b. 
participants to utilize this strategy.  Participants were told the experiment included a 
second round that would be similar to the first, but they had no knowledge that their 
memory for the words would be tested.  After completing the guessing portion, 
participants were informed that they would now be tested to see how well they 
remembered the meaning of the words they had just guessed.  The experiment lasted 





















The experiment was presented through an E-Prime program on PCs running Windows 
7.  It consisted of a series of video clips presented with four unique images of objects 
– that is, objects that appeared with one word did not appear with any other words.  
Figure 4.2 depicts the layout of a single guessing screen.  After a video played, 
participants were instructed to click on the object they thought the word meant.  Once 
a guess was made, all objects but the correct one disappeared from the screen, and 
text appeared informing the participant that the remaining object was the correct 
meaning.  Participants could then press the space bar to move on to the next video 
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clip.  When the guessing portion was completed, the experimenter was called in and 
explained the testing section.  Participants were also presented with written 
instructions and training for this section.  Testing consisted of a series of audio clips 
presented with four images of objects.  The set of objects for each word included 1) 
the correct object, 2) an object that appeared with that word in the guessing task but 
was not the correct meaning, 3) an object that did not appear with the word in the 
guessing task but was the correct meaning for a different word and 4) an object that 
appeared with a different word (not the same word as 3) but was not the correct 
meaning.  Participants did not receive feedback in testing in order to preclude using a 
process of elimination strategy over the course of the block.  After completing the 
testing portion, participants were asked questions about the experiment regarding their 
confidence in remembering words, whether they noticed the speaker gesturing and 
how it affected their guessing, and whether they thought the words ‘sounded like’ 
their meanings. 
 
Two versions of the program were created corresponding to the two experimental 
conditions.  Each version included twenty words each of VO and VG video clips, 
such that each participant saw all 40 words, half for each condition, and all words for 
both conditions were included overall across participants.  The order of words in the 
guessing portion was randomized one time, and all participants experienced the task 
in this same order.  Each version had two sub-versions in which the order that words 





Click on the object that you think the word means from 
the set below. 
Figure 4.2. Layout of screen after video has played and participants guess 





























A total of 41 participants were recruited, 33 female, eight male. 
 
As expected, words in the VG condition were generally guessed correctly, with 
performance highly significantly greater than chance (one sample t-test, M = 18.83, 
SD = 1.38), t(40) = 64.32, p < .001, d = 13.83).  Also as expected, guessing 
performance on average in the VO condition did not rise above chance, and in fact 
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was significantly below chance (one sample t-test, M = 4.26, SD = 1.5, t(40) = -3.12, 
p =  .003, d = -0.73). 
 
As predicted, the number of words remembered in the testing phase deviated from 
chance highly significantly for both the VO (one sample t-test, M = 13.31, SD = 3.01, 
t(40) = 17.68, p < .001, d = 8.32) and VG (M = 13.80, SD = 2.27, t(40) = 24.82, p < 
.001, d = 8.80) conditions.  These chance figures are based on the reasoning that there 
were 4 options to choose from in any given case for all 13 words in each condition.  
As described above, however, the testing phase options included only two objects that 
were ‘correct’ answers previously, a fact that might be recognized by participants.  It 
is therefore arguable that a more accurate standard for chance in this case may be 
based on there being two options instead of four.  By this measure, VO (one sample t-
test, t(40) = 7.05, p < .001, d = 3.32) and VG (t(40) = 10.72, p < .001, d = 3.80) 
conditions remain highly significantly above chance. 
 
In comparing the two conditions, on average, more VG words were remembered than 
VO words, though this difference was nonsignificant (two-tailed paired sample t-test, 
t(40) = -.915, p = .366, d = -.975).  Correlations were run to check whether words that 
were guessed correctly were more likely to be remembered in testing, which is one 
possible explanation for why more VG words were remembered than VO words.  
However, no significant correlation was found overall (Spearman’s rho = .145, p = 
.200), for VG words alone (Spearman’s rho = .227, p = .160) or for VO words alone 
(Spearman’s rho = .141, p = .386). 
 
Exit questions revealed that participants generally rated their memory for words fairly 
low (average 4.2 on a scale form 1-10).  All reported noticing the speaker gesturing 
and that they were usually able to guess based on the gesture.  Regarding the 
vocalizations themselves, the overwhelming majority of participants thought that the 
words did not sound like their meanings at all.  Some reported that certain individual 
words showed resemblance to their meaning, and these included the words chigau 
(‘lipstick’), hidari (‘toothbrush’) and soko (‘bracelet’).  Notably, none of these was 
cited by more than one person, indicating that, overall, vocalizations were generally 
perceived as arbitrary.  In addition, with the exception of chigau in the VO condition, 
these words were not remembered on average above the mean for all words, 
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indicating words that may have been more likely to be perceived as nonarbitrary were 




These results support hypotheses i) – iii) laid out above.  By strict measures against 
chance, participants learned words in both conditions.  In addition, VG words were 
not remembered to a lesser extent than VO words, demonstrating that the gestures did 
not disrupt or obviate the interpretation and learning of the words. 
 
Importantly, answers given to exit questions indicate that, as intended, the words were 
perceived as arbitrary.  Given that participants initially attempted to understand the 
vocalizations as nonarbitrary representations, we can reason that their learning of 
words involved a process of misinterpretation-to-reinterpretation. 
 
The finding that VO and VG were learned in these experimental circumstances 
indicates that, even when there is not expectation to learn a symbolic vocabulary and 
a listener is attempting to understand a message through recognition of nonarbitrary 
features, novel arbitrary vocalizations are attended to and remembered.  This suggests 
that arbitrary vocalizations would have been perceived as symbols and potentially 
learned and used later.  In addition, the memory for VO words was not greater than 
VG words, with no significant difference observed between the two conditions.  Thus, 
nonarbitrary gestures that carry the full communicative load do not detract from 
accompanying vocalizations and impede the processing and learning of those 
vocalizations, indicating that signs in the two modalities are integrated even when 
those do not share an established association via a common representational source. 
 
These results show the positive result that words in both conditions are learned.  In a 
comparison between conditions, however, the results only show that there is not a 
decrease in learning between VO and VG words.  A weakness in this experiment, 
then, is that it demonstrates a negative result.  Stronger evidence for the relationship 
between signs in the two modalities may be obtainable by comparing the effects of 
other gestures on learning in the same task.  Speech is often accompanied by 
movements that are not communicative signs, and testing to see if these affect the 
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processing and interpretation of vocal words in a different way may highlight the 
unique relationship between gestural and vocal signs.  Thus, we can investigate the 
effects of multimodality specifically as we are interested in it here by testing the 
effects of non-communicative gestures frequently produced during communication.  
So-called ‘self adaptors’ are movements that accompany speech that are not intended 
to represent or explicitly communicate information related to the content of speech.  
These include actions like tucking hair behind the ear, adjusting clothes or glasses, 
rubbing the nose and scratching.  In the same way that meaningful gestures could 
potentially distract attention from vocalizations, movements of this sort could do the 
same but not provide a communicative representation related to a speaker’s message.  
Testing the effect of these gestures will allow us to better understand how gestural 
signs specifically affect interpretive processes.  The next section will describe a 
second experiment designed to address these questions. 
 
4. Experiment II 
 
This experiment will be similar in design to the preceding one and compare learning 
under two conditions.  In this case, the conditions will contrast vocal-only (VO) 
words with vocal-plus-adaptor (VA) words.  VA words will be accompanied by self-
adaptor gestures and followed by feedback.  In the VO condition, we again expect 
participants to guess incorrectly and interpret the meaning of the word based on the 
feedback they receive after guessing.  As with the preceding experiment, we expect 
that if we test participants’ memory for these words, they will demonstrate learning. 
In the VA condition, we again expect participants to guess incorrectly and interpret 
the words based on feedback.  We would still expect VA words to be learned; 
however, it may be that the accompanying movements are distracting and result in 
diminished learning.  If self-adaptor gestures have such an effect, in contrast to 
nonarbitrary gestures, we would expect learning for VA words to be significantly 






i) Words will be learned in the VO condition 
ii) Words will be learned in the VA condition 
iii) The number of words learned in the VA condition will be 
significantly lower than the VO condition 
 
If i) and ii) are correct, it further supports findings from the previous experiment and 
the arguments presented in this thesis regarding the interpretation of novel vocal 
symbols.  If iii) is correct, it demonstrates that gestures can interfere with interpretive 
processes.  It would further indicate that the results above (section 3.2) are 
specifically attributable to the particular properties of nonarbitrary gestural signs and 





The experiment was conducted using the same one-way, within-subjects design 
comprising two separate Guessing and Testing tasks. 
 
4.1.2 Materials 
The stimuli consisted of the same 40 words and 160 images of objects.  The same 
word-meaning pairings were also used. 
 
New videos for each condition were created, with the volunteer speaker saying the 40 
words two times for each condition.  For VA, the speaker said the word and also 
produced a self-adaptor gesture. These were edited into 80 4.5-second video clips and 
used for the guessing portion.  Figure 4.3 shows stills from videos for these two 









Figure 4.3. Stills from videos for the word meaning ‘drum’ in the VO condition 




















Participants received the same instructions regarding the task, and the same E-prime 
program was used.  The structure of the experiment remained like the previous, with 
ordering of stimuli, program versions and other details unaltered (see section 3.1.3 for 





A total of 25 participants were recruited, 13 female, 12 male. One male was excluded 
due to participant error
14
, resulting in 24 datasets included in analysis. 
 
As expected, guessing performance in both VO (one sample t-test, M = 4.96, SD = 
1.71, t(23) = -0.12, p =  .906, d = -0.04) and VA (M = 4.75, SD = 1.94, t(23) = -0.63, 
p =  .534, d = -0.25) conditions did not deviate from chance significantly.  On 
                                                
14
 During exit questioning it became clear he knew Japanese, which was cause for 
exclusion. 
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average, fewer words were guessed correctly in the VA condition than the VO 
condition, but this difference was not significant (two-tailed paired t-test, t(23) = 
0.359, p = .723, d = 0.417). 
 
As predicted, the number of words remembered in the testing phase for both VO 
(25%: M = 13.5, SD = 2.92, t(23) = 14.26, p < .001, d  = 8.5; 50%: t(23) = 5.87, p < 
.001, d = 3.5) and VA (25%: M = 12.46, SD = 2.40, t(23) = 15.26, p < .001, d  = 7.46; 
50%: t(23) = 5.03, p < .001, d = 2.46) conditions was highly significantly above 
chance, for both a 25% and 50% baseline. 
 
In comparing the two conditions, participants, on average, remembered more VO 
words than VA words.  A t-test revealed this to be a significant difference (one-tailed 
paired t-test, t(23) = 1.78, p = .044, d = 2.08) (a one-tailed test was used as hypothesis 
iii predicts a particular outcome – that more VO words will be learned than VA 
words). 
 
Answers to exit questions were similar to those given in the previous experiment.  
The mean confidence rating for remembering words correctly was 4.8.  Words were 
again generally judged as not resembling their meanings.  The few words reported to 
sound like their meanings by participants in Experiment I were not cited in this 
experiment, though hoshi (match) was by two participants and kawaii (drum) by one.  
Participants frequently described the speaker’s gestures as distracting or off-putting, 
with some even speculating that the speaker was intentionally trying to mislead their 
guesses.  Some participants claimed to have simply ignored the gestures altogether, 
though this did not appear to translate into greater than average performance (of the 
two participants who made such claims, one remembered eleven VO words and the 




These results support the hypotheses i) – iii) above.  As in the previous experiment, 
words were learned in both conditions.  However, unlike the comparison between 
vocalizations alone and vocalizations with related nonarbitrary gestures, vocalizations 
accompanied by self-adaptor gestures were remembered significantly less than 
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vocalizations only.  Answers to exit questions again suggest that the words were 
perceived as arbitrary as intended, and a similar process of misinterpretation-to-
reinterpretation occurred.  
 
The finding that words in both conditions were learned corroborates the previous 
experiment’s results and further supports claims made in this thesis regarding novel 
vocal symbols.  In addition, the significant reduction in learning observed for VA 
words in comparison to VO words indicates that movements occurring with 
vocalizations can in fact disrupt memory and interpretation processes.  The effect that 
self-adaptors have reveals the importance of the lack of such an effect for nonarbitrary 
gestures.  Interestingly, adaptor gestures were generally shorter and smaller than 
nonarbitrary gestures used in the previous experiment, which on the surface suggests 
adaptors would be less distracting.  Nevertheless, they impeded word learning 
compared to no gesture while nonarbitrary gestures did not.  The divergent effects of 
non-communicative gestures versus gestural signs highlight the psychological 
unification of intentional multimodal communication and that interpretive processes 
naturally integrate semantically related representations in the two modalities. 
However, a problem with this reasoning that we cannot directly compare the present 
results to those from the preceding experiment.  To fully substantiate my claims based 
on these results requires testing all three conditions at once.  Doing so will allow us to 
test the effects of gestures in comparison to no gestures, as well as to compare the two 
types of gesture to one another. 
 
Another potential issue with this experiment is the strong reactions participants had to 
self-adaptors.  Given that gestures of this sort frequently occur during communication, 
these reactions are at first surprising.  However, observations from research on 
language and gesture point to a possible reason.  A hallmark of nonarbitrary co-
speech gestures is precise temporal and semantic alignment with concurrent words; 
that is, the movements constituting representations in gesture are tightly linked to 
vocal sounds and energy patterns (Chapter 3, section 3.2).  Self-adaptor gestures are 
not related to the content of speech and typically do not show such precise alignment.  
A close inspection of the speaker’s actions in the video clips used here found that, 




  This atypical alignment could in fact be an added distraction, and the 
observed effect of VA words may disappear if the speaker’s behavior were adjusted to 
resemble normal behavior.  To ensure the findings here are not a consequence of this 
possible confound, another experiment must be conducted using videos in which the 
speaker’s gestures more closely match natural self-adaptors.  The following section 




5. Experiment III 
 
This experiment will be similar in design to the preceding one, except learning will be 
compared between three conditions: vocal-only (VO), vocal-plus-nonarbitrary gesture 
(VG) and vocal-plus-adaptor (VA).  As with prior versions, we expect words to be 
learned in all three conditions.  Based on the results of Experiment 1, we expect to 
find no difference between learning in VO and VG conditions.  In this case, we want 
to go further distinguish between the two gesture conditions.  Based on results from 
both experiments, we expect performance in the VA condition to be significantly 
lower than the VG condition.  Thus, the hypotheses are: 
 
i) Words will be learned in all conditions 
ii) The number of words learned in the VG condition will not 
be significantly lower than the VO condition 
iii) The number of words learned in the VA condition will be 
significantly lower than the VG condition 
 
If i) is correct, it supports the findings from Experiments I and II.  If ii) is correct, it 
supports results from Experiment I and arguments based on them (section 3).  If iii) is 
correct, it will demonstrate the distinctive properties of nonarbitrary communicative 
gestures and their unique relationship to the vocal modality. 
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 The reason for this probably lies in the fact that the speaker was consciously aware 






The design was the same as that Experiments I and II, this time with three conditions. 
 
5.1.2 Materials 
The stimuli consisted of 39 words of the 40 used in previous versions (for three equal 
proportions of words for each condition) and 156 of the 160 images of objects.  The 
one word removed was selected randomly, and all word-object pairings were the same 
as Experiments I and II. 
 
A speaker was video recorded saying the 39 words three times each for each 
condition.  For VO, the speaker spoke standing with his arms at his sides, facing the 
camera.  For VA, the speaker said the word and also produced a self-adaptor gesture – 
this time carefully timed not to coincide perfectly with energy peaks in the vocal 
modality.
16
   These were edited into 117 4.5-second video clips and used for the 
guessing portion.  Figure 4.4 shows stills from videos for all three conditions.  The 
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 Movements were still concurrent and overlapping with vocal sounds. 
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Figure 4.4. Stills from videos for the word meaning ‘drum’ in the VO condition 
(a), VG condition (b) and VA condition (c). 



















Participants received the same instructions regarding the task, and the same E-prime 
program was used.  Two versions of the program were created corresponding to the 
two experimental conditions.  Each version included 13 words each of VO, VG and 
VA video clips, such that each participant saw all 39 words, one-third for each 
condition, and all words for all three conditions were included overall.  The structure 
of the experiment otherwise remained like the previous, with ordering, sub-versions 




A total of 30 participants were recruited, 17 female, 13 male. One male was excluded 
due to participant error, resulting in 29 datasets included in analysis. 
 
As expected, words in the VG condition were generally guessed correctly, with 
performance highly significantly greater than chance (one sample t-test, M = 12.55, 
SD = 0.63, t(28) = 79.30, p =  < .001, d = 9.30).  Also as expected, guessing 
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performance in both VO (one sample t-test, M = 3.21, SD = 1.26, t(28) = -0.18, p =  
.855, d = -0.04) and VA (M = 3.69, SD = 1.61, t(28) = 1.47, p =  .152, d = 0.44) 
conditions did not deviate from chance significantly. 
 
For a 25% baseline, the number of words remembered in the testing phase deviated 
from chance highly significantly for all three VO (one sample t-test, M = 8.31, SD = 
2.27, t(28) = 12.01, p < .001, d = 5.06), VG (M = 8.97, SD = 1.97, t(28) = 15.60, p < 
.001, d = 5.72) and VA (M = 7.45, SD = 1.88, t(28) = 12.01, p < .001, d = 4.20) 
conditions.  With a 50% baseline, VO (one sample t-test, t(28) = 4.30, p < .001, d = 
1.81) and VG (t(28) = 6.73, p < .001, d = 2.47) conditions remained at the same level 
of deviation.  VA words were at a lower level of significance, though still well above 
chance (t(28) = 2.71, p = .011, d = 0.95). 
 
On average, participants remembered more VG words than VO words and more VO 
words than VA words.  A one-way repeated measures ANOVA was run and returned 
a significant effect of condition (F(2, 56) = 6.51, p = .003).  Planned contrasts showed 
the number of VO words remembered approached but did not reach significance in 
comparison to VA words (F(1, 28) = 3.74, p = .063).  Post-hoc analyses using a 
Bonferroni adjustment for multiple comparisons revealed no significant difference 
between VO and VG conditions (p = .492), but significantly more VG words were 
remembered than VA words (p = .001). 
 
Correlations were run again to check whether words that were guessed correctly were 
more likely to be remembered in testing, which is one possible explanation for why 
more VG words were remembered than other groups. The mean number of times a 
word was remembered was 6.18 for the VO condition, 6.67 for VG and 5.54 for VA.  
The mean number of correct guesses for words was 3.21 for the VO condition, 12.55 
for VG and 3.69 for VA.  However, no significant correlation was found (Spearman’s 
rho = .116, p = .215). 
 
Answers to exit questions were similar to Experiments I and II.  The mean confidence 
rating for remembering words was 3.3, and participants in large part reported that 
words did not sound like their meanings.  Two exceptions were champagne (yappari) 
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and hairclip (simasu), neither of which was cited by more than one participant in this 




These results corroborate findings from Experiments I and II and support the specific 
hypotheses laid out above.  Participants learned words in all three conditions, though 
based on our stricter criterion VA words were learned to a slightly lesser degree than 
in Experiment II.  In addition, VO and VG conditions showed similar learning levels, 
while the VA condition had distinct effects from the VG and verged on doing so for 
the VA condition.  That the VA condition still significantly reduced learning after 
correcting for the possible confound in Experiment II demonstrates that effects are 
due to self-adaptors themselves and not atypical gestural timing.  Finally, exit 
questions again revealed that, as intended, the words were perceived as arbitrary, 
indicating the desired misinterpretation-to-reinterpretation process took place for 
some words. 
 
The finding that VO and VG were learned in these experimental circumstances is 
further indication that novel arbitrary vocalizations are processed similarly to novel 
symbolic words.  In addition, no difference was found between these two conditions, 
mirroring results from Experiment I and again indicating that signs in the two 
modalities are integrated even when those do not share an established association via 
a common representational source. 
 
The observation that learning levels are similar for VO and VG conditions becomes 
striking when we consider the effect of the VA condition.  Noncommunicative 
gestures impeded word learning compared to no gestures while nonarbitrary gestures 
did not, despite nonarbitrary gestures being larger and longer, and therefore 
potentially more distracting.  Instead, VO and VG conditions patterned together, 
demonstrating that nonarbitrary gestures have a unique relationship to the vocal signs 
they accompany, and confirming conclusions from Experiments I and II that 
vocalizations are interpreted and processed in similar ways for these conditions. 
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VA words were also learned in this experiment, though they showed less robust 
learning under the more stringent measurement of learning.  This is in contrast with 
the results of Experiment II, which demonstrated learning for VA words by both 
standards.  These different learning levels across experiments may have to do with the 
presence of multiple gesture types.  In this case, gestures could be either informative 
or distracting, but gesture type would be inconsistent throughout the task.  The fact 
that participants could not wholly rely upon or ignore gestures may have negatively 
impacted learning overall.  This seems to be the case, as the proportion of words 
learned dropped to 62% in Experiment III, compared to 68% in Experiment I and 
65% in Experiment II.  Interestingly, however, the decrease only occurs for VA words 
(62% in II to 57% in III) and VO words (68%  and 67% in I and II to 64% in III), with 
the proportion of VG words learned holding constant at 69% from Experiments I to 
III.  This suggests that inconsistency in expression may not negatively impact learning 




6. General discussion 
 
Findings from Experiments I-III suggest that, in the circumstances of presymbolic 
communication as described in Chapter 3, novel arbitrary vocalizations would have 
been perceived as symbols, learned and potentially used later.  Even in the absence of 
an expectation to acquire a symbolic system and with communication dominated by 
nonarbitrary gesture, these results suggest that vocalizations would be perceived as 
intentional, meaningful signs on par with gesture and, when perceived as arbitrary, 
interpreted as symbolic signs and learned similarly to how symbolic words are today.  
In this way, vocalizations were interpreted as arbitrary and learned without any of the 
communicative pressures known to favor symbolic signs (Chapter 1, section 3.3).  
Thus, overall these findings support the proposal in this thesis that vocal symbols 
could naturally arise from interpretive processes in operation during (intended) 
homeosemiotic multimodal communication. 
 
It is not possible to directly compare the extent of learning in these experiments to 
that observed in Kelly et al.’s (2009) study on foreign language learning reviewed in 
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section 2 above.  Their study included a total inventory of only twelve words and 
participants were exposed to these a total of three times, as opposed to the single time 
in the present experiments.  Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that in a test of 
recognition wherein participants had to choose the correct meaning of a word from a 
set of four choices, on average, words were remembered 78% of the time.  Averaged 
across Experiments I-III here, that percentage is 65%, which could arguably be 
considered on par to their findings, adjusting for the more than tripled inventory size, 
more limited exposure and no intention to acquire new words.  This similar pattern of 
learning to a task in which participants are explicitly learning new symbols further 
suggests interpretations of vocalizations as symbols could arise without additional 
pressures from the conditions of communication described in Chapter 3 section 6.2. 
 
Present results also demonstrate the integrated nature of multimodal communication 
as observed in the studies on language and gesture reviewed in section 2.  An 
additional but less robust finding from both Experiments I and III is that words 
accompanied by nonarbitrary gestures were learned to a greater degree than words 
alone.  This pattern reflects evidence from other studies that demonstrate memory for 
speech is improved when accompanied by a semantically related gesture (Beattie & 
Shovelton 1999; Feyerseisen, 2006; Kelly et al. 1999; Kelly et al. 2009).  The increase 
in memory was not significant in the present experiment, but these results remain 
inconclusive.  One possibility is that enhanced memory effects result from existing 
associations between words and gestures by way of shared representational sources.  
That is, when two, overlapping representations are activated for particular semantic 
content – in this case a spoken symbol and a related nonarbitrary gesture – these could 
reinforce each other and thereby increase memory for one or both.  In the present 
experiment, such reinforcement would not occur, as the words participants experience 
do not yet carry any meaning for them.
17
  Thus, it is possible reinforcement via dual 
representations is responsible for increased memory.  Alternatively, it may be that the 
lack of significance could be an artifact of the experimental design, and gesture could 
have a significant effect in slightly altered circumstances.  For instance, in the 
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 It is of course possible that participants think of a word in their language when 
guessing the novel words’ meaning and receiving feedback, but a specific word is not 
explicitly brought to attention as in other experiments.  It is the specific, overt 
involvement of established linguistic symbols that might be influencing results. 
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experiment most similar to the present one, Kelly et al.’s (2009) foreign language 
learning paradigm, the design was between subjects, which means an individual 
participant only experienced words in a single condition.  In this case, the presence of 
gesture would be consistent and expected, and participants could learn to attend to and 
utilize it as a reliable source of information.  In contrast, participants in this 
experiment only experienced nonarbitrary gestures for one third of words.  Sometimes 
gestures were not present at all, sometimes gestures were present but gave no clue to 
the intended meaning.  The inconsistency inherent to a within-subjects design might 
diminish the memory boost provided by gesture and could explain the difference in 
results between this and Kelly et al.’s (2009) study.  If so, gesture may have the added 
effect of increasing learning of new vocal symbols in the context of emergence.  
Improved learning of this sort could itself have further effects on conventionalization 
processes, particularly when we consider the additional finding that inconsistency in 
expression reduced learning rates for words alone and with noncommunicative 
gestures (section 4).  By aiding memory for novel symbols, gesture could have 
provided additional support and momentum for their spread and adoption by others.  
In addition, it could also affect the extent that arbitrary signs are conventionalized 
across a population and may be instrumental in explaining the observed differences in 
conventionalization in speech compared to signed languages.  These are questions that 




Previous research demonstrates that signs in speech and gesture are interpreted and 
processed together as a unified whole.  The experiments here show that this 
integration holds even when the communicative roles of the modalities are 
asymmetrical and no prior connection exists between vocal and gestural content.  
These results support the claims made in the previous chapter and inform our 
understanding of the interaction of the modalities in sign interpretation processes.  
The results also raise questions and point to future research avenues regarding the 
possibility that gesture in fact increases learning, which, if true, opens the possibility 
that gesture could have further effects on the process of conventionalization.  The next 
chapter will address the issue of conventionalization and the scenario proposed in 
Chapter 3 section 6.2. 
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CHAPTER 5 




A theme of this thesis is that a consideration of the fundamentally multimodal nature 
of embodied human communication can inform and aid an explanation of symbol 
origins.  The preceding chapter addressed questions concerning interpretation, and 
this chapter will address conventionalization – how, once arbitrary interpretations of 
signs arise, populations come to share the same symbols. 
 
In Chapter 3, section 6.2.2 I argued specifically that nonarbitrary gestures would have 
provided sufficient grounding for arbitrary vocalizations, which in turn would enable 
conventionalization.  In terms of mechanisms underlying grounding, this implies that 
information provided by gesture could support joint attention and reduce the context 
of communication sufficiently for learning and cultural processes to lead to 
convergence on a shared symbol system.  This chapter will approach this issue as it 
has been traditionally, through computational simulations.  Previous research on the 
topic has been reviewed and discussed in detail in Chapter 2, section 4.  This chapter 
will therefore first briefly revisit how existing models have been structured and how 
this framework can be modified to incorporate multimodality and different sign types.  
Three models will then be presented that are designed to test the claims made in this 




Computational models of symbol emergence begin with the assumption that signs are 
arbitrary.  Broadly, models simulate a population of agents that send and receive 
messages containing arbitrary signals, and through repeated exchanges agents learn 
signal-mappings.  Conventionalization occurs when agents in a population come to 
share – or converge on – the same signal-meaning mappings.  Successful convergence 
relies on a mechanism to simulate joint attention, which serves to limit the context of 
communication and allow receivers to identify a senders’ intended meaning.  Some 
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models implement perfect context reduction, wherein agents receive only a single 
meaning with signals and are therefore able to learn the ‘correct’ mapping (Steels & 
Kaplan, 1998; Steels et al., 2001; K. Smith, 2002).  Steels & Kaplan (1998) have 
shown that when this mechanism is removed and most or all meanings are potential 
referents in any given exchange, convergence is not attained.  Thus, in these models 
the joint attention mechanism underpinning successful convergence has been 
implemented as a monolithic entity, with manipulation of this variable being limited 
to a dichotomous comparison of near perfect reliability to near zero reliability – full 
certainty of an intended referent versus high uncertainty. 
 
Other studies have shown that, given certain learning strategies, convergence can also 
be attained in the absence of perfect context reduction.  Models that simulate cross-
situational learning and obverter signaling (Oliphant & Batali, 1997; Chapter 2, 
section 4.2.1) demonstrate that limiting context to a smaller number of meanings 
similarly enables conventionalization to take place (A.D.M. Smith, 2001; Vogt & 
Coumans, 2003).  This reduction of context is presumed to result from various 
mechanisms for establishing joint attention (Smith et al., 2010).  Thus, we can 
identify specific mechanisms capable of limiting context in this way and test how 
incorporating them into simulations affects convergence outcomes. 
 
As described previously (Chapter 2, section 4.3), one aspect of establishing joint 
attention is the use and recognition of gesture.  Nonarbitrary gestures carry meaning 
shared with or related to accompanying arbitrary words.  Such gestures, while not 
supplying the full informational content of a spoken utterance, could serve to narrow 
the range of possible intended referents in a given context of communication by 
filtering out meanings that do not possess features included in a gestural signal.  The 
potential contribution of gesture – in the form of related nonarbitrary representations 
that only partially indicate referents – in the emergence of shared vocabularies has not 
yet been modeled.  It may be the case that partial context reduction like that provided 
by gesture-like communication has a substantial impact on establishing reference and 
constructing shared systems.  In addition, the possible interaction of two modalities of 
signaling with different semiotic properties has not been modeled.  If incorporating a 
second signaling channel that functions like gesture leads to successful convergence, 
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it would support the arguments made in this thesis regarding heterosemiotic 
multimodal communication and the conventionalization of novel symbols. 
 
The following sections describe a series of simulations designed to investigate the 
dynamics of multimodal communication and the effects of a gesture-like component 
on emerging symbolic systems.  The aim of this investigation is to understand the 
potential contribution of gesture and provide a more fine-grained analysis of the role 
of nonarbitrary representations in the conventionalization process.  Thus, in regard to 
the interacting factors underlying grounding and convergence discussed in Chapter 1, 
section 4, we will attempt to minimize the operation of these other factors in order to 
isolate the effects of the gesture component as much as possible.  The specifics of 
carrying this out will be described along with other details of model structure below. 
 
Three models were created to address these issues.  The first simulates 
communication through nonarbitrary representations alone, which will establish how 
this type of signaling can be implemented.  The second is similar to previous models 
and simulates solely arbitrary signaling.  The third combines the two modes of 
signaling, one arbitrary and one nonarbitrary, to simulate the heterosemiotic, 
multimodal nature of communication.  The two individual models will show the 
particular potentials and limitations of each type of representation separately, and will 
also serve as a comparative tool to evaluate the dual model. 
 
3. Model I – Nonarbitrary signaling 
 
This model examines communication between identical agents that possess an 
inventory of signals that have nonarbitrary relationships to an inventory of meanings.  
All agents therefore already share all signals, as they are intrinsically and directly 
mapped to meanings by virtue of their forms.  In this way, this model does not involve 
learning, evolving sign systems or emergence of any sort.  Instead, it will show how 






3.1 Meaning and signal structure 
 
Nonarbitrary representations are characterized by having a direct connection between 
their forms and the meanings they represent.  Given that, we can implement 
nonarbitrary representations in this model by having meaning forms and signal forms 
be constituted by the same set of components.  In this case, both meanings and signals 
will be binary vectors of varying lengths. 
 
The size of the meaning inventory is determined by the number of bits that make up 
meanings.  For example, designating meaning length at two bits produces a total of 
four distinct meanings: 00, 01, 10, and 11.  A meaning length of three bits results in 
an inventory of eight meanings, and so on.  We can mirror the partial nonarbitrariness 
of gesture by having the length of signals be shorter than the length of meanings (for 
present purposes we will designate that signals correspond to the end portion of 
meanings).  A consequence of only partial signal-meaning coverage is that the same 
signal will overlap with more than one meaning; that is, no signal specifies a single 
individual meaning.  We can also vary the amount of nonarbitrary information 
contained in a signal by varying the length of signals in proportion to the length of 
meanings.  The length of a nonarbitrary signal determines how precisely it can specify 
a particular meaning; the longer the length, the less ambiguously a signal specifies a 













































We can vary certain parameters within this model to understand how the size of a 
communicative system and the amount of nonarbitrary information contained in 
signals affects communicative accuracy.  These variables include meaning length (and 
thus inventory size), signal length (and thus inventory size and signal-meaning 



































Tables 5.1-5.3 Examples of possible nonarbitrary communication systems; (1) one 
with three-bit meanings and one-bit signal, (2) one with three-bit meanings and two-bit 
signals and (3) one with four-bit meanings and two-bit signals.  Signals represent the 
final bit or bits of meanings.  Signals will never uniquely specify meanings, and the 
length of signals in proportion to meanings will determine the level of ambiguity at 






inventories, communicative dynamics and accuracy will be constant for all population 
sizes.  Therefore, population size will not be varied in this model, and simulations will 
consist of communication between two agents. 
 
3.2 Communication dynamics 
 
A communication event involves one agent sending a signal to communicate a given 
meaning to another agent.  Communication takes place in a specified context of 
multiple meanings, the precise number of which can vary across simulations.  
Receiving agents must choose a meaning from this context as the sending agent’s 
intended meaning, and this is done based on the information in the signal.  Depending 
on the specified signal-to-meaning length ratio and the meanings comprising the 
context, some number of meanings may be removed as potential choices.  Receiving 
agents then choose from the set of meanings (or meaning) that remains.  If the 
meaning chosen matches the sending agent’s intended meaning, the communication 
event is recorded as successful.  Thus, the full process of a communication event 
involves the following steps: 
 
1. A context of a certain size is created from a random selection of 
meanings from the full meaning inventory 
2. A meaning to communicate (MTC) is chosen at random from the 
context 
3. A ‘speaker’ sends a signal (S) that matches the corresponding 
portion of the MTC 
4. A ‘hearer’ chooses a meaning (chosen meaning – CM) from the 
context 
a. Narrowing the context; all meanings that do not match S 
are removed 
b. If only one meaning remains, this is CM; If multiple 
meanings remain, one is chosen at random as CM 
5.  If MTC is the same as CM, the communication event is successful 
 
Communicative accuracy (CA) is measured as the percentage of communication 
events that are successful in a series of exchanges.  I will use 95% communicative 
accuracy as a standard for effective communication for this and subsequent models.  
The number of exchanges in a single simulation was set to 10,000 in order to create a 
large enough sample size reflect as closely as possible the underlying probabilities of 




Figures 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3 graph the communicative accuracy for simulations with 































Figure 5.1 Communicative accuracy by context size for different levels of signal-
meaning overlap.  Each line represents a single simulation.  4/1 indicates that 




































Figure 5.2 Communicative accuracy by context size for different levels of signal-
meaning overlap.  Each line represents a single simulation.  6/1 indicates that 
nonarbitrary signals overlap with meanings by one bit, 6/2 by two bits and so on. 
Figure 5.3 Communicative accuracy by context size for different levels of signal-
meaning overlap.  Each line represents a single simulation.  8/1 indicates that 
nonarbitrary signals overlap with meanings by one bit, 8/2 by two bits and so on. 
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For four-bit meanings, CA rises above 95% only when context consists of two 
meanings and with a signal overlap proportion of 75% - or when signals contain three 
of the four bits that constitute meanings.  CA remains relatively high (93%) for the 
same meaning-signal ratio at a context size of three but does not reach our standard of 
effectiveness. 
 
CA reaches 95% for six-bit meanings in contexts larger than two meanings.  When 
the meaning-signal ratio is 6/5 – or 83% overlap – CA remains at effective levels up 
to a context size of five.  A ratio of 6/4 reaches 95% in a context of three.  A 50% 
overlap also meets the 95% standard, but only in contexts limited to two meanings. 
 
For eight-bit meanings, CA reaches 95% in a wider range of conditions.  Ratios from 
8/4 to 8/7 are above this level when context size is set at two meanings.  An overlap 
of 63% or greater maintains effective CA in contexts of five meanings.  An 8/6 ratio 
reaches 95% in a context of ten, and an 8/7 ratio does so up to context of fifteen 
meanings. 
 
The CA level reached for specific ratios changes as a function of meaning length.  A 
50% overlap does not meet the standard for four-bit meanings in a context of two, but 
the same ratio does for six- and eight-bit meanings.  The longer meaning lengths also 
reach 95% in contexts with a greater number of meanings.  Four-bit meanings only do 
so with a 75% overlap and context size set to two, while using six bits with the same 
ratio maintains effectiveness in contexts of three, and doing so for eight bits reaches 




These results demonstrate that partial information directly indicating meanings – like 
that embodied in nonarbitrary representations – can support effective communication.  
This finding is not surprising, as we would expect communication to be possible when 
interlocutors have access to each other’s intended meanings, which is exactly what the 
nonarbitrary signals in this model aid in.  Nevertheless, the efficacy of different levels 
of nonarbitrary information for meanings of different lengths in various context sizes 
informs how a model that incorporates these features can be structured. 
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The circumstances under which high communicative accuracy is maintained depend 
on context size, the length of meanings and the ratio of meaning length to signal 
length.  As the number of bits comprising meanings increases, the potential for 
proportionally equivalent partial information in signals to support effective 
communication increases. 
 
Meaning length reflects the number of distinct features meanings contain, and, in 
consequence, the total number of meanings.  One way to think of this factor may be as 
i) the complexity of meanings and ii) the overall size of the meaning space over which 
communication operates.  When this space is large and meanings are complex, 
effective communication is possible when signals contain half or a larger proportion 
of information indicating meanings.  This holds for small context sizes, but also 
extends to much larger contexts when meanings are more complex and signals 
indicate a large amount of information.  For example, an 88% overlap for eight-bit 
meanings maintains effective levels in context sizes up to 25 meanings (outside the 
range shown in Figure 3). 
 
In relating these findings back to gesture, we can note that the relationship between 
signals and meanings in this model is much more straightforward than how gestures 
relate to their referents.  That is, it is difficult – if not impossible – to quantify the 
amount of information contained in gesture and its proportion to the meanings they 
represent. The amount to which gestures represent features of their referents spans 
from the highly schematic to the highly detailed and precise depending on the type of 
gesture, the type of referent and the communicative demands involved.  Nevertheless, 
we can reasonably assume that the number and complexity of meanings conveyed 
through gesture is high, given the rich and open-ended nature of human 
communication.  In addition, gestures at least have the capacity to represent multiple 
and salient features of referents (Chapter 3, section 5).  Based on these factors we can 
place gestural communication somewhere along the spectrum of communication 
systems modeled here.  An appropriate comparison is probably to systems with a 
relatively higher number and complexity of meanings, and signals with moderate 
overlap with meanings.  This characterization will be put to use later when carrying 
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out simulations on a model that combines nonarbitrary and arbitrary signaling in 
section 5 below. 
 
Finally, effective communication here can be thought of as the capacity for 
information contained in signals themselves to enable agents to correctly identify 
intended meanings.  These simulations show that this is possible even when signals do 
not fully represent all features of a referent.  This context-limiting quality not only 
supports communication through nonarbitrary signals alone, but it could also serve a 
crucial function in conjunction with emerging arbitrary sign systems.  We can better 
understand how accompanying nonarbitrary signals affect convergence by first 
designing a model of an independent arbitrary system and testing emergence 
outcomes in this system in isolation.  The following section describes such a model. 
 
4. Model II – Arbitrary signaling 
 
This model will be similar to previous models of emergence discussed in detail in 
Chapter 2, section 4.  Like those, this model will simulate the communicative and 
cultural dynamics of a population of agents that do not initially share signal-meaning 
mappings.  Through repeated exchanges agents experience signal-meaning 
associations, learn them and thereby establish mappings.  Whether or not the 
population of agents as a whole converges on the same mappings indicates if 
conventionalization has taken place. 
 
Given that the ultimate aim of these simulations is to isolate the effects of an 
additional nonarbitrary signaling channel, certain characteristics of this model will 
differ from previous ones.  First, the learning strategy that agents employ is simple 
associational learning – that is, there is no lateral inhibition or other in-built bias for 
one-to-one mappings (the effects of different learning strategies is discussed in depth 
by K. Smith, 2002).  In addition, transmission is horizontal only within a closed group 
of agents.  This design will enable us to understand the separate effects of 
nonarbitrary representations on emergence dynamics when we compare the outcomes 




4.1 Meaning and signal structure 
 
As this model will ultimately be combined with the previous nonarbitrary-based 
model, it will also use binary vectors as meanings.  In this case, we want signals not to 
share any features with meanings.  As such, signals will be strings of alphabetic 
letters.  Even if signals contain multiple bits, however, they will not be analyzed by 
agents as containing discrete units.  Agents will treat signals as holistic units 
regardless of the number or identity of the characters that comprise them. 
 
The number of meanings and signals are both parameters of variation, so the exact 
inventory size for each and ratio between the two will vary depending on the 
simulation.  Baronchelli, Dall'Asta, Barrat & Loreto (2006) have shown that a larger 
number of signals than meanings reduces the possibility for homonymy and aids 
convergence.  Given that arbitrariness allows for many different forms to represent 
any given meaning, this design can include signal inventories that are large compared 
to meaning inventories, which will ensure failure to converge, if it does occur, is not 
the result of an in-built potential for homonymy. 
 
4.2 Communication dynamics 
 
All agents begin simulations with the same inventory of signals with which to send 
messages, but they do not initially have any mappings from signals to meanings – 
neither individually nor shared.  As such, learning is a component of this model.  A 
series of communication events will be simulated in which one agent attempts to 
communicate a certain meaning by choosing and sending a signal to another agent, 
who then attempts to understand the sending agent’s intended meaning based on that 
signal.  Agents have ‘memories’ in which meaning-signal pairs observed during 
communication events are stored with a frequency count.  Each time a pair is 
encountered, the frequency count is increased.  When one of a pair’s component 
signal or meaning is encountered in subsequent exchanges, the probability that the 
complementary component of a stored pair is chosen during the communication 
process (either in signal selection for sending or meaning selection in receiving) is 
proportional to a pair’s frequency count.  That is, the higher a frequency count for a 
given pair, the more likely that the pair will be used to choose a signal or meaning 
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during a communication event that involves its component signal and meaning.  In 
other words, pairs with the strongest association are not guaranteed to be chosen in 
any given exchange, but they have the greatest probability of being chosen, and this 
probability increases as frequency count increases.  This method for meaning and 
signal selection was applied in order to introduce a small level of noise to the model.  
Noise of this sort is usually included in models of language processes and is intended 
to simulate typical aspects of natural communication, such as imperfect memory 
and/or other interference. 
 
Unlike the nonarbitrary model above, agents in this case will not be identical and will 
have unique memories and vocabularies based on what signal and meanings they have 
experienced and learned while participating in communication events.  As a result, it 
will be possible to vary the number of agents in a population to understand how this 
factor affects convergence. 
 
Given the factors and dynamics described above, a communication event will involve 
the following steps: 
 
1. A context is created from the full meaning inventory 
2. A meaning to communicate (MTC) is chosen at random from the 
context 
3. An agent is chosen at random from the population to be a speaker (S) 
4. An agent is chosen at random to be a hearer (H; H ! S) 
5. S sends a signal to convey the MTC 
a. S checks stored knowledge for meaning-signal pair(s) that 
contain MTC 
i. If none are found, S chooses a signal from inventory at 
random 
ii. If some are found, a signal is selected using the method 
described above. 
6. H chooses a meaning from the context 
a. Checks stored knowledge for a meaning-signal pair that 
contains the signal and any meanings from the context 
i. If none found, H chooses a meaning at random from 
context 
ii. If some are found, a meaning is chosen (CM) using the 
method described above. 
7. S and H update their stored knowledge 
a. S: if (signal, MTC) in stored knowledge, increase frequency 
count by 1 
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H: if (signal, CM) in stored knowledge, increase frequency 
count by 1 
b. S: if (signal, MTC) not in stored knowledge, add pair and assign 
frequency count of 1 
H: if (signal, CM) not in stored knowledge, add pair and assign 
frequency count of 1 
 
Note that a consequence of this process is that a given exchange can result in the 
speaker and hearer storing different meaning-signal pairs.  Because there is no error 
feedback, hearers will store their chosen meaning with the observed signal regardless 
of whether it is the correct meaning.  Likewise, speakers do not have access to 
hearers’ choices and will store the pair they initially selected to send regardless of the 
outcome of the communication event.  This simulation will demonstrate if shared 
mappings can arise under these dynamics and under what conditions that occurs. 
 
Through a series of exchanges as described in steps 1-7, agents build vocabularies, 
and these stored vocabularies can then be used to test communicative accuracy.  After 
a simulation of communication and learning is completed, the following process is 
repeated. 
 
1. Steps 1-6 from above 
2. If MTC = CM the communication event is successful 
 
Repeating these steps simulates many communication events between agents that 
have formed vocabularies and in the process keeps track of how many are successful.  
Communicative accuracy is calculated as the proportion of successful communication 
events to total communication events.  Using our standard of 95% accuracy, a result at 
this level or higher indicates that agents can communicate successfully because their 
vocabularies overlap to a large degree.  In other words, this measure of 
communicative accuracy will indicate the extent to which agents share meaning-
signal mappings. 
 
With the model’s structure and dynamics laid out, we can now identify parameters of 
variation.  These include meaning inventory size, signal inventory size, context size, 





A number of different simulations were run varying meaning inventory size and 
signal inventory size along with other variations.  Similar trends were found for 
different meaning-signal inventory ratios, but we will focus on simulations that 
attained the highest communicative accuracy levels.  Figure 5.4 shows the results of a 
simulation with a meaning inventory of 50 and a signal inventory of 264.  These 
results reflect populations that have engaged in 100,000 exchanges, which was the 





















Communicative accuracy reaches 95% only when population size and context size are 
at the lowest level simulated: two meanings and two agents, respectively.  No 
population larger than two agents converged on a shared vocabulary.  The effect of 
population size changes as context size increased.  The difference between accuracy 
levels for population sizes of two and five become more pronounced, rising from 8% 
Figure 5.4  Communicative accuracy by context size for an arbitrary-only 
signaling system with 50 meanings and 264 signals.  Each color represents a 
different populations size. 
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in contexts of two meanings to 25% in contexts of five meanings.  In contrast, the 
difference in accuracy levels between population sizes of five and twenty narrows, 




These results demonstrate that the learning strategy and communicative dynamics 
implemented in this model on their own only support the emergence of effective 
communication, and thereby convergence, in the most limited of circumstances.  We 
can compare the results to Vogt & Coumans (2003) study, which also tested 
convergence outcomes for context sizes greater than one and different population 
sizes.  Their model implemented cross-situational learning and the obverter signaling 
strategy of the type described in Chapter 2 section 4, which are more powerful 
mechanisms for establishing mappings between meanings and signals than the simple 
associational learning and signal selection strategies employed here.  Simulations of 
this model showed that 95% communicative accuracy can be reached when contexts 
contain five meanings for populations of two and six agents, and populations of ten 
agents near this level (approximately 90%).  In comparison, communicative accuracy 
in the current model with the same context size only rose to 75% for a population of 
two agents, and further dropped to 44% with a population of five. 
 
Present results are also in line with what we would expect based on K. Smith’s (2002) 
study.  He showed that, even when context is limited to a single meaning paired with 
a single signal, shared systems do not emerge in populations of agents that learn using 
a simple associational strategy like that applied here.  These simulations demonstrate 
that similar results hold when generational turnover and transfer are not involved, 
though in this case convergence does occur in the very constrained conditions of 
context and population sizes of two. 
 
In relating these results to naturalistic communication, it is clear that a population size 
of two individuals communicating in contexts of only two meanings is not particularly 
realistic.  Even when context size remains relatively small final accuracy levels 
decrease substantially.  Without a grounding mechanism to reduce context sizes or 
other strategies to cope with ambiguity, convergence is not a likely outcome.  Overall, 
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then, the attributes represented in this model do not on their own constitute a robust or 
viable model for convergence.  These results can, however, serve as a baseline for 
comparison to a model that incorporates a grounding mechanism based on 
nonarbitrary representations.  The following section will describe a design that 
combines the two types of communication simulated in this and the preceding model. 
 
5. Model III – Multi-channel heterosemiotic signaling 
 
This model will combine the structure of the two preceding models to determine how 
partial information like that provided by nonarbitrary representations affects 
grounding and convergence.  As in Model II, learning and signal/meaning selection 
based on arbitrary mappings are factors and will be implemented using the same 
methods described above (section 4.3). 
 
5.1 Meaning and signal structure 
 
Like both preceding models, meanings will be binary vectors.  Agents will have two 
inventories of signals with which to construct messages.  One will be a fixed and 
shared inventory of nonarbitrary signals like that described in section 3.2.  The other 
will be a set of arbitrary signals like that described in section 4.2 that are initially 
unassociated with any meanings.  In any given exchange, the agent tasked with 
sending a message will choose a signal of each type and send both together.  
 
5.2 Communication dynamics 
 
Given that both types of signals are included in this model, signal and meaning 
selection combines the two processes above.  A sending agent will choose the 
nonarbitrary signal that most closely represents a meaning and send this along with an 
arbitrary signal chosen based on that agent’s past communication experience (when 
available).  In turn, the agent receiving this composite signal can use the nonarbitrary 
portion to identify the intended meaning or reduce the context by eliminating 
meanings that do not match it.  In addition, the receiving agent can use the arbitrary 




Thus, a given communication event proceeds as follows: 
 
1. A context is created from the full meaning inventory 
2. A meaning to communicate (MTC) is chosen at random from the context 
3. An agent is chosen at random from the population to be a speaker (S) 
4. An agent is chosen at random to be a hearer (H; H ! S) 
5. S sends a composite signal to convey the MTC 
a. Chooses a nonarbitrary signal (Sg1) that matches the corresponding 
portion of the MTC 
b. Chooses an arbitrary signal (Sg2) 
i. Checks stored knowledge for a meaning-(arbitrary)signal pair 
that contains MTC 
1. If no, chooses an arbitrary signal from inventory at 
random 
2. If yes, selects arbitrary signal based on method 
described above (section 4.2) 
6. H chooses a meaning (CM) from the context 
a. Narrowing the context: all meanings that do not match Sg1 are 
removed; if only one meaning remains, this is CM and step 6b is 
skipped. 
b. Chooses meaning from remaining context using Sg2 
i. Checks stored knowledge for a meaning-signal pair that 
contains Sg2 and any meanings from the context 
1. If no, chooses a meaning at random 
2. If yes, selects a chosen meaning (CM) based on method 
described above (section 4.2) 
7. S and H update their stored knowledge 
a. S: if (Sg2, MTC) in stored knowledge, increase frequency count by 1 
H: if (Sg2, CM) in stored knowledge, increase frequency count by 1 
b. S: if (Sg2, MTC) not in stored knowledge, add pair and assign 
frequency count of 1 
H: if (Sg2, CM) not in stored knowledge, add pair and assign frequency 
count of 1 
 
Through a series of exchanges and learning, agents build arbitrary signal 
vocabularies.  The extent to which these vocabularies are shared and convergence has 
taken place can be evaluated by repeating the following process:  
 
1. Steps 1-6 from the arbitrary-only model above (section 4.2)
18
 
2. If MTC = CM the communication event is successful 
 
                                                
18
 Note that nonarbitrary signals are not included in communication events.  Their 
exclusion makes it possible to measure independently the communicative accuracy 
and convergence status of agents’ constructed arbitrary signaling systems. 
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As in the arbitrary-only model, we will consider a communicative success rate of 95% 
as indicating that agents have converged on shared signal-meaning mappings. 
 
As in the arbitrary-only model, agents will not be identical and therefore population 
size is again a parameter to vary in simulations, along with context size, meaning 
inventory size, arbitrary signal inventory size, and nonarbitrary signal-meaning 
overlap and inventory size.  Given the considerations discussed in section 4.4 
regarding ratio of arbitrary signals to meanings, this section will focus on simulations 
with a proportionally large arbitrary signal inventory.  In addition, given the 
considerations regarding information content of nonarbitrary representations, it will 
focus on simulations with six-bit meanings, which will allow a fine-grained analysis 




Figures 5.5 and 5.6 show the communicative accuracy levels attained after 50,000 
exchanges for simulations with 64 six-bit meanings, 264 arbitrary signals and varying 
nonarbitrary signal lengths between four and five bits.  These are shown alongside the 
results for the arbitrary-only model in section 4 (represented in black).  For context 
sizes of two, communicative accuracy reaches 95% for a number of population sizes 
and signal-meaning overlap ratios.  All multi-channel simulations attain this level 
with populations of five, and those with an overlap of 67% and 83% do as well in 
populations of twenty agents.  With context size set to five, simulations with overlap 
ratios of 33% or higher reach 95% in populations of two agents.  For populations of 
five agents, those with a ratio of 50% or higher continue to reach this level.  For 
populations of twenty none reached 95% accuracy, though a simulation with 83% 
overlap was only slightly below at 94.4%. 
 
Another way to look at these results is in how many of the six circumstances possible 
by varying context size and population size convergence was reached.  Convergence 
occurred in the multi-channel model in two out of six with a 17% overlap, three out of 
six with a 33% overlap, four out of six with a 50% overlap and five out of six with 
both a 67% and 83% overlap.  In comparison, communicative accuracy levels indicate 
convergence was reached in the arbitrary-only model for only one in six simulations. 
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Figure 5.5  Multi-channel model results for context size of two and six-bit 
meaning length with varying population sizes.  Colored bars represent 
different nonarbitrary signal overlap ratios from 17-83%.  Arbitrary-only results 
are shown in black. 
The vocabularies of a sample population under similar conditions to the one examined 
in section 4.3 above also differs from the arbitrary model.  For a population of two 
agents and context size of five, 99% of the resulting vocabularies are shared, 
compared with 87% in the arbitrary model.  If we look at words within vocabularies, 
on average between the two agents 63% of the 64 meanings have synonymous 
signals.  In contrast to the arbitrary model, in which a single meaning could have as 
many as eleven synonyms, the highest number of signals mapped to a meaning in this 
model was three.  Finally, if we look at the individual signals, 31% are homonyms 



























Figure 5.6  Multi-channel model results for context size of five and six-bit 
meaning length with varying population sizes.  Colored bars represent 
different nonarbitrary signal overlap ratios from 17-83%.  Arbitrary-only 





















These results demonstrate that incorporating an additional channel of signaling that 
provides information directly related to meanings greatly increases the ability for 
populations to converge on shared arbitrary signal-meaning mappings.  This occurs as 
a result of the context reducing effect of nonarbitrary signals, which in turn enables 
successful grounding for the accompanying arbitrary signals. 
 
Convergence was reached in these simulations in the absence of a bias for one-to-one 
mappings (K. Smith, 2002; Steels & Kaplan, 1998; Vogt & Coumans, 2003) or cross-
situational learning strategies (A.D.M. Smith, 2001; Vogt & Coumans, 2003) 
included in previous studies.  Equipped with only a simple learning strategy of 
association, which on its own cannot reliably instigate convergence (section 4 above; 
K. Smith, 2002), populations of agents eventually converge on shared vocabularies of 
arbitrary signal-meaning mappings.  Thus, we can reason it is the action of the 
accompanying nonarbitrary signals that is responsible for this effect. 
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The vocabularies themselves demonstrate why communicative accuracy is higher than 
the arbitrary model alone.  The agents in Model III do in fact converge on a nearly 
fully shared vocabulary (99% overlap), while those in Model II do not (87%).  There 
are also much lower levels of homonymy and synonymy resulting from Model III 
simulations.  Moreover, agents share the same homonyms and synonyms when they 
do exist, whereas many of these are not shared by agents from Model II simulations.  
Although Model III vocabularies are not optimal communication systems because of 
these ambiguous signals, they are nevertheless effective, as evidenced by 
communicative accuracy rates.  We can assume that the reason effective 
communication is still possible for these populations and not those in Model II is 
because i) agents share the same vocabularies and ii) those vocabularies have 
comparatively much fewer ambiguous signals. 
 
The breakdown of differing levels of nonarbitrary information content in signals 
reveals that this device plays a more complex role than has been shown in the zero 
versus maximum ambiguity conditions modeled previously (Steels & Kaplan, 1998).  
These results show that convergence can still take place when the quantity of 
information in nonarbitrary signals is low to moderate – as low as a 17% overlap in 
some cases (see Figure 5).  Moreover, even when low informational content in 
nonarbitrary signals does not result in full convergence here, it nevertheless increases 
communicative accuracy well above the arbitrary-only base model.  This particularly 
holds for larger context sizes and population sizes, as illustrated in Figure 6.  If we 
consider the combined effects of more sophisticated and additional learning strategies, 
like those implemented in previous models and shown to be employed naturally by 
human learners in behavioural experiments (Smith et al., 2010), the capacity for 
nonarbitrary signaling to enable convergence becomes even greater.  We can reason 
that convergence outcomes would be resilient across a broader range of context sizes 
and population sizes, and more closely reflecting circumstances of real-world 
communication. 
 
One point to address is that these results may appear surprising in light of K. Smith’s 
(2002) finding that agents using the learning strategy modeled here did not converge 
on a shared vocabulary or attain high communicative accuracy.  However, certain 
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differences in population structure and signal-meaning structure can likely account for 
the successful outcome of this model.  First, transmission in K. Smith’s (2002) 
simulations was vertical, with agents receiving a single exposure to a previous agent’s 
signal and meaning pairs, then producing their acquired signal and meaning pairs a 
single time to the next agent.  In the present model, the population of agents remains 
stagnant and transmission is horizontal, which means agents send and receive 
messages repeatedly over time.  It may be that this cumulative process allows shared 
signal-meaning pairs, when they do arise, to be reinforced and strengthened in a way 
that cannot occur through vertical transmission like that modeled by K. Smith.  
Another difference in the models is in the ratio of signal inventory to meaning 
inventory.  In K. Smith’s model, the number of signals is equal to the number of 
meanings, while in the present model the number of signals is greater than meanings 
(by a factor of four).  As described above, a larger ratio of signals to meanings 
decreases the potential for homonymy, which in turns aids the convergence process 
(Baronchelli et al., 2006).  Thus, the greater ratio modeled here may also be in part 
responsible for the observed higher levels of communicative accuracy, and together 
with population structure can account for the difference in results with K. Smith’s 
(2002) model. 
 
These results provide additional support for the idea that symbolic communication 
can be built upon nonarbitrary representations.  The schematized and partial version 
of nonarbitrary representation applied here resembles gestural communication of the 
kind described in Chapter 3 that typically accompanies speech.  This model therefore 
reflects two fundamental aspects of human communication: multimodality and 
heterosemiotic representation distributed between the modalities.  Incorporating these 
features into simulations in itself enabled convergence in a range of circumstances 
and constitutes an additional ecologically and evolutionarily viable mechanism for 
models of convergence.  Present results therefore demonstrates how a natural feature 
of human communication – nonarbitrary representations via gesture – can contribute 
to the emergence of shared symbolic systems and, together with past research, 





6. General discussion 
 
Overall the results of Models I-III support the claim made in Chapter Three that 
nonarbitrary gestures could have provided sufficient grounding for arbitrary 
vocalizations.  Various levels of partial information made available in accompanying 
nonarbitrary representations was shown to be capable of reducing uncertainty to a 
point at which conventionalization of arbitrary sign-meaning mappings could take 
place.  Moreover, this conventionalization occurred through the operation of 
unintentional cultural and communicative processes.  Thus, these findings support the 
broader arguments of this thesis that multimodal communication and nonarbitrary 
representation are powerful explanatory resources for understanding how symbolic 
communication emerged in human evolution. 
 
One assumption of these arguments is that gesture provides the kind and quantity of 
information represented in the nonarbitrary signals of Models I and III.  One avenue 
for future related research would be to verify that natural gestures do in fact enable 
people to correctly identify referents under similar circumstances.  Other recent 
research has shown that computational models and their results can be successfully 
recreated in the laboratory (Kirby, Cornish & Smith, 2008).  Following these efforts, 
it would be possible to similarly design experiments to reflect the dynamics of Model 
III and test what kind of gestures people spontaneously produce, their grounding 
potential and their capacity to underpin conventionalization of arbitrary signs. 
 
Finally, these simulations indicate that there may be new and additional approaches to 
exploring the emergence of shared vocabularies in computational modeling by taking 
into account the particular features of embodied human communication and their 
consequences.  The potential for multiple channels of signaling, different semiotic 
roles of channels and the temporal and semantic relationship between the two open up 
a variety of possible conditions and factors that could influence convergence.  
Investigating these factors will enrich our understanding of conventionalization 
processes and the emergent properties of complex systems generally as well as the 




7.  Conclusion 
 
The simulations presented in this chapter extend findings from previous studies that 
show populations can converge on shared arbitrary signals when those signals are 
sufficiently grounded.  I have shown that incorporating an additional channel of 
signaling that reflects the properties of gestural representation into traditional models 
of symbolic communication enables the emergence of shared vocabularies under a 
range of conditions.  The presence of nonarbitrary signals allows the accompanying 
arbitrary signals to be mapped to the same meanings by agents across populations, 
forming a shared symbolic system that is communicatively functional in its own right.  
These results support the claim made in Chapter 3 of this thesis that the nonarbitrary 
gestures produced in multimodal communication could serve as an in-built grounding 
mechanism for accompanying vocalizations, and together with other cognitive and 







1. Scope of focus and research covered 
 
This thesis set out to investigate the emergence of symbolic communication in human 
evolution.  Given that this question is one rooted in human physical and social 
experience, an embodied perspective was taken in order to frame the issue accurately.  
This approach removes the question from the abstract and situates it in terms of the 
particular causally relevant features of lived human experience. 
In addition to taking an embodied perspective, the question is one that involves 
communicative signs and evolutionary processes, and therefore required the 
incorporation of ideas and principles from semiotics and evolutionary theory.  An 
examination of sign theory indicated that i) interpretation of signs as arbitrarily related 
to their meanings and ii) the conventionalization of those signs between individuals 
are the factors underlying symbolic communication.  As such, an explanation of 
emergence must account for both of these factors.  A plausible evolutionary scenario 
for emergence must also adhere to general evolutionary principles, notably those of 
parsimony and continuity.  It was also shown that one should avoid appealing to 
deliberate invention or purported communicative advantages as spurring the 
development of symbols. 
 
With these ideas in mind, Chapter 2 reviewed and analyzed research on emerging sign 
systems.  Evidence from experimental sign studies and emerging sign languages show 
that communication is established through nonarbitrary signs.  Furthermore, results 
indicate that symbolic reinterpretations of these early signs do not arise via intentional 
creation by individuals, but instead nonarbitrary signs become symbolic when they 
are transmitted to others who did not participate in their creation and development.  
These results thus further support the argument that an explanation for the emergence 
should first explore the potential for ‘blind’, unintentional forces to instigate the 
interpretation of signs as symbolic before implicating the insight of users or other 
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Emerging sign systems research also spoke to the issue of conventionalization.  A 
review of computational models simulating the construction of shared symbolic 
vocabularies across populations showed that mechanisms must be present to establish 
and maintain joint attention.  Joint attention is what provides interlocutors access to 
each other’s intended meanings when no information is available in a sign’s form and 
thereby enables the grounding of arbitrary symbols.  Thus, it was determined that an 
explanation for the conventionalization component of the emergence of symbols must 
account for a mechanism or mechanism by which novel symbols could be grounded 
in this way and adopted across a population. 
 
Chapter 3 applied the general processes identified in Chapter 2 to the specific case of 
symbolic communication in human evolution.  Human communication takes place 
predominantly through the vocal and gestural modalities, and these modalities have 
distinct semiotic capacities.  While both in theory are equal in capacity for arbitrary 
representation, gesture has a greater capacity for nonarbitrary representation than 
vocalization.  Gestures can be used to richly and more precisely depict a wider variety 
of referents than vocalizations, and these asymmetrical semiotic capacities are 
mirrored in the complementary functions the modalities serve in typical 
communication.  The vocal modality is the dominant channel for symbolic 
communication, while gestures are primarily used for nonarbitrary representation.  
Reviewed research also showed that vocal symbolic communication does not occur in 
isolation but is instead tightly temporally and semantically coupled with 
simultaneously produced nonarbitrary gestures.  Because symbols are psychologically 
and communicatively intertwined with bodily signs in this way, the question of 
emergence was reframed as one of how the specific multimodal, heterosemiotic 
speech-gesture system observed today arose.  In addition, the particular qualities of 
vocal versus gestural representation have implications for interpretation and 
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 This is not to imply that communicators’ actions would not be deliberate in the 
sense that individuals intentionally attempt to be understood in any given act of 
communication.  It is on the cultural, population level at which the feasibility of 
deliberate actions becomes untenable – that is, communicators deliberately 
coordinating to create a conventional, symbolic vocabulary. 
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conventionalization processes, and the explanatory potential of these qualities was 
taken into consideration in the remainder of the chapter that addressed the question of 
emergence directly. 
 
2. A theory of emergence 
 
Existing theories of emergence were reviewed and critiqued according to the ideas 
presented in this thesis.  Taken together, these proposals were shown not to address 
sufficiently the question of emergence in terms of the critical factors of interpretation 
and conventionalization, either by omission or implicit appeals to evolutionarily 
and/or psychologically unviable mechanisms.  I then argued that theoretical gaps and 
problematic scenarios could be resolved by mining the explanatory potential of 
embodied communication and sign interpretation processes.  First, the predominance 
of symbolic vocalizations would be a natural consequence of interpretation processes, 
as the vocal modality’s lower capacity for nonarbitrary representation relative to that 
of gesture would translate into more vocalizations being interpreted as arbitrary and 
symbolic.  Second, the reinterpretation and subsequent conventionalization of novel 
symbols could take place in normal communicative and transmission processes.  
These new arbitrary vocalizations would have an organic, in-built grounding 
mechanism available in the simultaneously produced semantically related 
nonarbitrary gestures.  The presence of gesture would thus enable interlocutors to 
identify correctly each other’s intended messages and thereby create the opportunity 
for the accompanying vocalizations to be interpreted correctly and adopted as shared 
symbols.  This scenario represents a more comprehensive and theoretically 
satisfactory explanation as it i) takes into account a more accurate characterization of 
embodied human communication and ii) does not require additional pressures for 
symbols or the innovation and insight of individuals in order for a coupled symbolic 
vocal and nonarbitrary gesture system like that observed in modern behavior to 
emerge.  In this way, it maximizes the explanatory potential of taking an embodiment 






3. Empirical contribution 
 
These claims rest on certain assumptions regarding i) how the vocal and gestural 
components of multimodal utterances are interpreted and processed, and ii) the ability 
for information like that made available in gesture to adequately ground arbitrary 
signs.  Chapter 4 described experiments undertaken to test whether multimodal 
messages similar to the novel arbitrary-vocal plus nonarbitrary-gestural combinations 
used in the purported context of emergence are processed as a psychologically unified 
whole as speech and gesture utterances are in language today.  Results indicate that 
such unified processing still occurs under these conditions, with participants attending 
to and learning vocalizations that are largely uninformative relative to co-occurring 
gestures.  These findings suggest that novel arbitrary vocalizations would be attended 
to, learned and adopted through typical communicative processes without the need for 
additional pressures favoring vocal symbols.  Chapter 5 described a series of 
computational simulations designed to model heterosemiotic multimodal 
communication and test the capacity for nonarbitrary signals of varying informational 
content to ground paired arbitrary signals, and thereby enable populations to converge 
on shared vocabularies through cultural processes alone.  Results showed that 
nonarbitrary signals in isolation – that is, without the additional aid of more 
sophisticated learning and signaling strategies – can sufficiently reduce uncertainty 
and allow agents to correctly identify each other’s intended meanings, which in turn 
allows arbitrary signals to conventionalize across a population of agents.  These 
findings suggest that nonarbitrary gestures, together with other known mechanisms 
that support grounding, represent a robust model for the conventionalization of 
symbols.  This model is constituted by factors inherent to the communicative process 
itself and would be in operation during normal transmission dynamics.  As such, it 
avoids implicating additional and/or intention-based forces in order to explain how 
shared arbitrary signs could arise and therefore represents an evolutionarily and 
psychological plausible explanation. 
 
4. Theoretical contribution 
 
By explaining how symbolic communication could emerge out of ‘blind’ 
interpretation and transmission processes inherent to typical communicative 
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dynamics, the arguments made in this thesis remove the need to identify additional 
pressures and conditions in human evolution that would have spurred the 
development of symbols.  That is, given the preconditions of bodily mimesis and 
related capacities, it is possible for conventional vocal symbols to arise through 
natural communicative and cultural processes alone.  This line of reasoning highlights 
the capacity for bodily mimesis as a critical juncture in human evolution, one that 
both represents a major biological and cultural change from precedents and also has 
substantial and far-reaching ramifications for the potential subsequent development 
and elaboration of resulting communicative systems.  Doing so allows us to focus our 
attention and research efforts on identifying the causes behind this seminal event in 
human history.  In addition, the position argued for in this thesis provides a 
foundation for other research areas that take as a starting point conventional symbolic 
communication. 
 
5. Future research 
 
Finally, the central ideas of this thesis point to a number of new avenues of research.  
Areas that can be explored include: more precisely measuring the capacity for 
nonarbitrary gestures to convey messages of varying complexity and types of 
meaning; experimentally testing in the lab which transmission dynamics spur a 
transition from nonarbitrary to arbitrary signs (assuming the analysis of previous 
experiments presented in Chapter 2); experimentally testing in the lab the processes 
and mechanisms by which novel arbitrary signs become conventionalized; testing 
whether modifications of the experimental conditions tested in Chapter 4 produce 
results like those for speech and gesture demonstrating beneficial memory effects for 
multimodal over unimodal utterances; and, if these beneficial effects hold, exploring 
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COORDINATED MULTI-MODAL EXPRESSION AND EMBODIED 
MEANING IN THE EMERGENCE OF SYMBOLIC COMMUNICATION  
 
J. ERIN BROWN 
Language Evolution and Computation, PPLS, The University of Edinburgh, 3 Charles 
Street, Edinburgh EH8, UK 
The study of language evolution has a long tradition of connecting gestures to 
language origins (Condillac, 1746; Hewes, 1973).  Modern theories point to gesture as 
the solution to a central problem: the emergence of symbolic communication. 
Prominent versions (Arbib, 2005; Corballis, 2002; Tomasello, 2008) share three 
critical features: i) early forms of communication consisted of pointing and 
pantomiming; ii) these gestures then became conventionalised and arbitrary, or 
symbolic; iii) at some point, the symbolic channel ‘switched’ and vocalisations 
became the dominant channel for symbolic communication.  I agree that i) is a 
plausible stage in language evolution but contend that points ii) and iii) are less likely, 
as they do not follow the evolutionary principles of parsimony and continuity, nor do 
they provide a satisfactory explanation for the relationship between speech and 
gesture as it exists today (McNeill, 2005).  In addition, arguments for this scenario 
rely on questionable assumptions regarding early hominid gestural and vocal abilities, 
the vocal channel’s greater potential for creating arbitrary symbols and the role of 
speech in the instruction of manufacturing techniques. 
 
Although these accounts recognise the powerful representational potential of gesture 
and consider the advantages of an additional, distinct modality of communication, 
they do not appear to fully appreciate the synergistic potential of both modalities 
together nor the limitations of a single modality on its own.  If mimetic gestures 
became symbolic as postulated, the power of their ‘natural’ meaning would have been 
lost.  Moreover, distributing meaning expression between symbolic and nonarbitrary 
forms provides cognitive and communicative benefits in language production and 
comprehension (Goldin-Meadow et al., 2001; Kelly et al., 1999), an advantage that 
would be sacrificed if gestures transitioned into arbitrary symbols.  Though it is not 
claimed nonarbitrary gestures disappeared during this transition, this scenario does 
not allow for the same simultaneous nonarbitrary-and-arbitrary signaling distributed 
across modalities that would enable the cognitively demanding task of forming 
symbols. 
 
Another problem for these theories is the ‘switch’ to vocalisations as the dominant 
vehicle for symbolic communication.  If a symbolic gestural system arose, it would 
have been hugely advantageous and caused evolutionary forces to move toward 
manual signed language, thus making it very unlikely for speech to evolve (Emmorey, 
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2005). In addition, an evolutionary scenario in which signaling types shift between 
modalities entails multiple and significant evolutionary transitions. 
 
A careful consideration of gesture research and the nonarbitrary nature of human 
communication can contribute substantially to our understanding of language origins.  
The representational power of gesture alone is not sufficient to explain how arbitrary 
forms came to carry meaning, as claimed in current gestural origins theories.  It is the 
coordinated multimodality of human expression that provides the opportunity for 
bodily manifestations of meaning to be transferred to co-occurring vocal signals.  If 
nonarbitrary gestures co-occurred with vocalisations early in hominid history, it 
presents an opportunity for sounds to become symbolic while preserving gesture’s 
‘natural’ meaning and retaining the cognitive and communicative benefits of 
gesturing.  In this view, symbols arose in the modality in which they still occur today, 
thus obviating a ‘switch’ in symbolic channel in the course of human evolution. 
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